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U.S. BEEF QUOTA CUT HURTS LOCAL INDUSTRY

Canberra THE AUSTRALIAN in English 5 Sep 83 p 3

[Article by Nigel Austin]

[Text]

AUSTRALIA'S beef industry is facing yet another trauma because exports to the lucrative United States market have been curtailed until next year after the Americans restricted the quota to 272,000 tonnes.

The latest crisis is expected to result in lower cattle prices, forced closure of some abattoirs and reduced domestic beef prices, the chairman of the Australian Meat Exporters federal council, Mr Kevin Bowtell, said yesterday.

Mr Bowtell said cattle prices started to fall towards the end of last week. They would continue to fall, and remain depressed for the next two months.

He said Australian consumers already received high-quality red meat at lower prices than the rest of the world. This would continue because export prospects in our three main markets, the United States, Korea and Japan were poor.

The oversupply of lamb and rock-bottom prices were other factors working against the beef industry in Australia.

After the US restrictions in August, the Australian Meat and Livestock Corporation allowed the sale of another 40,000 tonnes of beef with the prospect of further sales.

Hardship

But exporters immediately stopped buying cattle and cut

back on processing last week when it became clear Australia had reached the 272,000 tonnes US limit, Mr Bowtell said.

"Because the US is our highest-priced and most important market, any restriction in exports will have a detrimental effect on saleyard prices in Australia.

"Luckily, bumper seasonal conditions throughout Australia until the end of the year will result in farmers holding on to cattle and prevent prices from falling drastically."

The last Japanese beef tender until December, for shipments in the first half of the Japanese shipping year would be announced this week, compounding export marketing problems.

Mr Bowtell criticised the new export inspection charges raised by 200 per cent in the Budget, for causing unnecessary hardship for the industry when it was already at its lowest ebb for many years.

He said other factors working against the beef industry were the poor image of red meat compared with white and the high costs of production — from the farm gate and the high costs of production — from the farm gate through processing and on to ships.

The longer-term future for the beef industry is little better with big problems in the US likely to continue to depress Australia's industry.

A large jump in US dairy cattle slaughter was expected to compete directly against

Australian beef exports. Worse, the sharp increase in domestic slaughter, caused by summer heatwaves, was forcing US domestic prices down.

The Australian Meat and Livestock Corporation said last week the high US slaughter rate was pressuring the whole beef industry and beef stocks were 10 to 15 per cent higher than average because the unusually hot weather meant people ate less.

Mr Bowtell's grim predictions come on the eve of the Cattlemen's Union annual conference, which starts in Queensland today.

Producers are expected to demand improved marketing and urgent reform of the administration of the red meat industry. It is anticipated the Minister for Primary Production, Mr Kerin, will make an announcement about the industry's reform when he opens the conference.

CSO: 4200/108

DECLINE REPORTED IN WORKERS JOINING UNIONS

Canberra THE AUSTRALIAN in English 5 Sep 83 p 3

[Article by David Trounce]

[Text]

UNIONS have lost control over the majority of workers, according to figures from the Australian Bureau of Statistics.

Workforce membership of unions has dropped below 50 per cent for the first time since figures were recorded in 1976.

The decline, although only marginal, shows that the number of employees joining unions has dropped from 51 per cent in 1976 to 49 per cent last year.

The bureau's figures show there were 2,512,700 members of unions in 1976 and 2,567,600 in May last year.

The figures were issued at the weekend by the research division of the Victorian Ethnic Affairs Commission, which has analysed them further to give details of union membership according to sex, marital status and country of origin.

The Minister for Ethnic Affairs, Mr Spyker, said yesterday the only significant growth area in union membership appeared to be with mi-

grant women.

In the case of Yugoslav women, the membership rate was 74 per cent, compared with 48 per cent for Australian-born women.

Italian women had increased their membership rate from 62 to 67 per cent, and Greek women had increased theirs from 55 to 71 per cent.

For both men and women, the Australian-born proportion had dropped from 50 per cent to 48.

The British-Irish combined rate had dropped from 54 to 48 per cent, belying the belief that there has been an influx of British union influence.

Mr Spyker said the commission would use the figures to encourage migrants to take a more representative role in union leadership.

"The commission will obviously have to work more closely with trade unions to ensure that non-English speaking unionists have equal access to their services and problems," he said.

CSO: 4200/108

MAJOR OIL FIND IN TIMOR SEA REPORTED

Canberra THE AUSTRALIAN in English 2 Sep 83 p 11

[Article by David Erskine]

[Text]

BHP has made what appears to be a major oil find in the Timor Sea off the Northern Territory coast with its Jabiru 1A well.

With a potential of 200 million barrels of recoverable oil, it could be the largest discovery since the Fortescue field in the late 1970s.

It is still early days in the well's drilling program, but initial results have been extremely encouraging.

But BHP cautioned that the economic significance of the oil bearing zone awaits further testing.

Wireline logs have confirmed the presence of hydrocarbons over the interval 1394m-1651m — which could mean an oil payzone of up to 57m — believed to be near the top of the Jurassic sandstone.

Structure

The company said yesterday that the well tested oil from two zones. Further testing is continuing and another announcement is expected today.

A repeat formation test (RFT), at a depth of 1639m, recovered 2200 cu cm of oil along with 1200 cc of water and 3.2 cu ft of gas.

And a second RFT at a depth of 1647.2m recovered 2500 cc of oil along with 750 cc of water and 3.4 cu ft of gas.

But it is the best start the company could have hoped for, especially since it had so many technical problems when it first drilled on the structure.

BHP is sinking the well at sole risk under a farm-in agreement. It had to abandon the original well in

early August, after spending \$6 million, and move the rig about 150m south east to start again.

With a programmed total depth of 3200m, Jabiru 1A, which is being drilled in permit NT-P26 by the semi-submersible drilling rig Ocean Digger, has a number of further potential traps to test which could further increase the find's potential.

Seismic tests have indicated a structure which extends 2500 ha, which compares favorably with some of the Bass Strait fields.

If the zone tested yesterday were filled with oil throughout most of the structure — and only further drilling could determine that — it could mean recoverable reserves of at least 200 million barrels.

And discovery of further oil zones deeper in the well could take this figure to over 500 million barrels.

Only production testing of the Jabiru 1A, followed by further appraisal drilling, will give a firm indication of potential recoverable oil.

Located about 300km off the Australian coast in the Timor Sea, and 640 km from Darwin, the Jabiru find is fairly isolated.

Water depths of 119m mean development using conventional technology will be possible.

After the well is completed the ownership of the permit will be: BHP (operator) 50 per cent; Citco 18.75 per cent; Norcen 12.5 per cent; Weeks Australia 10.31 per cent; Ampol Exploration 6.25 per cent and Noranda and Brenda Petroleum 1.1 per cent each.

WESTERN AUSTRALIA OIL WELL FLOW RECORDED

Perth THE WEST AUSTRALIAN in English 6 Sep 83 p 52

[Text] THE Bambra No. 2 well, about 20km northeast of Barrow Island in WA's Canning Basin, has flowed oil at a partially stabilised rate of 880 barrels a day during a drill-stem test between 2037 and 2038.5 metres.

Bond Corp, which has a 27 per cent stake in the well, said yesterday that the flow was accompanied by a flow of 1720 barrels of water.

The company said the gas-oil ratio was more than 56.63 cubic metres a barrel and oil gravity was 38 deg API.

A further drill stem test through perforations between 2032m and 2033.5m will be reported on later this week.

The find is in the same shallow Barrow-group sands as the recent discoveries in the region by the Mesa joint-venturers in their South Pepper, North Herald and Chervil wells.

Besides Bond Corp, interests in the well are Australia Occidental Pty Ltd (27 per cent), Getty Oil Development (17 per cent), Texas Eastern Australia Inc (10 per cent), Reading and Bates Australian Petroleum Co (8.5 per cent), Pontoon Oil and Minerals NL (7.5 per cent) and Pelsart Oil NL (5 per cent).

In another development yesterday, the partners in the Chookoo No. 1 well in South Australia's Naccowlah block of ATP 259P announced the existence of an oil reservoir below the previously reported gas discovery in the top of the Hutton sandstone.

Partner, Delhi Petroleum Pty Ltd yesterday reported oil flows of 513 barrels a day accompanied by 13,594 cubic metres of gas between 1721 M and 1724m, considerably upgrading the potential of the north-eastern section of the Naccowlah block.

Open-hole testing of the late Jurassic Adori sandstone and West-bourne formation between 1594 m and 1634m and between 1596m and 1599m failed to recover significant hydrocarbons. After casing operations, Cookoo No. 1, located about 30km north-west of the Jackson and Jackson South fields, will be completed from the Hutton sandstone.

BRIEFS

COASTAL WATCH CONCERN--IMPROVEMENTS to the surveillance of WA's northern coast are overdue, State Parliament has been told. The Premier Mr Burke, said that in a submission to the Commonwealth the WA Government proposed a coastal surveillance control centre and defence facilities in the north. A system of satellite coverage should also be studied as a long-term alternative. An effective surveillance was essential to prevent smuggling, illegal landings and fishing and for improved quarantine and defence purposes, he said. Mr Burke was replying to questions from the Pilbara MLA Mrs Pam Buchanan (Lab). To a question from Mr Mike Barnett (Lab, Rockingham) the Premier said that the P150 locally-built patrol boat was suggested in the submission as suitable for inshore patrol duties on the northern coast line. The Federal Minister assisting the Minister for Defence, Mr Beazley, is reviewing the Commonwealth's coastal surveillance system. [Text] [Perth THE WEST AUSTRALIAN in English 25 Aug 83 p 28]

DISARMAMENT FUNDING--THE Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Hayden, said yesterday Australia would make a \$50,000 contribution to international disarmament activities this financial year. This will involve a \$30,000 contribution to the World Disarmament Campaign (WDC) and \$20,000 to the United Nations Institute of Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). Mr Hayden said the contributions would be used to promote greater public awareness and understanding of peace, disarmament and arms control issues. Provision for the \$50,000 was made in the 1983-84 budget and is additional to the contribution to the regular budget of the United Nations. The WDC aims to generate public understanding and support for the UN's disarmament objectives, while UNIDIR is an autonomous institution working with the UN Department of Disarmament Affairs, to undertake independent research on disarmament and related security issues. [Text] [Sydney THE AUSTRALIAN in English 29 Aug 83 p 3]

NATIONAL DEBT--PUSHED along by increased federal and State government spending programs, the national debt ballooned by \$5538 million last financial year to \$39,128 million. That is the equivalent of \$2445 for every Australian--an increase of \$346 per person, or 16.5 per cent in just one year. Figures for the national debt at June 30 last were issued late last night after the 81st meeting of the National Debt Commission in Canberra. The commission considered its report for the 1982-83 year on the national debt sinking fund and determined the funds available for the commission in 1983-84. Members of the commission are the Treasurer, Mr Keating, the Chief Justice, Sir Harry Gibbs, the

Treasury secretary, Mr John Stone, the Reserve Bank governor, Mr R. A. Johnston, the Attorney-General's Department secretary, Mr P. Brazil, and the States' representative from NSW, Mr N.Oakes. In a statement after the meeting, the Treasurer said that taking into account debt issued last year represented by government securities on issue, there had been a net increase last year. The domestic component of the debt issued on behalf of the Federal Government and the States increased by \$3971 million or 14 per cent to \$32,209 million. The total debt, national and foreign, was up \$5538 million or 16.5 per cent to \$39.128 million. [Article by Ian Perkin] [Text] [Sydney THE AUSTRALIAN in English 30 Aug 83 p 1]

FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES--Earlier reports of capital flowing into Australia were confirmed yesterday by Reserve Bank figures showing that the country's gold and foreign exchange reserves rose by \$158 million to \$11,174 million in the week to August 24. When account is taken of Australia's usual current account deficit this points to weekly capital inflow of more than \$200 million. Unofficial reports indicate that there has been a further net inflow in the last few trading days, a development which has helped keep money market rates down. [Text] [Sydney THE SYDNEY MORNING HERALD in English 30 Aug 83 p 18]

CSO: 4200/6005

EMIL SALIM PREDICTS CONTINUATION OF NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE IMPASSE

Jakarta SINAR HARAPAN in Indonesian 8 Sep 83 p 11

[Text] Jakarta, 6 September-- Prof Dr Emil Salim, minister of state for population and the environment, states that at the present stage of the North-South dialogue each side is holding firmly to its own view and perception. Meanwhile, each of the parties is in the grip of an overall economic crisis. Therefore, the present impasse in the dialogue will continue under existing conditions.

Minister Emil Salim said that the impasse in the dialogue may continue for as long as both sides concentrate their attention on the effort to find a formula which can be accepted by them for establishing new, overall rules of the game for the global economic system.

According to Emil Salim, this effort to find a formula must continue to be made. And this effort will produce results when the countries in the southern half of the world increase their economic capacities and are able to take a more respected position in the global economy. He said: "Therefore, it is our duty to continue to find new paths and new forums to continue the dialogue."

Divided Up

In his speech which was presented at the "Alpbach International Symposium on Economic Policy" recently in Alpbach, Austria, Prof Emil Salim expressed the view that such a dialogue can become more fruitful if it is divided into smaller components. This will help the dialogue to move in more concrete and more realistic directions. At the same time the results which can be achieved at the more detailed level finally can help to bring about a solution at the overall level.

Therefore it is very important to encourage bilateral dialogues between individual national units from the North and the South. The problems and the interests of the respective countries can be discussed more openly and in more concrete a fashion. The purpose of this effort should be to find solutions to the respective economic problems while calculating the impact of such activity on the economies of both sides to the dialogue.

The respective economies have special problems. The industrialized countries are facing the problem of unemployment while the restructuring of their economies is going forward. Over a longer period of time the industrialized countries will also be facing the entry of young workers into the labor market, while older workers become eligible for retirement.

It is here that a possibility will open up to adjust the economies of the developed countries to the economies of the developing countries, through a process of structural adaptation of their respective economies. Over a longer period of time, younger workers need to be trained and directed to handle forms of economic activity different from those handled by workers at present, more specifically toward economic activity in which their country has a comparative advantage which will be more beneficial in the future.

Difficult to Avoid

In another part of his speech, Minister Emil Salim said that it was rather difficult to avoid having our perception of the world economy greatly influenced by what we hope our domestic economy can do for us.

Such hopes are influenced by a priori and even ideological considerations, as well as by past historical experience.

The view of the developing countries on the role of their domestic economies are colored by special problems related to their backward conditions. These include the shortage of capital and a low level of savings, as well as a shortage of skills in so large a labor market and low levels of productivity. And above all else, this view is influenced by the poverty which grips a large proportion of their people, poverty with all of its consequences, such as low economic productivity and an inability to mobilize fully their sources of wealth.

Countries like these will pursue the objective of reducing poverty and will try to ensure achievement of social welfare for their people who are in the grip of misery. The effort to achieve social justice and equality will often be given priority over pragmatic considerations of their interests and economic calculations. At the same time such an attitude may be considered a kind of investment in the future, Emil Salim said.

The industrialized countries have already achieved a level of welfare and social justice demanded by their people. It seems that this level has been achieved without assigning it a particularly high priority. This level has been reached over a rather long period of time, and this process, for the most part, has been assisted by the exploitation of their colonial possessions scattered throughout the world. This has caused paralysis in the development and emancipation of these colonial territories in the past.

Over the Short Term

The developing countries do not have such advantages at present, and they also won't have as much time available to them as was previously available for the

development of the industrialized countries. The developing countries must develop themselves now, over an increasingly short period of time, and, at the same time, their policies for improving levels of welfare must have the highest priority in their development plans.

On the other hand, in the industrialized countries at the present time, expenditures for the people's welfare have constrained government budgets. On the one hand it has become increasingly difficult, from a political point of view, to reduce the welfare budget. On the other hand, excessive government expenditures are regarded as the primary cause of the emergence of the present economic crisis. Therefore, in many countries in the northern half of the world, there is a tendency in the direction of a new form of conservatism, in the direction of decreasing government interference, and participation by the government in the domestic economies is tending to become smaller.

A form of conservatism which emphasizes greater economic freedom (*laissez faire*) and greater dependence on the market mechanism has become the major slogan in an increasing number of industrialized countries in the northern part of the world. These slogans have also been urged on the developing countries. However, when national interests are affected, there is no doubt that there will be no hesitation in bringing about government intervention in trade and financial matters and in erecting trade barriers and in taking steps for the protection of their economies.

This ambivalent and contradictory attitude, and the demands by northern countries for stereotyped solutions based on mistaken views regarding the global situation add to the flames of frustration in the developing countries.

Stereotyped Solutions

One such stereotyped solution is demanding the full adoption of the principle of "comparative advantage." Indeed, this truly is important and meaningful advice. However, the problem now is that most of the developing countries cannot take full advantage of their "comparative advantages" because the supporting structure, such as the possibility of access to the markets of the world, of access to the capital market, of developing the necessary skills, and of obtaining the necessary technology and information--all of this structure is under attack, and obstacles are placed in the way of obtaining these needs. Trade barriers are very easy to erect, and the flow of capital can very easily be limited by the industrialized countries. And in every maneuver involving money, he who has the money most often has the most advantageous position and can most effectively influence the market mechanism and prices.

In addition, the principle of "comparative advantage" at times can be an obstacle in itself. For Sri Lanka, for example, this means that it is committed to a tea export economy for a long time. If Japan had held to this principle after World War II, and if it had not taken a daring leap into the future, Japan could not have become the economic giant and electronics industry that it now is.

5170

CSO: 4213/9

AQUINO'S ASSASSINATION BLAMED ON POLITICAL FANATICISM

Surabaya SURABAYA POST in Indonesian 23 Aug 83 p 6

[Editorial: "The Danger of Fanaticism"]

[Text] The assassination of the main leader of the opposition in the Philippines was shocking and saddening, yet it serves to remind us all of the danger of political fanaticism or of any kind of fanaticism. Assassination, as an act of political ambition or fanaticism, does not solve any problems and can mark the beginning of an even greater tragedy.

Whatever the motivation of the people involved, be it democracy, security, stability or something else, if they have become fanatical about the issue then they can easily lose their sense of balance, propriety and caution and bring harm to themselves and others, and even to the people and the state. And if fanaticism is opposed by fanaticism the situation becomes even worse.

Political assassinations can occur in the Philippines, in other developing countries, and even in advanced countries. But the effects of a political assassination in a developing country can be more serious than in an advanced country, particularly if political, social and economic stability have not yet been achieved. We pray that our ASEAN brothers in the Philippines will be able to overcome this great and present danger, and we note that if this matter is to be resolved it will require the utmost political maturity on the part of all the country's leaders, both those within the government and those outside.

It is clear that this tragic event must be used as a lesson to strengthen our awareness of the danger of political fanaticism to the Philippines and to all of the world, including Indonesia.

5458

CSO: 4213/570

SUDHARMONO EXPLAINS 'REGENERATION'

Jakarta PELITA in Indonesian 3 Sep 83 pp 1, 11

[Excerpts] Jakarta, PELITA--Minister/State Secretary Sudharmono, attorney, cautioned that the word "regeneration" not be equated to "passing the baton," as it is known in relay races.

"In a relay race, a runner hands the baton to the next runner at a specified distance, but in the context of regeneration of the nation we must understand it as something natural," he said to participants in the Expanded Plenary DPP-KNPI [Central Executive Committee-National Congress of Indonesian Students] Conference at the Headquarters for Higher Education in Cibubur yesterday.

The minister/state secretary asked that young people understand regeneration as motivation to study hard and extensively, so that they will be ready when the moment to take leadership arrives naturally. Regeneration will take place naturally. "But do not see it as though this minister must be replaced by....," he emphasized, referring by name to several KNPI leaders standing at his side.

He also asked that regeneration not be understood narrowly, that is, merely in connection with government. He said that, actually, regeneration will take place in all areas of national life. "Therefore, the important thing for you is to prepare yourselves. Study so that you will be mature and ready," he declared.

He also noted that if specific positions are considered the number of jobs is very small. "The most prepared will have the right to take them," he stated, repeatedly stressing the need for young people to study and to train and not to give up when they meet obstacles.

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CS0: 4213/12

DIPLOMATIC POST TO PHILIPPINES STILL VACANT

Jakarta TEMPO in Indonesian 10 Sep 83 p 12

[Article: "Finding the Right Man"]

[Text] Relations between Indonesia and the Philippines are considered "very good." However, the post of Indonesian ambassador to the Philippines is still vacant.

When asked for his views on developments in the Philippines since the murder of Benigno Aquino, Sutopo Yuwono, the former chief of BAKIN [Intelligence Coordinating Body] and now governor of the National Defense Institute, stated last week, among other things: "It is very difficult to know much about developments there." The reason is that the post of Indonesian ambassador to the Philippines is now vacant.

The post of Indonesian ambassador to the Philippines has been allowed to remain vacant for about 1 year. The Indonesian Embassy, which is located on Salcedo Street in Makati, Manila, has no one to fill the office of ambassador. Since Ambassador Leo Lopulisa was called back to Jakarta last year, the position of chief of the Indonesian mission in Manila has been held by Ronny H. Kurniadi.

By itself this situation invites questions. The post of ambassador to a country which is a fellow member of ASEAN and which has Class A-1 status among Indonesian embassies abroad is considered very important by the government. Why is so important a post allowed to remain vacant for months?

Interviewed at his residence on Monday [5 September], Minister of Foreign Affairs Mochtar Kusumaatmadja gave a short answer to a TEMPO representative. "The post of Indonesian ambassador to the Philippines is still vacant because it is very difficult to find a person suitable for an ASEAN country and a neighboring country which has very close relations with Indonesia."

A TEMPO source has stated that the post of Indonesian ambassador to Manila has deliberately been left vacant as an indication of the attitude of the Indonesian government toward the way Manila handled the "Leo Lopulisa case." This case came up at the beginning of 1982 after Ambassador Leo, who had only been in his post for 3 months, was stated by Philippine Minister of Foreign Affairs Romulo to have left him "very unhappy" because of a question by Ambassador Leo which was regarded as "improper interference" in the Sabah question.

Romulo's anger was based on a statement made by Ambassador Leo when he was interviewed by the Philippine daily newspaper, BULLETIN TODAY. In that interview, among other things, Ambassador Leo suggested that the Philippine Government issue an official statement abandoning its claim to Sabah, which had been approved by the Philippine National Assembly. This should be done, according to Ambassador Leo, to open the way for harmonious relations with Malaysia.

Ambassador Leo was later called back to Jakarta for explanations. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs later declared that what Leo had stated "did not reflect the attitude of the Indonesian Government on the Sabah question."

It seems that what made Jakarta angry was the way in which Minister of Foreign Affairs Romulo reprimanded the Indonesian ambassador, particularly in so open a fashion. According to a TEMPO source, this was regarded as "not in accordance with the spirit of ASEAN." Therefore, as a "protest," the post of ambassador to the Philippines was temporarily left vacant.

Is there another matter which made Jakarta feel annoyed? We don't know. Pacifico A. Castro, Philippine deputy foreign minister, himself stated to a TEMPO representative in Manila last week that he hoped the post could quickly be filled. He said: "We are waiting for a new ambassador." However, the absence of an Indonesian ambassador in Manila is regarded by Castro as "not harmful to good relations between the two countries."

5170

CSO: 4213/11

TIGHTER CONTROLS ON USE OF FOREIGN WORKERS

Jakarta KOMPAS in Indonesian 7 Sep 83 pp 1, 5

[Text] In order to accelerate the program for the Indonesianization of manpower, the government will place tighter controls on the supervision and use of foreign workers in Indonesia. Also, extensions of permits that allow companies to employ foreign workers will not be renewed when they expire.

Engr Drs Danang D. Joedonagoro, the director general for manpower placement and management at the Department of Manpower, told newsmen in Jakarta on Tuesday that Manpower Minister Sudomo had asked that tighter controls be placed on the use of foreign workers.

Controls will be tightened on the types of jobs that can be given to foreign nationals, and in checking for various types of violations that may have been committed by foreign workers.

He said that there are about 18,000 foreign workers in Indonesia at the present time. The presence of such a large number of foreign workers does not mean that no foreign workers have left Indonesia since the program for the Indonesianization of manpower began; rather, this large presence is due to the fact that new workers have come in to work on new projects.

Control Measures

The director general did not specify the types of control measures that will be taken by the government. "But one important measure is that permit extensions will be stopped. This is one form of tighter control," he said.

Regarding possible violations in the use of foreign workers, he said: "There is not much of this. And where it has been found there have been only one or two cases."

Two of the more common violations occur when a foreign national takes a job in Indonesia while here on a tourist visa, and when a company, by hiring a foreign national, fails to comply with the stipulations in the permit issued to it by the government.

Danang said that since the beginning of the year the government has enforced tighter controls to prevent violations of this sort. Also, the fine that an offender is subject to was raised from \$1,000 per worker to \$4,000 per worker in January. "The intention here is to provide a disincentive for businessmen who do not follow the rules in employing foreign workers. In the end it is the company that must pay," he said.

Training Course

Yesterday the director general opened a training course for appraisers. The course is being attended by 35 persons from various Indonesian appraisal firms and several government agencies, and it is being held to upgrade the skills of Indonesian employees of appraisal firms. Funds for the course are obtained from the education and training assessment, which is a component of the program for the Indonesianization of manpower.

Appraisal services are a new and developing activity. According to Marwan Mukhtar, the chairman of the GAPPI [Indonesian Merchants Association?], there are now 22 appraisal firms in Indonesia. The firms appraise assets and property so that their real value can be determined and used in various types of transactions. Government policy and regulations on appraisal services were not established until 1977 and may be found in Directive of the Minister of Commerce No 161 of 1977, dated 7 June 1977.

"Since we represent a new activity the public is still hesitant about utilizing our services, and there are not many sectors that understand the importance of appraisal services," Marwan said. Asked about the future development of appraisal services, he said that that would "depend on the type of system that develops, on whether or not there is a need for this profession in the system."

5458

CSO: 4213/8

REPORTER VISITS TRANSMIGRATION CENTERS IN IRIAN JAYA

Sydney THE SYDNEY MORNING HERALD in English 30 Aug 83 p 9

[Article by Peter Hastings: "A Highway Through the Swamp Opens a Frontier"]

[Text]

THE road to Sota from Merauke is quite amazing: 60 kilometres of compressed earth highway, carrying two-way traffic, pushed across one of the world's largest swamps about a metre above wet season flood levels. It is part of the projected southern half of an all-weather compact road which will eventually link, some say in five years, but more likely 10, north and south Irian Jaya and form the basis of a large-scale Javanese resettlement scheme.

There's nothing much to see but swamp eucalypt, roadside expanses of water lilies, fleeting glimpses of tiny Indonesian Rusa deer and some surprisingly large kangaroos here and there. Some Indonesians are quite nationalistic about having their own kangaroos.

At Sota, a not very entrancing Irianese village near the PNG border, the road turns sharply north along the border heading for Bupul by way of Erambu and Kweel. Not too far north of Erambu, due to the errors of a Japanese surveyor, employed by a Jakarta construction company, the road crosses into PNG in three places.

The PNG Government took the intrusions calmly enough while the PNG press panicked. The Indonesians were at first incredulous and then apologetic. Privately they think it rather funny and hope the incident is forgotten.

The road has to be taken seriously, however. It represents real economic development in terms of crops, settlements and infrastructure in one of the least probable settlement areas in the world.

It is not the road to Sota that should worry the PNG Government, but the road from Sota to the nearby PNG border and the

almost total lack of development by comparison on the PNG side of the border through which I exited, after immigration proceedings the previous day at Merauke, by way of a miserable jeep ride through jungle to the Bensbach River, two river crossings by dugout canoe, another jeep ride in a PNG police vehicle followed by a tedious plane ride from Weam to Daru and thence to Port Moresby — a 14-hour trip.

There's precious little development on the PNG side, where one suspects the Government in Port Moresby rather hopes that the Ok Tedi project will do the job for them. It won't.

Border development is going to prove a large and uncertain element in future Indonesian-PNG relations following the joint 1979 agreement by which both countries are pledged, in the interests of traditional crossers (village people), to a "balanced development" program involving the establishment of roads, crops, land reclamation, schools and social services.

The notion behind the agreement was to gently discourage traditional border crossers — moving either way to tend garden plots, harvest trees or see clansmen — by offering enough development to keep them whichever side of the border they were born.

It's a good idea, but it can only work in a regime of equal development on both sides. If one country has development and the other hasn't, the effect will inevitably be wholesale trans-border movement to where the action is, with all of the accompanying complicated jurisdictional problems of sovereignty and citizenship disputes — something PNG and Indonesia, slowly settling down to a workable relationship, can do without.

The road to Sota, strictly speaking, begins with the road from Jayapura, provincial capital in the north, to the new TM (transmigration — see below) camps at Koya and Arso near the PNG border in the north. Koya is quite an eye-opener. It is a huge area of neat intersecting roads, new houses with tin roofs, laid out in equally neat rows, two primary standard schools, dispensaries, a central mosque and a Protestant Church, to meet the needs of the Irianese community, which accounts for about 25 per cent of an estimated settlement of 2,160 people or 500 families.

Most of the non-Irianese are Javanese settlers. Most arrived there last year. The Indonesian Government paid their transport by ship and helped them build their homes. For one year each family will receive free sugar, salt, rice, kerosene and cooking oil. The rice ration is crucial until the newly painted paddy starts to grow.

TMs are all volunteers. They must settle and make the best of where they are sent. At a packed meeting of settlement leaders I could not find one who wished to return to Java. Most, in fact, were trying to bring other family members to join them. The big attraction was the two hectares of land — the first they had ever owned — to which they had been given title.

The usual arrangement is a quarter hectare for house and private garden and the remainder for crop cultivation. In the fields I saw rice, soybean, peanuts, chillies, cucumbers, green beans and tomatoes. At Arso, some 20 kilometres further south, oil palm has been put in on a large scale, the highway is being pushed further south and new houses are ready for an expected 500 Javanese families.

But the big question that arises from establishment of these centres is their effect on the Irianese, especially as the Javanese can be expected to come in increasing numbers. The problem that immediately intrudes, for anybody familiar with PNG, is that of land ownership.

Traditionally Melanesians own land as clans, not as individuals. It is held in trust for future generations. It cannot be given away, although it can be used by others, hence the leasing system employed by the Australian administration when encouraging white settlement in the past. Compensation for land use is crucial.

Nowhere throughout my 10-day tour of TM settlements north and south of the central ranges did I get any feeling of satisfaction over the question of compensation and use of land. I had the distinct feeling that the Indonesian adminis-

tration, in its genuine concern, its anxiety, in fact, to integrate Irianese and Javanese settlers, was unaware of the resentments likely to brew over land alienation, not least over land alienation in the border area, where customary owners may well include PNG citizens.

Integration of Javanese and Irianese farmers, on the other hand, offered some surprises. One of the oldest TM settlements is at Dosav, about 60 kilometres from Jayapura, on relatively good soil. There I found a well-integrated community of both races.

The settlement started in 1966 with five Javanese TM families. It now has about 200, nearly half of them Irianese busily growing cocoa, coffee, vegetables and a variety of tropical fruits, including durian — of the sort you never see in PNG — for the markets at Jayapura, now a rapidly growing Asian-type centre of 80,000 people.

A similarly encouraging situation seems to exist in the much larger TM settlements which spread, their tin roofs gleaming in the sun, for 60 kilometres and more in all directions from Merauke. This former tiny Dutch settlement has developed into a centre of 20,000 people, about half of them Indonesians from all over the archipelago.

But the successfully integrated settlements share a common factor. The Irianese have already become largely Indonesianised. But some of the integrated settlements in the west of the island, at Nabire on the Bird's Neck and at Timika, involving bush Melanesians, have been markedly unsuccessful.

The results of simply taking a group of traditional Irianese sweet potato subsistence cultivators and attempting to mix them with a group of Javanese rice farmers in the hope that they will acquire highly technical skills overnight have, on occasions, been fairly disastrous. In fact, the Irian Jaya commander, Brigadier-General Sembiring, a North Sumatran Christian, told me that he had closed down the west coast settlement at Timika.

The inevitable process of Indonesianisation produces strange contrasts in attitudes. Many Indonesians on the island, including General Sembiring, would like to see the acculturation program slow down. The Governor, Hendrik Indom, an Irianese, wants to see it speeded up in the belief, he says with a nervous giggle, that within a generation "we will all have straight hair," meaning one culture.

In the end it is the missionaries who have the clearest view of where things are heading. All to whom I spoke, both Catholic and Protestant,

believe that the process of Indonesianisation is irreversible and that the Irianese will only succeed by adapting to it and succeeding within it. In a country in which 94 per cent of the indigenous people are Christian, the missions are crucial and their message is clear.

"Things are changing here rapidly," a Catholic father whom I knew 20 years ago told me. "The days of the OPM guerrillas, the Dutch-trained generation, are over. I doubt whether young people at Cenderawasih University even know who Nicolaas Jouwe (the OPM leader in Holland) is, or care.

"I do not mean that they are contented. There is plenty of opposition and many of the people are afraid for their land. But opposition is increasingly within the system. It is directed against central government in the same way that opposition in Java is, or Sumatra.

"People are beginning to realise that if they go to school, to university, exploit their opportunities, they can succeed within the system. Since you were here last (1979) there has been a dramatic increase in the number of Irianese employed in government, in banks and shops. Most of the bureau chiefs in the Governor's office are Irianese. Five of the island's nine Bupati (District Commissioners) are Irianese.

"But it is for the bush people we fear. They are increasingly angry over land and confused by the Javanese preoccupation with civilising them. In the highlands I see penis gourd wearers forced to wear shorts over their gourds. They can hardly walk, poor fellows, but it satisfies a misplaced Javanese notion of propriety."

I asked a Protestant pastor about security. "It is low profile as you can see. There are the same three battalions as there were when you were last here, one each at Jayapura, Manokwari and Sorong, a total of 2,400 and about as many police.

"There is no need for more. While it is true that there are sporadic outbreaks against the administration, in the Highlands especially, they have few arms and in any case find burning schools and churches counter-productive. Just as they did in Dutch times."

And administration attitudes to the missionaries?

"Sembiring is, of course, Christian and pins great faith in the missions which is reflected by and large in administration attitudes. The Government knows that without the missionaries, without MAF (Missionary Aviation Fellowship), this country would virtually stop — schools, hospitals, communications, everything. It demands only that we do not interfere with Indonesian sovereignty, no matter what our private views.

"And they are doing a lot. There is real development everywhere compared with Dutch times. I was here then and nothing happened. But we wish Indonesia would go more slowly and have more regard for the people, for the culture it is replacing with another. Good intentions are not enough. And I would stop unsponsored migrants."

This is certainly a sore point in Irian Jaya. In addition to the known, probable 60,000 sponsored TMs there is an unknown number of unsponsored migrants — perhaps 160,000 — mainly Buginese, but

comprising entrepreneurial types from all over the archipelago. They are greedy, tough South-East-Asian-style survivors who live in slummy kampongs and run all over the Irianese. But as Indonesian citizens they have every right to visit and settle another part of Indonesia. They cannot be stopped, for they are as much part of the process of Indonesianisation as the communicants streaming to early morning Mass at Merauke's cathedral — or the brand new mosque taking shape not a kilometre from it.



REASONS WHY INDONESIA IS NOT A SECULAR STATE

Surabaya SURABAYA POST in Indonesian 27 Aug 83 p 2

[Text] Blegoh Soemarto, the chairman of the East Java legislative assembly, says that secularism and the philosophy of a secular state may not be the same thing, but the Pancasila state definitely is not a secular state.

He gives three reasons to support his opinion.

First, when the matter is viewed in terms of the philosophy, foundation and identity of the nation then the principle of belief in God, the first principle of the Pancasila, is seen to be the inspiration for the other four principles, while the Pancasila itself must be considered to be a complete whole.

Second, when we consider the matter in terms of the constitution and its supporting legislation and regulations we find that the spirit of religion is clearly reflected in the preamble to the constitution, for the phrase "with the blessing and mercy of the One God" appears in the third paragraph of the preamble. Also, it is clear from article 29 of the constitution that our nation is neither a secular state nor a religious state, even though the spirit of religion-- but not any one religion--inspires our system of government.

And third, in our system of government we have a Department of Religious Affairs that reaches to the grass roots of society, we celebrate religious holidays, and prayers are said and we ask God for his blessing at the beginning of every meeting.

He said that all of these things are proof that the state is inspired by and does not forsake religion. He added that the acts of the People's Consultative Congress, laws and other legislation and regulations, and court decisions always begin with the phrase "with the blessing of the One God," and that this means that the spirit of religion inspires our system of government.

5458

CSO: 4213/570

INDONESIA

PRESIDENT ASKS FOR NEW CREDIT SYSTEM

Jakarta KOMPAS in Indonesian 5 Sep 83 pp 1, 12

[Text] Jakarta, KOMPAS--President Soeharto has asked BAPPENAS [National Development Planning Board] to consider a new system to replace the current one for providing mass program credit. It is hoped that the new system will stop the ever increasing delinquencies under mass program credit.

Efforts to improve repayment under the credit program continue to be based on INPRES [presidential directive] No. 10 of 1981, but these efforts will be intensified and enforcement of the law strengthened. Farmers who are unable to repay loans after two planting seasons will not be granted further credit until they have made repayment. The extent of delinquent loans is now considered to be intolerable.

SESDALOPBANG [secretary and operational director of development] Solihin GP, as chairman/coordinator of the Coordination Team for Improving Repayment of Mass Program Credits, made these statements to reporters at Bina Graha on Saturday [3 September].

Ir Wardoyo, vice minister for improving food production, also spoke. Others who spoke were principal director of the BRI [Bank Rakyat Indonesia] Kamardy Arief SE, BRI director Hartawan, Soemosoebroto, Licentiate, and Ir H. L. Gaol, director for food and nontax revenues of the Department of Finance.

Several Systems

Solihin explained that, based on the experience of the INPRES 10 team, there are several systems that can be considered. These systems are in principle consistent with President Soeharto's wishes in that they are more selective. This means that mass program credit, which is considered very inexpensive, should be granted to those who truly need it.

One idea is to divide farmers into large-scale, medium-scale, and small-scale categories. Large-scale farmers probably no longer

need cheap credit from such mass programs but should use credit generally available in the banking system. Medium- and small-scale farmers may still be considered for cheap credit.

In addition to establishing a priority system for providing credit, priorities will also be set for efforts to improve repayment. For example, the highest priority will be directed toward delinquents among village officials. Next will be delinquents who are members of the armed forces, BRI employees, teachers, and other government employees. Rich farmers will be next, and the last will be farmers who are truly poor.

"It must be noted, however, that the ones with the largest debts are farmers," he said. As of 31 May 1983, delinquents numbered 2,044,803 people, of which 95.37 percent, or 1,950,180 people, were farmers. However, the debts of farmers, which average 25,000 rupiahs, are relatively small. On the other hand, the average debt of village officials is 83,000 rupiahs, and that of BRI employees is 926,000 rupiahs. The largest debts are those of KUD [village cooperative] employees, which average 7.292 million rupiahs per person.

Three Systems

Vice Minister Ir Wardoyo added that actually three systems of providing credit to farmers have been tried. The first system is the provision of credit through farmers groups. The second is through KUD's, and the third is to diversified farm enterprises. Evaluation is still being made to determine the best of the three systems. For that reason, all three constitute pilot projects.

"We must be very careful in making our selection, lest the new system actually cause even greater debts," he said.

The vice minister admitted that when a new system is chosen there will be a transition period, which may result in a little delay in meeting the needs of farmers. The delay will be only temporary, however, and when all is flowing smoothly there will be no further problem.

A credit system like BIMAS [Mass Guidance for Self-Sufficiency in Food] must be phased out. As a matter of fact, most farmers have now joined the INMAS [Mass Intensification for Self-Sufficiency in Food] program, under which delinquencies are not very great. INMAS does not use mass program credit to any great extent.

BRI principal director Kamardy Arief told KOMPAS yesterday that for the banks the safest system is through the KUD's. Under this system, only a KUD as a legal body owes BRI. The KUD then distributes the credit from BRI to farmers needing it. "But this

method requires KUD's that can be trusted. So far, they are found in 33 regencies and still constitute pilot projects," he stated.

This principle accords with technical bank procedures, since the worthiness of a KUD as a business can be evaluated. Consequently, if a farmer is delinquent, it is the KUD that is responsible. A bank may cut off credit to a KUD if its debts become excessive. For that reason, the KUD will always work hard to obtain repayment from farmers. This method will also reduce to a minimum the amount of fictitious credit, that is, credit without a designated recipient.

"A bank's business is based on being right in three aspects: the right amount, at the right time, and for the right reason," said the former director of Bank Indonesia.

A credit system that works through farmers groups is hard to expand. Since farmers groups are not legal bodies, direct contact must be made with each farmer. That is difficult to do, he added.

Credit to diversified farming activities is only possible in a few places. Credit under this system is a type of small investment credit, or permanent working capital credit, which may reach 10 million rupiahs. This system, therefore, is not for the small farmer, but is for the needs of a farmer whose efforts include agriculture, livestock, etc. In fact, a farmer who has five types of work may obtain credits for all five of them.

Help from the Public

Solihin GP stated that efforts to reduce debts under mass program credit should not be the burden of the government only, but the public must help by guarding against misuse of credit.

He called on leaders of organizations such as HNSI [All-Indonesian Association of Fishermen], HKTI [Indonesian Farmers Association], and others to help this program for small farmers

The SESDALOPBANG expressed his regret over several reports about the implementation of KEPPRES [presidential decision] No. 39 of 1980 regarding credit for fishermen. HNSI participates in deciding which fishermen will receive credit, since HNSI is believed to know directly which ones should be helped. In practice, however, many HNSI people have used that confidence for their own interests. It was hoped that HNSI would be a protector of the fishermen.

Similarly, HKTI and other farmers associations should emphasize the needs of true farmers. If there are manipulations by

government officials, these public organizations must dare to resist them for the good of the people whom they protect.

"The point is that these inordinate delinquencies are no longer acceptable. The legal enforcement of INPRES 10 will be performed rigorously," he said. Action will definitely be taken against government employees who are involved.

"Compared with credit debts under various other projects, credit to farmers is possibly still quite small. For that reason, the matter should not be exaggerated as though farmers should no longer have a right to credit allocation," he said.

Kamardy Arief also added that, in order to prevent further increases in the debt, a farmer who has not been able to repay his debt after two planting seasons will receive no more credit.

The current mass program credit system depends heavily upon the recommendations of village leaders. Now, however, the BRI will be more selective and will always make investigation. This method will give assurance that the designated farmers actually exist and truly need the credit.

Much previous delinquent credit repayment was a result of fictitious recipients, meaning that the recipient did not exist and that the credit resulted only from the entry of a name. In fact, there may have been cooperation between village officials and certain individuals for the purpose of receiving credit.

Another type of manipulation occurred when credit repayment by a farmer was handled by a middleman who offered his services for a fee but who failed to pass on the farmer's payment to the BRI.

New Delinquent Debts

Based on reports as of May 1983, debts under old mass program credit totaled 71.4 billion rupiahs. These debts were those incurred prior to 30 June 1981. In addition, new delinquent debts of 72.5 billion rupiahs accrued between July 1981 and March 1983. Delinquent debts therefore now total 143.9 billion rupiahs.

BIMAS/INMAS debts of 63 billion constitute the largest part of the credit delinquencies being handled by the INPRES 10 team. Other types of credit being handled by the team are TRI [intensification of sugarcane small holdings] and intensification of pepper, cloves, and coffee. Also included are PUTP [five types of raising animals for meat], intensification of poultry raising, food acquisition, drying floor warehouses, small tractors, fisheries, and rice field planning.

Old nonfarm debts, especially those by village, BRI and armed forces (law enforcement) employees, are most numerous in West Java. Of all debts by village employees, 32.92 percent, or 12,040 persons, live in West Java. All 217 BRI employees involved and 29.97 percent of armed forces debts were in West Java.

Solihin was not prepared to reply when asked about this problem. He merely said that he did not look at specific regions but at Indonesia as a whole. "I will not solve problems for a region but for all of Indonesia," said the former West Java governor.

Data of 31 May 1983

As of 31 May 1983, there were 2,044,803 people with delinquent debts, of whom 1,950,180 were farmers. Those who were not farmers included 36,578 village and subdistrict officials, 217 BRI employees, 599 Agriculture Service employees, 282 KUD officials, 2,746 armed forces members, 7,182 teachers, and 8,552 other government employees. Third parties numbered 38,467 people.

From the viewpoint of sizes of debts, 81.73 percent of the total amount was by farmers, or 49.4 billion rupiahs. Others were village officials at 3 billion rupiahs, BRI employees 201 million rupiahs, Agriculture Service employees 290 million rupiahs, KUD officials 2 billion rupiahs, armed forces members 180 million rupiahs, teachers 1.4 billion rupiahs, and other government employees 1.4 billion rupiahs. Third parties made up 2.3 billion rupiahs.

Based on success in repayment of 10 types of mass program credits as of 31 May 1983, first place is held by East Kalimantan, with 100 percent repayment. Others are Yogyakarta (95.6 percent), Bali (64 percent), Maluku (59.6 percent), East Java (59.2 percent), North Sulawesi (58.1 percent), Central Java (55.8 percent), West Sumatra (42.6 percent), Lampung (36.5 percent), Central Sulawesi (32.9 percent), West Nusa Tenggara (32.7 percent), South Sumatra (31.7 percent), East Nusa Tenggara (31.2 percent), Jambi (30.5 percent), West Java (26.7 percent), North Sumatra (26.7 percent), Bengkulu (22.9 percent), Riau (22.7 percent), Central Sulawesi (21.5 percent), Aceh (20 percent), South Sulawesi (18.7 percent), Central Kalimantan (16.5 percent), West Kalimantan (15.5 percent), and, last, South Kalimantan (13.6 percent).

From the viewpoint of size of delinquent debts as of 31 May 1983, the largest sum was in West Java, at 27 billion rupiahs. Other areas were Central Java at 8.9 billion rupiahs, East Java 7.6 billion rupiahs, South Sulawesi 6 billion rupiahs, North Sumatra 4.2 billion rupiahs, South Sumatra 2.9 billion rupiahs, Lampung 2.1 billion rupiahs, West Nusa Tenggara 2 billion rupiahs, West Sumatra 1.49 billion rupiahs, South Kalimantan 1.48 billion

rupiahs, Aceh 1.33 billion rupiahs, West Kalimantan 1.11 billion rupiahs, Bengkulu 802 million rupiahs, North Sulawesi 799 million rupiahs, Jambi 473 million rupiahs, Central Kalimantan 440 million rupiahs, Central Sulawesi 386 million rupiahs, East Nusa Tenggara 307 million rupiahs, Riau 295 million rupiahs, Bali 213 million rupiahs, Southeast Sulawesi 131 million rupiahs, Yogyakarta 47 million rupiahs, and Maluku 19 million rupiahs.

6942

CSO: 4213/12

FOREIGN CAPITAL INVESTMENT STILL NEEDED IN PELITA IV

Jakarta MERDEKA in Indonesian 3 Sep 83 p 10

[Text] Jakarta, 2 Sep 83--Ir Soehartoyo, chairman of the BKPM [Capital Investment Coordination Board], stated that PMA [foreign capital investment] will still be needed in Pelita [5-year development plan] IV to support growth of the Indonesian economy. This investment must be for high technology, capital-intensive industry, and oriented to exports.

The capabilities of PMDN [domestic capital investment] investors are growing. As evidence, he noted that many applications for investment opportunities formerly made on behalf of foreign investors are now being made by domestic investors.

Although the capabilities of domestic investors are expanding, the doors are still open to foreign investors interested in Indonesia, especially for export-oriented investments, he stated.

Soehartoyo said that the transfer of capital overseas cannot be faulted, since Indonesia follows a system of free foreign exchange traffic. "The transfer of capital overseas by various investors can be justified since there is no regulation against it," he said.

The transfer of capital overseas, according to the BKPM chairman, is not because of a disadvantageous investment climate in Indonesia, for Indonesia has greater potential than other countries.

Indonesia's potential includes abundant natural resources, cheap labor, political stability, and adequate security. Furthermore, Indonesia's population of 150 million constitutes a better potential market, he declared.

The BKPM urges that the transfer of shares (Indonesianization) of PMA companies that have been operating in Indonesia for 10 years be implemented right away.

Not all PMA shares will be transferred to PMDN, but PMA shares will be reduced gradually to a maximum of 49 percent, and PMDN capital will be increased to a maximum of 51 percent.

Although he could not give complete details, Soehartoyo said that the shares of many PMA companies have already been transferred to PMDN, some through fellow stockholders and some through the capital market.

In addition to performing Indonesianization in the investment arena, the BKPM also cooperates with the Department of Manpower to Indonesianize the work force through exchange of technology, Soehartoyo explained.

Saturated

According to Soehartoyo, the domestic textile industry is now considered to be saturated. Therefore, in accordance with the DSP [priority list], the BKPM is not granting permission for new textile industries for the time being.

Textile export activity, which is handled by the Department of Trade, is now being directed toward tightening up quality, so that textile exports will be truly acceptable on foreign markets, he said.

Soehartoyo noted that the minister of finance had issued a directive giving additional authority to the BKPM to provide facilities to textile manufacturers who wish to perform restructuring.

Restructuring is an investment that does not increase capacity but expands types and quality of products in order to fulfill export requirements.

The BKPM will not easily grant permission for expansion of textile manufacturing, since the domestic textile market is sluggish at present. Nevertheless, the BKPM will give permission to manufacturers who wish to restructure, he stated.

For the last 15 years, capital investment in Indonesia has been dominated by the Japanese. In an effort to attract capital from other nations, Soehartoyo will leave in mid-September on an investment and promotion mission to the Netherlands, West Germany, France, the United States, Australia, and the Middle East.

Projects to be offered will include metals, machinery, and basic chemicals. Agrobusiness will be offered to PMDN investors who have the resources, said Soehartoyo.

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CS0: 4213/12

INFLATION RATE FOR JAN-AUG 1983 9.77 PERCENT

Jakarta KOMPAS in Indonesian 8 Sep 83 p 2

[Text] Jakarta, KOMPAS--The inflation rate, which was at the level of 9.79 percent during the first 7 months of 1983 (January-July) has now fallen again to 9.77 percent (period from January to August). This is because there was a decline in the overall rate of 0.02 percent in August.

Although this is so, the inflation figure for the first 8 months of 1983 is still higher than the same period of 1982, when it was 6.52 percent. The influence of the devaluation of the rupiah last March is the cause of the high inflation figure this year. Seen in terms of the fiscal year (April to August), inflation in the first half of the fiscal year amounted to 5.64 percent. During the same period of 1982 it was only 1.1 percent.

According to the Central Statistical Office, the national deflation rate of 0.02 percent in August was a consequence of the fall of prices in the food group of 0.46 percent, a zero inflation rate in the housing group, inflation in the clothing group of 0.14 percent, and inflation in miscellaneous goods and services of 0.78 percent.

The rather substantial rate of deflation in the food group reflects the decline in prices for several commodities included in this group. According to the Central Statistical Office, this was caused by the weakness in the people's purchasing power after the end of the Lebaran holidays, and this finally caused a fall in market prices. Demand for foods declined, until price levels tended to decline also.

In order to prepare its figures for the National Consumer Price Index (IHK), the Central Statistical Office conducts research on price developments covering goods and services in 17 provincial capitals. In August 1983, of the 17 provincial capitals which were surveyed, deflation occurred in 11 of them. Only in Ambon, Mataram, Manado, Bandung, Jakarta, and Pontianak was there further inflation.

5170
CSO: 4213/9

WORKERS TO HAVE 1 PERCENT DEDUCTED FROM PAY FOR FBSI DUES

Jakarta HARIAN UMUM AB in Indonesian 10 Sep 83 pp 1, 11

[Article: "Tripartite National Meeting Decides That 1 Percent of Workers' Pay Will Be Deducted for FBSI Dues"]

[Text] Jakarta, HARIAN UMUM AB--In the near future the salaries of workers belonging to FBSI (All-Indonesian Federation of Workers) will have 1 percent deducted for the FBSI, which will be used for the development fund of its members. The deductions will be made by employers every month and directly deposited into a bank.

This decision came out of a meeting of the tripartite national meeting, presided over by Minister of Manpower Sudomo at the Hilton Hotel, Jakarta, on Friday [9 September]. The tripartite national meeting was attended by representatives of the Ministry of Manpower, the executive council of PUSPI/KADIN [Central Organization of Indonesian Employers/Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry] and of FBSI.

According to the minister, the deductions will be made by PUSPI as contributions made by the members of FBSI to their organization. The size of the deduction will be 1 percent of "take home pay." These funds will be in replacement of FBSI "consolidation funds" which have now been abolished.

Agus Sudono, general chairman of the Executive Council of FBSI, said on this occasion that in the near future the FBSI will issue a directive on the system for the use of these funds, from the central level of the organization down to trade union locals on the factory floor. To control the use of the funds and prevent any abuses, a supervisory body will be established in addition to an open budget showing income and expenditures.

Answering questions from reporters after the meeting, Agus Sudono declared that the basis for the contribution of 1 percent is contained in Regulation No 2 issued by the minister of manpower and transmigration in 1977. At present the money received by the executive council of the FBSI is only about 2.5 percent as much, or between 250,000 and 300,000 rupiahs per month. And this is only collected from 10 percent of the members of FBSI, which, according to its records, has 3 million members.

He said that if each worker on the average, makes 500 rupiahs per day, funds amounting to 15 million rupiahs per day will be collected, or about 450 million rupiahs per month, if all members make this contribution.

Regarding the size of this contribution, Hatta, from the executive council of PUSPI, told a HARIAN UMUM AB representative that he considered a deduction of 1 percent too small. However, he fully agreed with the decision made at the meeting to re-establish the practice of collecting these contributions. Hatta, a director of PT Unilever, thinks that a standard on the size of the contribution needs to be determined. At Unilever it has been decided that the basic contribution will be 1,000 rupiahs per month for each worker.

Daily-Paid Workers

The national tripartite meeting also decided to improve the situation affecting nonaffiliated or contract workers and contract workers employed by companies regarded as being in good financial condition. In that connection Minister Sudomo asked the FBSI and PUSPI to prepare materials for immediate use in a seminar. The future of workers like this will be so arranged that they can work on a life time employment basis.

The general chairman of FBSI said that in Indonesia there are still many well-off companies who still employ their workers on the basis of certain kinds of labor contracts. According to law, after the passage of a trial period of 3 months, they should not be called unskilled personnel any longer, but rather should be promoted to the status of permanent employees. However, this kind of treatment continues, as in the case of the hotels.

Regarding this FBSI comment, Minister Sudomo declared that labor contracts have been deliberately prepared to provide security to the employees. However, there must be an immediate distinction made between companies which are allowed to enter into labor contracts and financially-strong companies which must immediately begin to treat their personnel as permanent employees. A strong and long-established firm should immediately end the practice of labor contracts for its personnel.

Another decision reached at the tripartite national conference was strengthening work safety, as proposed by the FBSI and by PUSPI. According to the FBSI, over the past 15 months there have been 6,635 work accidents, but not every company has set up a work safety committee. In Indonesia 50 percent of the work accidents are caused by employee reluctance to use work safety equipment, while the remaining 50 percent are caused by conditions in the factory which do not meet the work safety requirements.

Suprpto Pudjosastro, the general chairman of PUSPI/KADIN, added that workers are usually reluctant to use tools given them for maintaining safe working conditions, even though this equipment has been provided by the company. In this connection Minister Sudomo has decided to undertake immediately a work safety campaign to increase the awareness of the workers and thereby prevent work accidents.

Participate in Decision

At the beginning of his speech Minister Sudomo declared that the strengthening of the tripartite national conference as a place for consultations and reaching agreements between elements of the Ministry of Manpower, the FBSI, and employers is intended to speed up the consideration of emerging labor problems. For this purpose similar institutions will also be set up at the provincial level, presided over by the governor. These bodies had previously been presided over by the local Ministry of Manpower office.

In this connection Minister Sudomo said he wanted to see a strong FBSI and a strong PUSPI. This is because the two professional organizations, which are also social forces, will be included by the minister in all decisionmaking by the Ministry of Manpower. He added: "So it is not true that the FBSI and PUSPI are under pressure from the Ministry of Manpower." These two organizations will be further strengthened, and will be asked to take the initiative in training their workers, both in terms of political education as well as in vocational skills.

The tripartite national conference will meet once every 3 months, except in the case of urgent problems which must be resolved at once. In this connection the permanent membership of the conference will shortly be made public, each element consisting of five persons.

Up to now the tripartite national conference has met four times: twice in 1981 to discuss the question of the P4P [Central Committee for the Resolution of Labor Disputes] and the P4D's [Provincial Committees for the Resolution of Labor Disputes], and to discuss the question of workers' insurance; the other meeting was held in 1982 to discuss the question of an increase in the price of petroleum fuels and the world recession.

5170

CSO: 4213/11

ELIMINATION OF CORRUPTION 'A GRADUAL PROCESS'

Surabaya SURABAYA POST in Indonesian 13 Aug 83 p 6

[Editorial: "Clearly Difficult"]

[Text] The public relations officer in the office of the Central Java public prosecutor has said that the office is having a difficult time in its efforts to eradicate corruption because of the protection received by suspects, inadequate support from the regional government, and a shortage of funds.

The situation is highlighted by the Maluku governor's appeal to his subordinates that they not conspire to embezzle state funds. Also, when the ticket scalpers at the Gambir railroad station were raided, the people arrested turned out to be employees of the railroad company, railway police, and even members of the armed forces who had been assigned to clean up the scalping operation. They were all protecting one another.

The general public demands that corruption be eliminated and wants to see firm and immediate action and quick results, as if this was a simple and easy thing to do and the culprits could be swept up without careful planning. But the public should realize that this is no simple problem.

We also must realize that the effort to take action against people who engage in corruption and the effort to run a clean government places a heavy burden on the shoulders of the public prosecutor and other government officials, and even on the national leadership and government. It is clear that there is no use in responding to this problem emotionally, and this could even be dangerous, could lead to frustration and consequent friction in our national unity.

The history of the world provides many examples of nations that undergo turmoil and suffering when they are ruled by a succession of governments that use the elimination of corruption as their excuse for seeking power but in fact never do eliminate it.

So while we might like to use another approach, in our efforts to eliminate corruption we must be patient, must see the facts clearly, and must work conscientiously, continuously and unceasingly while following a plan.

Corruption and the elimination of corruption clearly are difficult and serious problems. However, if we have unity and the will to overcome them then they definitely can be overcome, and safely overcome, although the process must be a gradual one.

5458

CSO: 4213/570

BALANCE BETWEEN HOUSING STARTS, GROWTH RATE FORESEEN

Surabaya SURABAYA POST in Indonesian 25 Aug 83 p 2

[Text] Cosmas Batubara, Licentiate, the state minister for public housing, has said that he anticipates that a balance can be reached between housing construction capabilities and the population growth rate by the year 2000. The state minister was speaking at a ceremony marking the appointment of the executive board of the East Java branch of Real Estate Indonesia (REI) which was held last night at the Elmi Hotel in Surabaya.

He said that with a population of 150 million, Indonesia needs an additional 700,000 housing units each year but has the capability to build only 450,000 units a year. According to UN standards there should be 13 houses for every 1,000 persons, but in Indonesia there are only 3 houses per 1,000 persons, he said.

"However, I see that housing construction in East Java, and also in Jakarta and Bandung, is progressing satisfactorily and has a good potential," he said.

The state minister was asked if he was not concerned that the competition provided by large and wealthy real estate firms would cause the National Housing Construction Corporation [Perumnas] to run short of land area.

"Then we build apartment houses," he replied.

"There is a national guideline that every real estate company must adhere to the ratio of 3 units of middle-income housing and 6 units of low-income housing to every unit of high-income housing. This is a national guideline and it must be observed," he said, while pointing to a report prepared by Drs Asmoro Parasetyo, Licentiate, the head of the East Java REI.

Asmoro noted in his report that the 25 REI members in East Java had built 645 high-income housing units, 6,909 middle-income units and 7,027 low-income units for a total of 14,271 housing units.

"Real estate developers prefer to build middle-income units because they get a quicker turnover on their money than when they build high-income units," the state minister said.

He told the REI members that the real estate business in East Java should grow at a faster rate after the developers join the REI. "Remember, real estate developers in other countries are prominent, skilled and respected people. I hope that developers in Indonesia will meet international standards," he said.

At the ceremony Mr Prasetyo, a retired police officer, was appointed chairman of the East Java REI and Iskak Safii was appointed deputy chairman. Other appointments were Sentot Koesbiantoro as secretary, Koesnadi as treasurer, Engr Setiawan Rahardjo and Engr Ibrahim Soetjahyo as technical staff, and Amien Setiyono as legal staff.

5458

CSO: 4213/570

FIVE MILLION PEOPLE TAKE PANCASILA COURSES

Jakarta HARIAN UMUM AB in Indonesian 6 Sep 83 p 1

[Text] As of 31 May 1983 some 5 million people have taken the Guidelines for the Practice and Application of the Principles of the Pancasila (P-4) courses. The courses are presented in an educational program supervised by the Management Board for the Implementation of Guidelines for the Practice and Application of the Principles of the Pancasila (BP-7).

The total of approximately 5 million people includes 160,456 employees of the national government, 2,453,951 employees of regional governments, 19,975 members of national organizations, 521,583 members of regional organizations, and 147,200 members of the armed forces and defense establishment.

Government employees take the type A, type B or Type C upgrading courses, while members of national and regional organizations can take a 120-hour upgrading course for candidate instructors or a 45-hour, 25-hour or 17 hour upgrading course for supporters.

Drs Arisandi, the head of the BP-7 Documentation and Information Bureau, told a HARIAN UMUM AB reporter that in addition to these various types of courses, efforts to popularize the P-4 are carried out through the mass media, through traditional media, such as folk opera, by holding exhibitions, and in other ways.

Persons who have taken the P-4 courses are asked to maintain, perpetuate and, if possible, further develop the P-4 concept among the public.

5458

CSO: 4213/8

LABOR PROBLEM AT CENGKARENG AIRPORT PROJECT SETTLED

Jakarta SINAR HARAPAN in Indonesian 9 Sep 83 pp 1, 12

[Article: "About 5,000 Workers on Cengkareng Project Demand Money for Food, Overtime, Transportation"]

[Text] Jakarta, 8 September--About 5,000 workers engaged on the Cengkareng airport project on Thursday [8 September] did not report for work because they were demanding money for overtime and food and transportation allowances, which have not been paid for almost 2 years by the contractor, SB SAE-Colas, the company which is handling the entire project.

The workers have not been reporting for work for the past 3 days. They just sit around as a group, waiting for the results of the discussions between their leaders and the company. Satino Karso, leader of the workers, on Thursday [8 September] held discussions with Dr Soetoyo Oesman, director general of labor relations development and worker protection.

After the discussions ended, Satino urged the workers to be patient and wait for the decision to be made on Friday [9 September] by the company, the local trade union, and the Ministry of Manpower.

Soetoyo, the director general of air communications, when he was contacted by a SINAR HARAPAN representative on Thursday [8 September], said that he had not yet received a report on the matter. However, he said that the cost of building the airport was rather high. He said that a great deal of money had already been spent, and simply spending more money was not in accordance with the regulations.

He said, that is a matter for the workers. He did not state how much money has already been spent on the project.

Sudomo's Request

Franquete Roy, a director of SB SAE-Colas, when contacted by a SINAR HARAPAN representative on Friday [9 September], was unwilling to provide any information.

He objected to providing any information on the failure of the workers to report for work on the Cengkareng airport project. Franquet Roy even suggested that our representative contact Minister of Manpower Sudomo directly.

A SINAR HARAPAN source stated that the case involving the Cengkareng workers is being handled directly by Minister Sudomo at this time. From information obtained by SINAR HARAPAN it was learned that Minister Sudomo, on 18 May 1983, sent a letter to Minister of Communications Rusmin Nurjadin, asking him to help in resolving the labor problem at Jakarta International Airport at Cengkareng (JIAC).

Sudomo also informed Minister Rusmin Nurjadin of discussions that had been held between the directorate general of air communications of the Ministry of Communications and the directorate general of labor relations development and worker protection, according to the SINAR HARAPAN source.

In the discussions a possible solution was found, that is, by paying overtime at the same time as the salaries already provided for. The Ministry of Manpower is waiting for a decision by the Ministry of Communications. At the same time Sudomo advised the contractor to avoid raising any new problems, since in May 1983 steps had been taken to resolve the problems of hours of work and salary issues. As is generally known, the JIAC project is under the supervision of the Ministry of Communications. At the time the discussions were held with the Ministry of Manpower, the directorate general of air communications was represented by Lieutenant Colonel (Air Force) Suwardi, who is also the commander of the JIAC Security Unit.

Views of the FBSI

The local trade union, represented by Santino Karso, said on Friday morning [9 September] that it would hold further discussions with the Ministry of Manpower, the Ministry of Communications and the company management.

Santino, who was encountered at the Ministry of Manpower on Friday, [9 September], told a SINAR HARAPAN representative that he was attending the meeting to represent the aspirations of his friends, the workers on the JIAC project. He would take the results of the meeting on Friday afternoon [9 September] to the workers, who were waiting for him at the job site, to discuss them further, he said.

Agus Sudono, general chairman of the FBSI [All-Indonesian Federation of Workers], when asked for his views, said that if the allowances owed to the workers by the company have not yet been effectively paid, this is a violation of the existing regulations.

Delays

From a number of workers a SINAR HARAPAN representative learned that the effort to have their rights respected has been under way for a long time. However, so far they have not yet been respected, and the workers have simply been put off repeatedly. This happened although, they said, the Ministry of Manpower some time ago had promised to resolve the matter satisfactorily.

In the view of SINAR HARAPAN the situation at the work site is quiet because the workers are not doing their job as they should do. The work that is going on is performed by daily-paid workers who are employed by a sub-contractor.

Satino told a SINAR HARAPAN representative that what is most disturbing to the workers is that their labor contract will expire on 1 November, according to the terms of the agreement. What they are opposed to is having the labor contract expire while they have not yet reached a solution of outstanding issues.

Lieutenant Colonel Sasongko, who is presently handling local security at the work site, urged the workers not to damage anything when they are campaigning for their demands.

He urged them not to be provoked by a third party which may try to exploit the situation. He said that if there is someone who wants to make trouble, he should be arrested and turned over to the security officers. The workers said they agreed with this suggestion.

Satino Karso asked the workers to return to their homes. Many of the workers climbed aboard trucks provided for them in front of the road leading out of the Cengkareng airport project. The departure of the workers was also followed by the departure of security officers from Air Force Headquarters and police, numbering about 30 in all.

According to Satino Karso, the dispute between the workers and management should have been resolved a long time ago by management, since last December there was an agreement to pay the workers' demands which were estimated to cost almost 2 billion rupiahs.

"Everything's Settled"

Meanwhile, Minister of Manpower Soedomo, in his statement to the press at the three-sided meeting on Friday [9 September], said that the problem has been solved. According to the minister, on Friday discussions were held with management, and an agreement was reached to resolve the problem completely.

He also said that the project will continue in accordance with the plan.

He warned that if implementation of the project is delayed, the management side may be subject to claims by the Ministry of Communications. Soedomo said with a smile, "There is no further problem at the Cengkareng airport project. Everything's settled."

5170

CSO: 4213/11

STRIKERS SUBJECT TO 'NO WORK, NO PAY' RULE

Authorized by Law

Jakarta MERDEKA in Indonesian 7 Sep 83 pp 1, 11

[Text] Some companies in Jakarta have applied the pay-cut rule to workers who have used strikes as a means of achieving their objectives.

Minister of Manpower Sudomo told reporters in his office on Tuesday that at least three companies in Jakarta have docked the pay of workers who have gone on strike. This sanction is authorized by Law No 8 of 1980 and Law No 12 of 1957.

Citing Yamaha Motor in Pulogadung as an example, he said that the company had cut 4 days from the pay its workers received for the month of August. More than 1,000 of the company's employees went on strike for 4 days in July.

He said that the workers accepted the company's decision after it was explained to them that the pay-cut was authorized by law. "The basic rule is 'no work, no pay'," the minister added.

Minister Sudomo told reporters that he never stopped thinking about why workers would decide to go on strike. He said that since he had become head of the Department of Manpower he had maintained an "open door" policy, was receptive to all problems, and made an effort to settle them. "We have post office box 555 [to receive complaints], we can be contacted at any time. and we encourage all concerned to work together to find solutions to problems. So, what need is there to strike?" he asked.

The minister said that his people never sided with anyone, neither employers nor employees, in settling disputes between them.

Case In Riau

Discussing a case involving the jobs of 4,235 employees of PT Petrosea, a contractor for Caltex Pasifik Indonesia (CPI) in Riau, Sudomo said that the basic problem here was the fact that PT Petrosea was supplied with workers by a subcontractor.

It was reported recently that these workers were threatened with dismissal because of the expiration of the contract between PT Petrosea and CPI. PT Resources Jaya Teknik Management Indonesia (PT RMI), the contractor replacing PT Petrosea, said that it could not take on the Petrosea workers because of the agreement with the subcontractor.

Minister Sudomo said that an on-site review of this problem led to its resolution. He said that all 4,235 of the Petrosea workers will be taken on by PT RMI.

Even so, the time in service of the former Petrosea workers will begin at zero and they will be on probation for 3 months. Workers whose performance does not meet requirements during the 3-month period will be considered to be unqualified. The minister also said that a collective labor agreement would be carried out between PT RMI and the company's labor union.

Ismail, the head of the Department of Manpower team that made the on-site review, said that it had been decided to give separation pay to the Petrosea workers as of 31 August. The Petrosea workers transferred to PT RMI on 1 September 1983.

He said that the separation pay would come from funds deposited by PT Petrosea in the Social Security Fund. The monthly company deposit is 8.33 percent of its total payroll. Formerly the Social Security Fund was regulated under Directive of the Director General for Labor-Management Relations No 75/DP/76.

But a year later the government issued Government Regulation No 33 of 1977 establishing the Workers Social Insurance Fund (ASTEK), and all of the funds accumulated in the Social Security Fund were transferred to the ASTEK Public Corporation. The ASTEK Public Corporation is automatically required to pay the separation pay demanded by the former employees of PT Petrosea.

May Set Precedent

Jakarta MERDEKA 10 Sep 83 in Indonesian pp 1, 11

[Text] Agus Sudono, the general chairman of the Indonesian Labor Federation (FBSI), says that the principle of not paying wages to workers who go on strike is recognized internationally.

When questioned by an Antara reporter in Jakarta on Friday about the recent statement by the minister of manpower that workers who go on strike will have their pay docked, Agus Sudono said that the International Labor Organization also observed this rule. "This is a common occurrence in other countries," he said.

Agus added that he was concerned about the implementation of this policy in Indonesia. "I am concerned that the implementation of the 'no work, no pay' rule in Indonesia will be a signal to workers that they can strike," he said.

Workers may decide that they are willing to lose 1 or 2 days' wages and then go on strike for a day or two, he said.

He said that strikes in Indonesia, a developing country, are a "luxury item" and for this reason the FBSI issued a circular some time ago urging workers not to resort to strikes in struggling for their demands.

He called on workers to avoid going on strike if at all possible, saying that at the present time the Department of Manpower was giving considerable attention to labor problems in Indonesia. All problems should be discussed with employers. If this does not produce results then the Department of Manpower, or even the minister, can be asked to intercede, he said.

He said that many labor problems had been successfully resolved in the last few months as a result of the "open door" policy of the leadership of the Department of Manpower.

5458

CSO: 4213/8

PLANTING OF SECONDARY CROPS IN DROUGHT-AFFECTED FIELDS RECOMMENDED

Jakarta KOMPAS in Indonesian 8 Sep 83 pp 1,12

[Text] Jakarta, KOMPAS--Areas affected by drought as a result of the long dry season in 1983 should not be planted to rice, but rather with secondary crops, so that the harvest can be used. Provincial governments, together with farmer groups and other associations related to agriculture in the drought areas will be asked to provide the farmers with further information on this matter.

This was a result of the limited session of the economic, financial, and industrial section of the cabinet which was held on Wednesday [7 September] at the Bina Graha offices. The session was presided over by President Soeharto, and the announcement of the results of the meeting was made by Minister of Information Harmoko, who was accompanied by Prof Dr J.H. Hutasoit, deputy minister for increasing production of livestock and fisheries.

Harmoko declared that the 1983 drought was not as bad as that in 1982. As a result, food production in 1983 will be greater than it was in the previous year.

Areas considered to have been affected by the drought include the following: in West Java, Indramayu, Cirebon, and Majalengka; in Central Java, Kebumen, Grobogan, Demak, Purworedjo, and the area around Yogyakarta; in East Java, only a few small areas were affected.

To deal with the drought, the president has requested the installation of water pumps and has also requested that paddy plantings be replaced with secondary crops, so that the harvests will be more useful. To support this effort, he also asked that seeds for secondary crops be provided at once. Water canals should be repaired at once, through labor-intensive public works programs.

At the cabinet meeting the minister of agriculture reported on the location of rice fields which are now available for planting, covering 290,000 hectares in all. Of this area 111,180 hectares have been certified as ready, while 77,121 hectares are still being prepared for planting.

Exports Increase

Regarding exports other than petroleum and natural gas, the minister of trade reported to the cabinet meeting that exports from January to May 1983 have increased by 13.9 percent, compared with the same period of 1982. Exports during the first 5 months of 1983 amounted to \$1/839,000,000.

The export commodities which reflected an increase included: handicraft items, bauxite, automobile tires, fruits, canned vegetables, granite, dried fish, glass, rubber and rubber products, paper and paper products, coffee beans, plywood, lumber, furniture made of rattan and wood, essential oils, palm oil, ready to wear clothing, fertilizer, clove cigarettes, tea, frozen shrimp, and fresh shrimp.

The increases were generally in terms of volume, with the exception of bauxite and tea. Harmoko said: "The increase in exports reflected the greater steadiness of prices on the world market."

Sugar

The question of sugar was also discussed at the cabinet session. It was stated that by the end of the Fourth 5-Year Plan 18 sugar mills now being planned must have completed the construction stage. Six of these mills have already been constructed by the government. The remaining 12 will be turned over to the private sector under the Fourth 5-Year Plan. In the construction of these sugar mills maximum possible use of domestic materials must be made.

The sugar mills are needed because by the end of the Fourth 5-Year Plan it is hoped that Indonesia will be self-sufficient in sugar and will not need to import any more sugar. For 1983 sugar production is expected to reach 1.7 million tons, or 100,000 tons more than in the previous year.

This production of sugar may be compared to sugar requirements of 10.6 kilograms per capita. This requirement is smaller, compared to the calculation of sugar consumption for 1983, which worked out to 14 kilograms per capita for the year. On the basis of estimated population growth of about 2 percent per year, estimated sugar consumption by the end of the Fourth 5-Year Plan will reach 17.9 kilograms per capita annually. To meet this need, domestic sugar production should increase to 3 million tons, which can only be achieved by adding 18 more sugar mills.

Cooperatives

There was also discussion at the cabinet meeting of the role of cooperatives in distributing fuels. In this connection there was an agreement reached between the minister of cooperatives and the ministry of mining and energy, which will later take the form of a joint letter of decision.

In the agreement, village unit cooperatives (KUD) will be permitted to act as retail kerosine distributors, selling at the highest retail price permitted by the government.

To distribute super or premium quality gasoline and diesel fuel to its members, for example in the case of transportation, shipping, and fishing cooperatives, the cooperative may function as an industrial fuels filling station (SPBI). It may open up its pumps for its members. The cooperative may also distribute fuel to the public and act as an SBPU (public fuels filling station), which was previously only possible on an individual basis.

5170

CSO: 4213/9

NO AGREEMENT REACHED WITH EEC ON TEXTILE QUOTA

Jakarta HARIAN UMUM AB in Indonesian 9 Sep 83 pp 1, 3

[Text] Jakarta, HARIAN UMUM AB--So far the EEC has not yet reached an agreement on what limitation will be placed on Indonesian exports of Category 3 textiles, that is, textiles made of woven synthetic fiber.

The two consultations held at Denpasar [Bali] on 29 August and 5 September and later continued at the Ministry of Trade have ended inconclusively.

A source at the Ministry of Trade told HARIAN UMUM AB that the two sides are not in agreement on the size of the quota which is to be applied to Indonesia.

In this connection the Indonesian delegation taking part in the discussions has suggested that the Category 3 textile quota for 1983 should be 4,437 tons. The EEC side has simply agreed to a quota of 2,023 tons.

Indonesia has suggested this quota, based on its export performance toward France over the 12 month period between April 1982 and March 1983, which amounted to 774.4 tons. On the basis of this total an annual increase of 6 percent was calculated, with the result that the Category 3 export limit for shipments to France was proposed to be 820.8 tons.

The French textile market at present is 18.5 percent of the EEC global market for Category 3 textiles. In that connection the Indonesian side, at the meetings referred to above, proposed that the Category 3 overall quota for the EEC should be 4,437 tons.

However, so far the EEC side has only proposed a figure of 3,477 tons for the Category 2 (woven cotton fiber) and 3 import quota. In this connection, the EEC should not establish a quota for Category 2 imports because total exports from Indonesia are not yet very large.

In that context the Indonesian delegation, at the meetings referred to, rejected that figure and the quota relationship between textiles made from synthetic and cotton fiber.

A source in the Ministry of Trade said: "If agreement is not reached, there is a real possibility that the EEC will act unilaterally, establishing limitations on its own, as provided for in the provisions of the MFA (Multi-Fiber Agreement)."

If indeed the EEC acts unilaterally in setting a quota, at most it will be about 1,446 tons and only a little less than our recorded export performance for 1982-83 of 2,100 tons.

At the meetings Indonesia proposed that the quota for 1984 should be 4,705 tons; for 1985, 4,900 tons; and for 1986, 5,290 tons.

Meanwhile, the EEC put forward a figure of 2,063 tons for 1985 and 2,147 tons for 1986.

Indonesia's textile marketing efforts have been slow, compared with the efforts made with the same commodity by other countries, and as a result the export quota for Indonesia will be very small, compared to other countries.

For example, textile exports by South Korea to the EEC in 1982-83 amount to 14,455 tons. For Hong Kong the corresponding figure is 42,926 tons; for India, 46,567 tons; for Malaysia, 16,523 tons; for Pakistan, 22,475 tons; for Singapore, 4,330 tons; for Thailand, 33,340 tons; for Taiwan, 11,661 tons; and for the People's Republic of China, 27,636 tons.

5170

CSO: 4213/11

SOVIET UNION, EAST GERMANY EXPRESS INTEREST IN IMPORTING RUBBER

Jakarta KOMPAS in Indonesian 8 Sep 83 p 2

[Text] Jakarta, KOMPAS--Two East European countries, the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic, have again expressed their interest in purchasing Indonesian rubber. The rubber which is planned to be purchased this year is 30,000 tons for the Soviet Union and 9,000 tons for East Germany. The two countries have even designated the company which will handle their imports of rubber from Indonesia.

Every year the Soviet Union imports rubber from a number of producing countries, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Vietnam, Kampuchea, and Burma, in rather substantial quantities. The largest level of rubber imports by that country took place in 1981, when it purchased 432,620 tons. However, last year the level of rubber imports fell drastically to 187,179 tons. The reduction of natural rubber imports was related to a decline in the consumption of rubber in the Soviet Union itself.

According to information obtained by KOMPAS on Wednesday [7 September] from GAPKINDO [Association of Indonesian Rubber Companies], the Soviet plan to import 30,000 tons of rubber this year is less than average annual imports from Indonesia, which up to now have amounted to about 35,000 tons per year. However, it is believed that the decline in planned imports is exclusively due to the weakness in demand from the Soviet rubber goods manufacturing industry, as a consequence of the pressure resulting from the world recession.

As its importing firm the Soviet Government has designated V/D Raznoimport, whose address is in Moscow. However, it is not known when the rubber will be shipped. Payment is scheduled to be made, using letters of credit. It has only been stated that this time the Soviet Union will not require Indonesian businessmen to purchase goods of Soviet manufacture in exchange for Indonesian rubber.

Potential

Another East European country which has declared its intention of importing Indonesian rubber is East Germany. Having designated the AHB Chemie Export-Import firm for this transaction, this country is planning to purchase 9,000 tons of rubber, valued at about \$7.5 million. Compared with East German imports of Indonesian rubber in 1982 of 10,000 tons, imports this year have clearly declined.

Eastern Europe constitutes a potential market for Indonesian rubber. In 1980 total exports of Indonesian rubber to various countries of Eastern Europe, including the Soviet Union, amounted to 102,742 tons. In 1981 this total increased to 102,897 tons. However, in 1982 Eastern European rubber imports declined sharply to 64,817 tons.

Dr Harry Tanugraha, executive director of GAPKINDO, said some time ago: "In fact, if Indonesia is able to overcome a number of obstacles in its trade with Eastern Europe, this year it would not be difficult to export up to 100,000 tons of rubber."

Such a statement provides a picture of the size of the potential market for Indonesian rubber in the countries of Eastern Europe. However, at present and after direct trade relationships had been established, new obstacles have arisen which often disappoint the importers of Eastern European countries. Previously, in fact, purchases of Indonesian rubber were affected through third countries, particularly Singapore.

One of the causes of the disappointment of Eastern European importers is the difficulty the purchasers often encounter in obtaining their goods. The excuse often advanced by Indonesian producers is that their rubber has already been purchased by "people from Singapore." As a result, many potential purchasers are happier to establish contact with Singapore businessmen.

Another obstacle which often is encountered involves a classic problem, the transportation area. For example, transportation costs are high, there is no assurance the goods will be shipped in the time frame promised, and a number of other, related problems have come up under this category. If such problems are not immediately resolved, there are many groups of businessmen who doubt that Indonesia is able to take care of the needs of this potential market. Such a situation is also of benefit to other producing countries.

5170

CSO: 4213/9

EAST JAVA NON-OIL EXPORTS INCREASE 18.49 PERCENT PER YEAR

Jakarta PELITA in Indonesian 8 Sep 83 p 6

[Text] Surabaya, PELITA--From the beginning of the Second 5-Year Plan until the present the level of non-oil and natural gas exports from East Java has steadily increased at an average of 18.49 percent per year, except for 1980, when there was a decrease of 17.5 percent.

The value of such exports in 1981 was \$267,670,777; in 1982 they amounted to \$277,105,597; and from January to the end of June 1983 they totaled \$123,776,683.

Doctor Soeparmanto, deputy governor of East Java, made this statement at a meeting held at the end of last week with Rachmat Saleh, minister of trade, which was also attended by exporters, businessmen, and representatives of regional firms and banks at Grahadi Hall in the governor's office in Surabaya.

He said that the kinds of commodities which had reflected an increase in exports were: tobacco, coffee, animal skins, coconut oil cake, copra, rattan, plywood, rice bran, frozen shrimp, lumber, clove cigarettes, textiles, and frogs' legs. These commodities were exported to a number of countries, including Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong, West Germany, the Netherlands, and the United States.

Commodity Groups

Soeparmanto said that these export commodities could be categorized into four groups: processed commodities, semi-processed commodities, miscellaneous committees, and goods awaiting export.

The group of processed commodities includes coffee, rubber, tobacco, animal feed, frozen shrimp, animal skins, plywood, lumber, textiles, and textile products. He said this was called the processed commodities group because the marketing of these products is controlled in terms of export guide prices previously set for export on a continuing basis and with relatively high receipts in foreign exchange terms.

The category of semi-processed goods includes cacao beans, seeds, raw nuts, birds' nests, fish, frogs' legs, clove cigarettes, prawn crackers, raw materials for medicines, cosmetics, canned fish, other processed foods, and handicraft articles and other products of small industry.

This category includes semi-processed goods which have already been exported. The foreign exchange value of these items is relatively not high, but the marketing prospects are quite encouraging, the production potential is rather satisfactory, and these have become a major hope for exports from East Java.

Other commodities listed in the miscellaneous category include ground animal bones, treated seeds, live birds, sawdust, processed shellfish, kaolin, beeswax, music cassettes, and other products exported on a seasonal basis.

Some types of commodities which have not yet been exported but which have potential markets abroad include partly-incubated eggs [belut], vegetables, green beans, bull frogs, forgem [as published], kenanga tree oil, and sweetening agents.

On this occasion the minister of trade asked regional officials to respond quickly in meeting the needs of businessmen and to provide proper support and encouragement from all concerned, so that the export development program will be able to function smoothly.

5170

CSO: 4213/9

LNG TRANSPORTATION CONTRACT WITH SOUTH KOREA SIGNED

Jakarta KOMPAS in Indonesian 10 Sep 83 p 2

[Text] Jakarta, KOMPAS--A contract for the transportation of liquified natural gas (LNG) was signed in Jakarta on Friday [9 September] by Dr Joedo Sumbono, principal director of PERTAMINA [State Oil and Gas Company]; Bambang Triatmodjo, principal director of PT Samudra Petrindo Asia; and Dr Bambang Trisulo, principal director of PT Fast Marine Service. This contract involves the transportation of two million tons per year of LNG, in accordance with the contract for the sale of LNG, entered into by PERTAMINA and Korea Electric Power Company (KEPCO), which was signed in Jakarta on 12 August 1983.

Joedo Sumbono considers that the signature of the transportation contract is very important. For in addition to providing an opportunity for the transfer of technology, it is also the weakest link in the chain and is full of risks for the basic sale of natural gas. The transportation of the gas has to be accomplished under the best security conditions.

The two Indonesian companies are the first to be entrusted with the transportation of LNG. They will provide two tankers with a carrying capacity of 125,000 cubic meters, more or less of similar size as a petroleum tanker with a carrying capacity of 450,000 barrels of oil. Each of the two tankers has a tonnage of about 60,000 DWT [Dead Weight Tons] and is powered by 40,000 horsepower steam turbines. They can steam at about 19 knots per hour.

According to present plans, the two ships will be delivered to PERTAMINA by the end of 1986. They are to be in operation for 20 years, in accordance with the period of validity of the contract for the sale of LNG to Korea. The two ball-shaped tankers will strengthen the tanker used by Indonesia for the transportation of LNG at the present time: that is, eight tankers used to transport natural gas on an FOB basis to Japan and seven other ships used by the Japanese purchasers themselves.

The principal director of PERTAMINA said that the transportation of LNG to South Korea will now be handled by Indonesia. However, the possibility is not foreclosed that South Korea will handle the transportation itself if at a later date they purchase more than two million tons of LNG from Indonesia.

5170

CSO: 4213/11

STEEL CONSUMPTION CONTINUES TO EXCEED PRODUCTION

Jakarta KOMPAS in Indonesian 8 Sep 83 p 2

[Text] T. Ariwibowo, the executive director of Krakatau Steel, estimates that it will be necessary for Indonesia to import steel until 1990 since the annual increase in consumption is not being balanced by an increase in production.

T. Ariwibowo spoke with reporters in Jakarta on Wednesday following the signing of an aid agreement between the United States government and the Indonesian government. Under the agreement the United States will provide funds for a feasibility study on the expansion of a hot strip mill.

Ariwibowo said that at this time it is difficult to determine when Indonesia can stop importing steel. Steel imports will continue to increase if production capacity is not expanded, he said. "The problem now is costs. The cost of building a steel mill is very great, and support must be obtained from the public or from other sources that can provide funds," he said.

National consumption of raw steel is running at about 2.6 million tons a year, while national production capacity is put at about 2.2 to 2.3 million tons a year. Krakatau Steel has a production capacity of about 1.5 million tons a year and the production capacity of private companies is 600 to 700 million tons a year.

Indonesia must import steel to meet the needs of national consumption. Consumption is increasing an average of 13 percent a year and at this rate there will be a demand for 7.2 million tons of steel a year in 1990. "With the aid provided by the United States to finance this feasibility study, national capacity will increase by about 1 million tons a year. The feasibility study will last about 7 months and should be completed around the middle of 1984," Ariwibowo said.

The agreement provides for a grant of \$500,000. The United States government was represented at the signing ceremony by Ambassador John Holdridge, the Indonesian government by Director General of Basic Metals Industry Eman Yogasara, and Krakatau Steel by T. Ariwibowo.

5458

CSO: 4213/8

INDOCEMENT BECOMING LARGEST CEMENT PRODUCER

Jakarta KOMPAS in Indonesian 5 Sep 83 p 2

[Text] Jakarta, KOMPAS--On 5 September, Minister of Industry Ir Hartarto will dedicate the sixth phase of the rotary kiln of the Indocement cement factory area in Citeureup, Cibinong, West Java. With this opening, Indocement production will reach 4.7 million tons per year, or 40.5 percent of the national installed capacity of 11.6 million tons.

Sudwikatmono, principal director of the Indocement Group, gave this information to reporters at the Graha Purna Yudha building on 3 September. Ibrahim Risjad, director of the Indocement Group, was also present.

The rotary kiln with a capacity of 1.5 million tons per year, will have the highest production in Indonesia. So far, only Japan and Korea have produced as much as 1.5 million tons per year from one rotary kiln.

Investments in the sixth phase total \$179 million (169.5 billion rupiahs). Investments for the purchase of major machinery came from the Banco Exterior de Espana (Spain) and for factory building construction from an Indonesian bank consortium (Bank Duta Ekonomi, Bank Central Asia, and Bank Niaga).

"This is the first financing from a consortium of private national banks. The interest is 18 percent per annum over 7 years," said Sudwikatmono.

A total of 95 percent of raw materials for this factory will be derived from domestic sources, and only 5 percent will be imported. When phase six is complete, it will be followed by phases seven and eight, each of which will add 1.5 million tons per year. By 1985, production of cement of the Indocement Group will reach 7.7 million tons per year, or more than 50 percent of the national installed capacity of 14.6 million tons. The Indocement Group will be the largest cement producer in Indonesia.

No Shortages

Indocement director Ibrahim Risjad added that, with the constantly increasing production capacity of Indocement, the problem of cement shortages in Indonesia will be overcome. Following phase six production, national installed capacity will reach 11.6 million tons per year. Since only 8.5 million tons are needed, the remaining 3.5 million tons can be exported.

"Moreover, after Indocement production reaches 7.7 million tons, Indonesia is expected to become one of the main cement exporters in the world. There will be no more domestic cement shortages," he said.

He admitted that in the past Indonesian commercial cement exports have not been very successful. Improvement is expected next year, however, since the increasing production will exceed domestic requirements. Furthermore, competition from South Korea and Taiwan will decline, since more of their production will be absorbed by their own domestic demands.

"Singapore, Malaysia, and Brunei are now the best markets because those three countries are performing large-scale construction. Besides, the price of cement in those countries is the highest in the world," said Ibrahim.

Exports

Indocement will take great advantage of this momentum to make Indonesia one of the main exporters in the world. By 1985 Indonesia will no longer import cement.

In the past, Indocement has exported cement to Bangladesh, Saudi Arabia, and Hong Kong. In the last few months, this manufacturing group has exported 30,000 tons of cement to Bangladesh under funding from the Islamic Development Bank.

The PRC has also shown interest in buying cement from Indonesia in volumes of 50,000 tons per month over the long term. The Indocement Group stated that it is prepared to supply PRC needs if permission is received from the government.

6942

CSO: 4213/12

DEVELOPMENT OF CEMENT INDUSTRY FOR EXPORT PROGRAM

Jakarta KOMPAS in Indonesian 6 Sep 83 p 2

[Text] Citeureup, KOMPAS--Consumers must be able to depend upon the stability of domestic cement prices. This can be accomplished by continuous efforts to improve efficiency in the factory as well as in distribution.

Minister of Industry Ir Hartarto made this statement in written remarks read by Ir Sidharta, director general for basic chemical industry, at the ceremony for the initial firing of the phase six rotary kiln at the Indocement Group complex in Citeureup, Bogor, West Java, on Monday afternoon [5 September].

In order to meet constantly increasing demands for cement, especially that which is expected at the beginning of 1986, new cement industries are being developed in Central Java, Madura, West Sumatra, South Sulawesi, South Sumatra, etc. "Implementation will be in handled by private industry," said Hartarto.

Diversification must be continued in addition to increasing the national installed capacity. At this time, production includes white cement, cement for port construction (ASTM V [expansion unknown]), and cement for oil wells. In addition, the manufacture of portland-pozzolan cement is being initiated.

With the growth of the cement industry in Indonesia, there must be efforts toward the domestic manufacture of machinery and spare parts. These efforts must be supported by software capabilities, particularly in the design of machinery.

Based on its experience, Indonesia must be confident in its ability to handle this strategic sector. With a little additional investment, our national machinery industry must be able to make machines and spare parts for the cement industry.

Export Program

The minister of industry further stated that the national installed capacity for cement production will reach 11.72 million tons by the end of 1983. This will be accomplished by the completion of the sixth expansion of the Indocement Group, the completion of the PT Semen Andalas factory in Andalas, Aceh, the expansion of unit III-A of the PT Semen Padang factory, and the completion of the PT Semen Kupang factory by the end of 1983.

A series of efforts is now actively being made to build new cement factories. By the end of 1984, national installed capacity will reach 15.61 million tons per year through the completed expansion of PT Semen Tonasa, the expansion of Indarung III-B of PT Semen Padang, the expansion of the PT Tridaya Manunggal in Cirebon, and the completion of the seventh Indocement Group project. By the end of 1985, national capacity will rise again to 17.91 million tons per year through the completion of the eighth Indocement Group project and PT Semen Cibinong.

As a result, Indonesia will be able to start an export program between 1984 and 1986. Domestic requirements will be satisfied first. Exports are very important for increasing foreign exchange earnings and for the growth of the national economy. "National industries must be encouraged to work efficiently in an export program," said the minister of industry.

Sudwikatmono, principal director of the Indocement Group, stated that the sixth phase of the rotary kiln was begun on 8 August 1981. This kiln, with a production capacity of 1.5 million tons per year, was constructed through PMDN [domestic capital investment] of about \$173 million. About 30 percent of the project's construction was done with domestically produced materials.

Others present at the dedication were Minister of Manpower Sudomo, West Java governor Aang Kunaefi BKPM [Capital Investment Coordination Board] chairman Ir Suhartoyo, DPR [parliament] Commission VI chairman Ir Rachmat Witoelar, and Indocement Group president/commissioner Sudono Salim (Liem Swie Liong).

6942

CS0: 4213/12

NEPAMOINDOU DECLARES HIS CANDIDACY

Paris LE MONDE in French 20 Sep 83 p 7

[Article by Frederic Filloux: "New Caledonia: A Last Minute Trouble Maker"]

[Text] Noumea--It was 11:42 pm on Friday night 16 September in Noumea--that is 18 minutes before registrations were to close--when Kapa Nepamoindou, 56 years old, chief of the Saint-Pierre de Thio Melanesian tribe, located on the east coast of the territory, created a sensation by declaring himself a candidate for the Militant Independence Front of the Melanesian Progressive Union (UPM, a section of the Independence Front). Claiming the support of the Kanak Socialist Liberation (LKS, another component of the FI [Independence Front]), Nepamoindou explained that he had been urged on by the separatist leaders "who believe that the Independence Front should have its own candidate and should not ally itself with another party."

This unexpected candidacy was all the more surprising in that the IF military staff, controlled by the Caledonian Union (UC, the main independence group), had just a few hours earlier announced its support for the outgoing senator, Lionel Cherrier (Centrist Union), member of the Federation for a New Caledonian Society (FNSC, an ally of the FI in the territorial assembly). Cherrier said he was "extremely surprised." His friends are already talking of a "remote controlled attack, the result of a sinister bargain," aimed at favoring the rival of the outgoing senator, Dick Ukeiwe, former vice president of the government council (territorial executive), which represents the Assembly for Caledonia in the Republic (RPCR, the main arm of the opposition).

Is this a rupture then in the Independence Front which has never managed to overcome its internal dissensions completely? "Not at all," the trouble maker and his deputy, Edmond Nekirai, president of the UPM declared. "Our candidacy does not call in question our allegiance to the FI. It simply re-opens a debate."

Objectively however, their presence in the competition is an embarrassment for the outgoing senator and could cost him his seat to the advantage of the anti-independantists who support Ukeiwe. According to Cherrier, this will no doubt mean the loss of 18 votes out of 324 major constituents; the FNSC and the RPCR seemed to have gathered 155 each. That leaves 14 major European constituents undecided. They are perhaps the ones who will make the difference.

CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OPPOSES U.S. BOMBINGS

Manila BULLETIN TODAY in English 14 Oct 83 p 26

[Text]

The Civil Liberties Union (CLU), through its chairman, Hernando J. Abaya, and Commissioners Luis R. Maunio and Emil de Peralta, issued yesterday the following statement:

"During the last four years, four bombs have fallen from US Air Force fighter planes on practice bombing runs, causing heavy damage to property and posing grave threat to the lives of thousands of panic-

stricken innocent civilians in towns of Zambales and Pangasinan.

"The first of these bombs fell on June 12, 1979, followed by another in 1980, and two more on September 12 and 16 this year. Strange as it may seem, the Philippine government reacted to each incident with unusual silence, as if tacitly admitting to one and all that those falling bombs are fringe benefits to be expected from the Philippine-

American military bases agreement and military assistance pact.

"The Civil Liberties Union condemns the use of any part of the Philippines for practice bombing runs or any other military exercises by the United States armed forces or those of any other foreign power, and calls upon the government of the Philippines to protest this kind of infringement of the Philippine independence and sovereignty."

CSO: 4200/112

FOREIGN MINISTRY RESHUFFLE EXPECTED BY YEAREND

Manila PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS in English 14 Oct 83 p 6

[Article by Mel Parale]

[Text]

A RESHUFFLE of foreign ministry officials and personnel is likely before the year is over.

Deputy Foreign Minister Pacifico Castro met behind closed doors yesterday with key ministry officials and discussed problems affecting the ministry's efficiency.

Details of the meeting were not disclosed but sources said the conference touched lengthily on how the performance of various offices were faring.

Among those present in the meeting were assistant ministers with the rank of ambassador.

* * *

SOURCES said all heads of offices and division chiefs were required to submit their performance reports before the year is over.

Such reports, the sources said, will be used in a performance audit which, in turn, will be used as basis in rating the officials' and employees' performance during the year.

Several ministry employees have complained privately that it had been difficult to get a promotion in the ministry "unless you have the proper backing."

BATASAN LEADER SCORES OPLE'S CABINET REVAMP PROPOSAL

Manila PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS in English 14 Oct 83 p 6

[Text] A BATASAN leader chided labor Minister Blas F. Ople yesterday for urging a Cabinet revamp to preclude "job fatigue" and for his remarks that the present economic problems sprang for "a pervasive crisis of confidence."

Assemblyman and Assistant Majority Floorleader Rodolfo B. Albano (KEL, R-2) said that what is needed at this time is not a Cabinet revamp but a visit to the rural areas by Cabinet members for them to feel the entire nation's pulse and to check on the implementation of government programs and activities.

Albano cautioned government leaders against "myopic instances," stating that Metro Manila is not the Philippines.

He said that the anti-government demonstrations in Metro Manila have not gained support and sympathy in the rural areas.

ALBANO said he had just submitted to President Marcos a report on the situation in Region 2 (Cagayan Valley) based on a two-week survey he had conducted. He said there "is no uneasiness in the area."

"On the other hand," Albano said in his report, "our constituents and local leaders have reiterated their faith and support to the nation's leaders."

IN A SPEECH Tuesday before the Publishers' Association of the Philippines, Inc., Ople said "staying too long in one place exposes one to job burden or fatigue."

Ople also said the crisis of confidence which, he explained, was brought about by economic problems has shaken traditionally esteemed institutions of Philippine society following the assassination of former Sen. Benigno S. Aquino Jr.

IN ILOILO CITY, Assemblyman and Minister of State for Information Jose T. Tumbokon urged a political ceasefire in the light of the repeated call for national reconciliation by various segments of society. He said a moratorium on partisan strife and political bickerings is in order at this time when the nation is facing economic crisis.

MARCOS ISSUES DETENTION ORDER AGAINST EDITOR

Manila BULLETIN TODAY in English 14 Oct 83 pp 1, 11

[Text]

President Marcos has issued a preventive detention action (PDA) against Rommel Corro, detained publisher-editor of the tabloid Philippine Times who is charged with the crime of inciting to sedition.

The PDA was signed on Oct. 7 and attached to a motion filed by Quezon City Fiscal Sergio Apostol in opposing a move by Corro's lawyers to secure bail for the newsman.

The PDA was issued at the request of Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile.

Apostol said that Corro, now confined at the Bicutan Detention Center, can not be granted bail unless the PDA is lifted by the President or his duly authorized representative.

Early last week, Corro was charged in court with inciting to sedition, a crime against national security which, under Presidential Decree 1834, is a capital offense.

Former Sen Jose W. Diokno, representing Corro, said the alleged seditious articles were written and published in the Philippines Times before PD 1834

took effect.

According to Diokno the decree signed by the President a day prior to the lifting of martial law, was published in the Official Gazette only on Sept. 29, this year.

Defense lawyers claimed that a law can take effect only 15 days after its publication.

In opposing Diokno's motion, Apostol contended that the crime is non-bailable and the government has sufficient evidence to secure the conviction of Corro.

Apostol added that the President ordered the detention of Corro because it was demanded by national security and public order.

Judge Pedro T. Santiago of the regional trial court handling the case gave defense lawyers two days to file their answer to Apostol's motion.

AFP TO BUY LOCAL ARMALITES

Manila BULLETIN TODAY in English 14 Oct 83 p 5

[Text] Military and police authorities decided yesterday to buy 28,000 locally made pistolized "baby Armalite rifles" for the use of the Integrated National Police (INP).

The decision came close on the heels of the slaying of Quezon City Patrolman Epifanio Canson, Jr., by an amok last Oct. 8 because Canson's .38 caliber revolver turned out to be ineffective.

The purchase of the "baby pistolized Armalite" that can fire 300 bullets per second was firmed up with the signing of a contract with the manufacturing firm after a P45-million loan was secured from the Armed Forces' Retirement and Separation Benefit System (RSBS).

The loan was signed in behalf of the Armed Forces and the INP by Gen. Fabian C. Ver, AFP chief of staff who is also chairman of the board of RSBS; Lt. Gen Fidel V. Ramos, AFP vice chief of staff and concurrent PC-INP chief; and Col. Jacinto Galang, INP chief of staff and comptroller.

Pepito del Gallego signed for Elisco Tool which will manufacture M-16 Armalite rifles.

Elisco Tool is under licensed by Colt Corp. of the United States to manufacture Armalite rifle in the Philippines.

Ver and Ramos said the acquisition of additional M-16 rifles (baby pistolized Armalites) will boost tremendously the capability of the INP in its drive against criminality.

The P45-million loan will be payable in five years at 21 per cent annual interest.

According to Ver, the loan will also bolster self-reliance defense program because the M-16 assault rifles would be manufactured locally. Elisco Tool has been the supplier of M-16s to the Armed Forces for several years now.

NEW INVESTMENTS DECLINE IN SEPTEMBER

Manila BULLETIN TODAY in English 14 Oct 83 p 16

[Text]

Initial paid-up capital investments of newly registered firms reached only about P200 million in September this year, which is about 50 per cent less than the P387 million recorded in the preceding month of August.

Gonzalo Santos, Jr., associate commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), attributed the decline to the reluctance of some businessmen to invest until such time that the economic and political climate returns to normal.

"But with even this decrease in September, the figure could still be considered higher compared to all other

months of the year except August and June," Santos said.

The eight-month period from January to August 1983 reflected a growth in corporate investments of newly-registered firms by 18.8 per cent from the P1.1 billion investments recorded in the same period last year.

Previous January-to-July figures showed combined investments falling behind the 1982 record by 2.2 per cent.

The big boost in August was due to the creation of more firms and the increase in per capita investments. August data also revealed a very strong investment surge when compared to past months.

CSO: 4200/112

EIGHT COMPANIES PUT ON AUCTION BLOCK

Manila BULLETIN TODAY in English 14 Oct 83 p 16

[Text]

The Development Bank of the Philippines has placed on the auction block eight more companies which have not been able to pay total loans amounting to more than P1 billion.

A report prepared by the DBP's special project management unit indicated that the bank is bound to lose

around P640 million from four of the eight accounts.

The four accounts have unpaid loans of P847.737 million, including interests, but their total assessed value as of the middle of last year was placed by the DBP itself at only P638.344 million, or a loss of about 33 per cent.

Some of the eight accounts and their respective loans and assessed values are: Manila Garden Hotel, P272,941,551 (assessed value, P232,617,950); Manila Peninsula Hotel, P272,191,111 (assessed value, P121,783,470); Tradewinds Hotel, P166,201,659 (assessed value, P116,463,000);

Fame Textiles, P156,403,247 (assessed value, P67,479,810).

The DBP is also exposed to the tune of P52,485,634 to a food firm whose assessed value as of early this year was 50 per cent less or P23,408,500.

Also placed on the auction block were relatively smaller borrowers; namely, Luzon Aggregates, Western Steel, Link Shipping,

Cortex Manufacturing, Marvex Commercial Corp., Basalt Rock Aggregates, and Pines Hotel. Figures for these accounts were not immediately available.

Sources in the DBP also said that there was an offer to buy Paragon Paper Mills in Bataan for P400 million with a P10 million down payment, the balance in 25 years.

CSO: 4200/111

ANONYMOUS INVESTORS WILLING TO REHABILITATE STEEL FIRM

Manila BULLETIN TODAY in English 13 Oct 83 p 9

[Text]

A new group of investors has informed the Securities and Exchange Commission of its willingness to infuse fresh capital into the bankrupt Philippine Blooming Mills Co. under a new rehabilitation plan.

The group, which requested anonymity for the moment, is expected to present the new proposal to the creditors of PBM, Bulletin sources said yesterday. Details of the plan, however, were not immediately available, but the same sources said that the major creditors were amenable to the proposal.

An earlier rehabilitation program has not been implemented because PNB, the major creditor, could not come to terms with the rest of other creditors. SEC action on the proposal is being withheld in the absence of the approval of the majority of the creditors.

The PNB has proposed that it would take over the operations of the steel firm. This was rejected by the other creditors who claimed

that the takeover would convert a substantial portion of their loans into equity and the balance to be written off.

Some groups of creditors want the firm to be under a management committee that will pave the way for the payment of their investments within 15 years. The PNB is the largest single group of creditor of PBM.

Late last month, the National Steel Corporation (NSC) offered to buy facilities of the firm. Likewise, First Manila Management Corp. (FMMC), has also expressed intention to revive PBM.

SEC chairman Manuel Abello was of the view that the commission will only decide on the purchase proposal as soon as the NSC makes a formal offer.

PBM, which is still working out a rehabilitation plan for the company, is under suspension of payments, which means all kinds of collection suits are temporarily frozen except those approved by the SEC.

EDITORIAL, CARTOON REPORT FAILURE OF PRICE WATCH TEAMS

Manila PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS in English 13 Oct 83 p 4

[Editorial: "Less Talk, More Action"]

[Text] IN THE PAST days, much has been said and done about the government's intent to protect the consumers from unwarranted hardships and blatant exploitation by unscrupulous businessmen.

The intensified campaign against hoarders, profiteers, blackmarketeers, and other price manipulators has been much heralded. Price watch teams have been fanned out. A tough presidential directive which imposes stiff penalties for violators has been issued. A nine-man Cabinet action group has been formed to map out strategies.

But the consumer has only to go to the market or nearby grocery to realize that commodities have either vanished from the shelves or are being sold at much higher prices. The markets tell the same tale. So do many other stores.

Even some Kadiwa stores are selling some goods at marked-up prices. Some of Kadiwa's suppliers of basic commodities have already given notice that they have increased prices of deliveries.

Apparently, many businessmen are again making a mockery out of government efforts to prevent hoarding and price manipulation. They are quick to cash in on the sharp drop of the peso value and the inevitable rise in costs of goods and services. Stocks bought and manufactured at old price levels are being sold at adjusted prices.

The public is restive, to say the least. If higher prices are the inevitable result of the peso devaluation, let them come at least when they should, perhaps two months from now. Right now, there is hardly any reason other than selfish gain to jack up prices.

There should perhaps be less press announcements and more of law enforcement regarding hoarding, profiteering, and price manipulations. Several stores have reportedly been closed for violations. But how many are these compared to the violators who are all around us? Are violators going to be prosecuted this time? And will their stocks be confiscated? Unless the government can

make good its pledge of eradicating business malpractices, it might be better to have less official announcements which only raise false hopes in the people.



CSO: 4200/112

CAUTIOUS FOREIGN BUSINESS ATTITUDE ANALYZED

Manila BULLETIN TODAY in English 13 Oct 83 p 9

[Article by Samuel Senoren]

[Text]

The foreign business community in Manila has taken an overly cautious stance in their operations because of fears of a sharp decline in the volume of the country's foreign trade in the months ahead.

Business sources say that many companies are trying to keep their operations normal but have

shelved plans to expand or bring in additional investments.

Foreign companies in the country are mostly engaged in manufacturing, services and trade-based activities.

Fears of a big trade drop have been based mainly on major import restrictions which the government imposed to con-

tain an increasing deficit in the country's balance of payments.

Such restraints usually disrupt the flow of production goods resulting in stunted productivity, which in turn, leads to volatile markets.

A foreign business analyst told the Bulletin that the foreign business community is keenly watching

economic and political developments in the last quarter of 1983 through the first quarter of 1984.

The next six months, he said, would be "very critical" for the foreign business sector. He did not elaborate.

It could indicate, however, that foreign companies are not likely to make any

major risk-taking decisions until the second quarter of 1984.

Government officials have already admitted that about \$300 million of the BOP deficit in the third quarter was due primarily to a big drop in trade during the period.

Sources also said that some firms

which expected foreign exchange for additional working capital deferred acceptance of the funding as a hedge against further depreciation in the value of the peso.

Instead, some firms, sources said, are now considering peso borrowings for additional working capital.

DEVALUATION SLOWS DOWN DBP LENDING

Manila BULLETIN TODAY in English 13 Oct 83 p 9

[Text]

Lending operations of the Development Bank of the Philippines are expected to slow down markedly as a consequence of the recent devaluation.

The pressure on the bank's lending portfolio will come from the additional P4 billion that the DBP would have to raise to service its foreign debt of more than \$1.3 billion. The amount represents the difference between the old rate of P11 set on June 23 and the new parity of P14 to one dollar.

On top of the foreign loans which have maturities extending

up to 1994, the DBP has also issued guarantees covering \$847.163 million for the private sector. The additional peso requirements to service the DBP-guaranteed foreign loans amount to more than P2.5 billion.

The Philippine National Bank is obviously in the same predicament but figures were not immediately available.

DBP's inability to collect an estimated P12 billion in past due loans given mostly to tourism oriented projects and to the textile industry, has already

forced the bank to reduce its loans to selected clients, giving preference to agribusiness and export-oriented projects.

Top officials of the DBP have been meeting continuously with the financial group of the Central Bank since last week presumably to hammer out strategies that will soften the impact of the new peso-dollar rate.

The group is said to be closely examining the dollar earning potentials of projects with guaranteed foreign obligations obviously to determine

the extent of possible defaults. As guarantor, the DBP will have to make good its word in the event that the principal borrowers default on their foreign obligations.

Sources said that the DBP will speed up the disposal of its acquired to be able to raise more funds for debt service and loan operations.

An official said that serious negotiations are underway with local group for the sale of Tradewinds Hotel whose total debts to the DBP amounts to slightly less than P200 million.

CSO: 4200/111

DEVALUATION MAY RESULT IN LOSSES TO MANUFACTURING

Manila BULLETIN TODAY in English 14 Oct 83 p 16

[Text]

A number of manufacturing companies are likely to incur considerable losses during the second semester as a direct result of the devaluation of the peso from P11 to P14 to the US dollar, industry sources disclosed yesterday.

Firms that will be hit hard by the devaluation, according to sources, are those which bought raw materials and other production inputs from foreign suppliers on deferred payment basis.

Many companies had opened 180-day usance letters of credit in favor of their suppliers to cover raw material purchases for the third quarter.

Sources said many companies heeded a

government advice to avail of suppliers credit to conserve foreign exchange for the rest of the year.

Central Bank officials had encouraged the use of suppliers' credit following the first devaluation in June that pulled peso value down from P10.20 to P11 to the dollar.

Monetary officials had repeatedly assured the business sector that the government was strongly supporting the new rate to maintain it at that level.

Based on such assurances, sources said many firms opted for 180-day suppliers credit so that no dollar payments would be made during the

second semester.

With the second devaluation, however, these firms will now have to shell out an additional P3 for every dollar payment when the debt instruments mature in January or later.

The payment of the additional P3 burden, sources said, is based on the assumption that the P14 to \$1 rate will hold until early next year.

What makes the situation doubly difficult for many firms, according to sources, is that finished products have already been disposed of or contracted under old prices, giving them little chance of recovering the cost overruns.

CSO: 4200/112

GARMENT BUYERS CANCEL PHILIPPINE TRIPS, OPT FOR HONG KONG

Manila PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS in English 14 Oct 83 p 10

[Text]

FOREIGN buyers of local-made garments have reportedly cancelled trips to the Philippines and asked the local suppliers to meet them in Hongkong, instead.

The foreign buyers, mostly from the United States and Europe, have been scared by reports on "politically-inspired" crisis in the country, local garment makers told Trade and Industry Minister Roberto V. Ongpin in a dialogue yesterday.

They claimed buyers have expressed preference to negotiate contacts in Hongkong.

Traveling to Hongkong, however, will increase the costs of local exporters, who aside from spending for their fares, will also pay additional travel tax.

THE exporters said they are willing to go to Hongkong provided Ongpin make representations with agencies involved for their exemption from the travel tax.

The exporters explained their foreign buyers have not cancelled orders nor hinted at stopping future purchases.

"They just don't want to come over," exporters added.

Garment exports for the first nine months of the year have reached \$398 million, and based on export clearances already issued, may hit about \$680 million by year-end, according to the Garments and Textile Export Board (GTEB).

Last year, garment exports totalled \$540 million, way below 1981 levels because of a combination of factors including the worldwide recession.

CSO: 4200/112

DEVALUATION CAUSES FURTHER ELECTRIC RATE HIKE

Manila BULLETIN TODAY in English 14 Oct 83 pp 1, 12

[Article by Ray S. Enano]

[Text]

The National Power Corp. (NPC) is increasing its rates for private utility owners, including the Manila Electric Co. (Meralco), by another 3.4 centavos per kilowatt hour (kwh) in the wake of the new exchange rate of P14 to \$1.

The latest NPC rate is apart from the 4.1-centavo per kwh and the 3/4-centavo per kwh it announced earlier.

The new increase in rates takes effect Oct. 26, the same day the quarterly increase of 3/4-centavo will be implemented. Thus, for the current month alone, NPC raised its charges by a total of 8.25 centavos per kwh. In sum, NPC has raised its power rates between 17 and 18 centavos since the start of the year.

Private utility firms normally pass on the increased NPC charges after one month. In the case of Meralco, the

new NPC adjustment would be reflected in its purchasing power adjustment clause.

Gabriel Y. Itchon, NPC president, said yesterday that the new rate came as a result of the foreign currency adjustment clause in the power firm's monthly billings to customers which the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) approved only last month.

Itchon explained that in view of the new foreign exchange rate of the peso, NPC's foreign debt charges for the last quarter of the year would increase by P180 million which would have to be recovered thru the new charges.

He said that NPC's amortization payments for the last quarter amounted to \$60 million. For the first three quarters of the year, foreign debt service payments were estimated at \$130 million.

To recover the foreign exchange losses which NPC incurred during the past three quarters as a result of the June 23 devaluation from ₱9 to \$1 (at the start of the year), the government adopted the currency adjustment clause.

NPC said that without the adjustment, it will not be able to finance on-going power expansion projects, most of which are scheduled for completion between 1983 and 1984. The \$2-billion nuclear power plant project, alone, is expected to be completed late next year or early 1985.

Itchon said NPC's financing program has been hampered by three major factors, namely, the rise in the peso exchange rate, the 50 per cent cut (₱900 million) on government equity contributions for the current year, and the drought in Mindanao where the power firm consumed more oil.

He continued that due to the drought, NPC's oil consumption

for the whole year will go up by 1.52 million barrels at a cost of ₱410 million based on the pre-July 1, 1983 prices.

Without adjusting the rates, he said the three external factors would have reduced NPC's resources for financing its power projects by ₱1.58 billion. He pointed out that in 1982, NPC's internal cash generation only amounted to ₱0.54 billion.

The latest adjustment on NPC's rate is on top of another expected increase in power charges after fuel oil prices are adjusted in early December this year.

Last January, NPC also increased its rates by 10 per cent on account also of the rise in the exchange rate of the peso from ₱7.50 to \$1, the exchange rate prevailing when the 10-year power expansion program was prepared in 1980.

NPC has been financing the foreign cost component, or 60 per cent of its power projects from foreign loans.

CSO: 4200/111

EXPORT TAX EYED ON PRODUCTS PROFITING FROM DEVALUATION

Manila BULLETIN TODAY in English 14 Oct 83 p 15

[Text] A government study group has prepared two options on the application of the export tax on products which are recording windfall profits as a result of the latest adjustment on the foreign exchange rate of the peso.

A member of the study group said yesterday that first option calls for an across-the-board tax on all export products by one or two per cent.

The second one, on the other hand, is to be applied to a selective approach wherein the export tax and a premium duty would be slapped on selected export commodities.

The study group identified the five items to be subjected under this approach as logs, lumber, coconut oil, banana and pineapple. The source explained that these items have been identified since the five are the only products which have registered price increased since 1975.

The source said the other products were not included under the second approach since their prices have either fluctuated or gone down since 1975.

The export tax would actually be a reimposition after the government stopped its application about three years ago. The same source said the study would soon be considered by the Cabinet.

The source said that in connection with the second option, the study group is also recommending a change in the base price of the premium duty to be slapped on each of the five commodities listed.

He pointed out that the premium duty in 1975 was based on the existing price at that time. He said that study group has recommended July 1983 as the new base price since prices have already gone up.

The source, however, cited the pros and cons of the two options. According to him, the first option would be advantageous on the part of the government since more revenues would be collected. He said that once favored by the government, application of the first option would start by next month up to the whole of 1984.

On the other hand, he said the first option can be disadvantageous since it affects everybody. He added that the second option could favor other sectors since those would be slapped an export tax and premium duty can well afford to comply because of the price increases they have charged over the years.

CSO: 4200/111

BRIEFS

MANILA STOCK PRICES--SHARE prices at the Manila Stock Exchange (MSE) yesterday again firmed on turnover of P10.47 million, up from P6.58 million Wednesday. Analysts said the advance reflected persistent demand from investors who preferred to put their money into the market because of fears of another peso devaluation. The commercial and industrial index rose 1.22 to 133.90, the mining marker 121.55 to 1,419.52 and the oils index 0.081 to 1,220. ATLAS Con B firmed to P38 from P36, Benguet Con B to P94 from P84, Lepanto B to 0.13 from 0.11, Philex B to 0.2150 from 0.19, Basic Petroleum to 0.0085 from 0.0075, Oriental B to 0.025 from 0.024 Phil Overseas to 0.016 from 0.015 and PLDT to P44 from P42. San Miguel B eased to P22.50 from P25 and San Miguel A to P22.25 from P25. [Text] [Manila PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS in English 14 Oct 83 p 9]

MARINDUQUE OBTAINS LOAN--Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corp. (MMIC) has signed for a 800 million peso syndicated loan from five banks led by Citibank, N.A., bank officials said. They said the eight-year loan, with three years' grace, bears interest at 2.5 per cent above the Manila reference rate, currently 15.25 per cent plus a further 2.5 per cent. The money will be used to convert MMIC's short-term loan to medium-term maturity and finance the company's coal conversion project. (Reuter) [Text] [Manila BULLETIN TODAY in English 13 Oct 83 p 10]

CSO: 4200/111

ANALYST VIEWS RELATIONS WITH NEIGHBORS, U.S.

Bangkok LAK THAI in Thai 15 Sep 83 pp 18-19

[Analysis by Chaichana Phimanmaen: "Thailand's Standpoint"]

[Text] At the present time news about Thai political officials visiting many places in the world makes it appropriate for us to try to consider whether it has much meaning for the making of our policy and for the internal political situation. General Prem went to South Asia; General Kriangsak went to Laos; General Athit went to America.

The question we might ask ourselves is: Will we be able to return to the point of being our own masters and friends with our next-door neighbors without destroying the past good relations with the United States? Or how far can we stumble into becoming an opponent of the United States? These are matters which we can learn and analyze from the past in the following manner.

In the period immediately following the end of World War II, those countries--namely America, Russia, and China--which desired power in Indochinese territory in place of the old powers, caused the creation of groups which were at the right place at the right time to stage coups citing, for example: important economic reasons, such as inflation; administrative problems such as corruption (taking bribes and smuggling rice out of the country); political problems, such as separatism which sought to make the northeast a federation of states; and military problems, such as lack of interest in, and support for, the military.

The crucial thing is that President Truman of the United States changed his mind and gave aid to Vietnam through France instead of giving it directly to Ho Chi Minh as had been agreed beforehand. This was in hopes of humoring France in Europe and allowing her to regain her former power in Indochina, and it totally failed even in Europe; De Gaulle refused to join with NATO under American leadership, insisting instead that the guarantee of the security and safety of Europe against Russian aggression lay in building Europe's own strength, especially that between Germany and France. As for Indochina, [the plan] miscarried until finally the United States had to become the military opponent of its former allies, namely Ho Chi Minh and North Vietnam. Regarding England, she had to allow Burma, Malaya, and Singapore to become independent. Indonesia also escaped from Dutch authority.

The Kuomintang then had to go to war against Mao Zedong and the Communist Party instead of having the chance to reconstruct their country like other nations. Even though they had received generous aid from the United States, they lost to Mao Zedong before having time to truly carry it out, and evacuated the government to a set up a stronghold on the island of Taiwan to this very day. Chang Kai-shek himself ended his life in Taiwan.

The United States at that time was lacking a basis to seize upon as the point from which to expand its influence in the region. The question at that moment was how the United States was to expand its influence into the region in place of England, France, and Holland, and link it [Southeast Asia] with the United States' Pacific rim. We have seen that what the United States sets its hand to as the first step was to take the money which in Chang Kai-shek's era was used to restore China, and reconstruct Taiwan, aid the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, South Vietnam, and Burma through the form of an aid program called the Point-Four Program [as published]. This program was eventually called AID, and the real object was to build stability and security in the region and to allow it to escape the influence of Communist China's expansion. In other words, the United States hurried to build a wall encircling China for use in protecting its own interests and its own security.

The consequences for Thailand were that the government of 8 November 1948 Coup Group leaped to receive U.S. aid, and put its signature on agreements with the United States to receive aid and technical assistance on 19 September 1950, and military aid on 17 October of the same year. Ever since that time Thailand has adapted herself to fit side-by-side with the United States. The reasons that the government of Field Marshal Phibun Songkhram's Revolutionary Group began to accept aid from the United States may be guessed as stemming from many important factors but it is presumable that some of them were the problems of reconstruction, elimination of political rivals, and the placating of the United States by covering over their own mistakes after the fact. In any case, that decision had the result of changing the future orientation of a nation [from one] which was established on the foundation of guarding its independence through neutrality and friendship with neighboring countries and all the nations in the world, to one of accepting the jurisdiction of the United States and belonging to the U.S. camp. The results of carrying out such policy caused Thailand to be continually estranged from its neighbors until the time when the United States in the person of President Nixon altered its own policy because conditions had forced it to withdraw itself and its influence from this region. The result was to allow South Vietnam and Kampuchea to fall under the complete control of the communists. The questions for Thailand were:

- 1) Would we be able to escape the pressure to fall under the communists influence?
- 2) How were we to adapt ourselves and our policy?

In summary, the political changes in Thailand after World War II show that although we truly tried to build a parliamentary political system following the

1946 constitution and to lay down an international political policy which held fast to our independence and our relations with our neighbors, the changes brought about by the revolution on 8 November 1947 were the starting point of the alternation of the line of political development from democracy towards a period of reaccumulation of power by the military under the form of a parliamentary system.

Furthermore, relationships with other countries changed to that of absolute support of the expansion of American influence in this region. This line of thought was made firmer in Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat's era with the call for leading nations of the SEATO organization to send troops to help protect against communist aggression in Indochina.

From that time on, statements that "raise the spectre of communism" has caused the government to be accused all the time. Nevertheless, in the midst of official expressions of this kind, discontent and disagreement with the government began to be expressed secretly--namely, in the covert aid to national liberation groups in Burma, Cambodia, and Laos carried out by individuals in government groups who disagreed with the nation's headlong tumble to join with America as the enemy of neighboring countries. Simultaneously, the terrorist movement called the CT [communist terrorists] began to prosper widely, like a shadow lurking behind one. Resistance to [government] policies began to surface in increased numbers of intellectual circles, beginning with protests everywhere against the United States' operations in Indochina.

The actions of the opposition continued until they were most violent, and led to the overthrow by groups of intellectuals, university students, and the public, of the government of Field Marshal Thanom Kittikhachon on 14 October 1973. After that, Thailand entered an era which has been called one of planning adjustments to fit herself to new internal and external circumstances. The question at this time therefore lies in whether we can return to point of being our own masters and friends with our near neighbors without destroying past good relations with the United States, or how far we can stumble into becoming an opponent of the United States.

12532

CSO: 4207/3

SPECIAL BRANCH POLICE CHIEF PROFILED

Bangkok MATICHON SUTSAPPADA in Thai 14 Sep 83 p 38

[Profile of Police Colonel [as published] Kasem Saengmit, new head of the Special Branch]

[Text] Born 11 January 1930 in Tanyaburi District, Pathumthani, son of Subdistrict Chief Phan and Mrs Chalaem Saengmit.

His primary education began at Phiphat School, and he finished secondary school at Wat Ratchabophit School in the same class as Major General Suchinda Khraprayun, head of the Army Directorate of Operations. Later on Kasem entered senior high school. Class mates included: Chana Rungsaeng, Pramuk Burnawanit, Nippon Sasithon, Anan Anantakun, and Samoechai Phumphueng.

He enrolled in the Faculty of Engineering, Chulalongkorn University, in 1949, the same class as Praphat Premmoni. He studied engineering for two years, then transferred to study in the Faculty of Political Science where he recommenced his studies at the freshman level. Class mates at the Faculty of Political Science included Kramon Thongthammachat and Manaphat Chuto. He graduated with a degree in political science and second-class honors in 1955.

Col Kasem began his career as an army sub-lieutenant trainee attached to the Army Personnel Department. After only a few months' work, he was released from active duty, and he then applied for temporary employment with the Special Branch during Police Maj Gen Phao Siyanon's tenure as director general of the Police Department and of the Central Intelligence Division.

Col Kasem applied for employment in the Special Branch at the persuasion of Police Lt Gen Wasit Dechakunchon, who was an elder classmate at the Faculty of Political Science. He received his commission as a lieutenant on 3 January 1957. Next, he was named deputy inspector of the Department 2, 6th Command of the Special Branch. He later rose to become inspector of the same section. From that position, he received an appointment as deputy director of the Fourth Command Special Branch, and then rose to become director of the headquarters of the Central Investigations Division. He then transferred, becoming director of the Seventh Command Special Branch.

In 1975, Col Kasem became deputy chief of the Special Branch. Then in 1980, he received the post of director of the Interrogation Center of the Intelligence Branch of the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC) as well, until he received his appointment as chief of the Special Branch, effective this coming October.

Married in 1959 to Navy Lt (Female) Sarani Suphanachat, daughter of Lt Col Luang Chatwiraphon (Rian Suphanachat). At present, she works as a civil servant C-7 in the Meteorology Department.

12532

CSC: 4207/3

COLUMNIST CRITICIZES 'STRATEGIC GOODS' CLASSIFICATION FOR LAOS

Bangkok DAILY NEWS in Thai 10 Sep 83 p 3

[Commentary by Mr Chakkayan]

[Text] Is the situation on the Thai-Lao border along the banks of the Mekong more tense or less?

Better listen as Elder Brother Wirawon Sitthitham, Social Action Party MP from Nakhon Phanom, lets us know:

"At the end of last month, 12 Thais were taken prisoner by the Lao military. Right now they are being held at Savannakhet, along with six boats," MP Wirawon complains on his people's behalf.

"There was not even any provocation. The villagers went to practice for traditional boat races, and it appears that it rained and strong winds and currents blew the boats over into Lao territory. The Lao side threatened them with guns and then herded them into custody and up onto the bank," Brother Wirawon says in a discouraged voice.

Brother Wirawon is silent for a moment as he sighs softly. "I want to ask the minister of the interior what kind of review there will be of the policy to protect Thai subjects who make a living along the Mekong."

"The villagers who were captured are completely in the dark. Before we can get in touch and get them back, it will take months and months. Sometimes something starts out as a small affair, but it can later turn into a major problem." Brother Wirawon sighs again.

"I am on the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and I recently visited Laos to see the lay of the land," adds Brother Wirawon. "I saw that the relations between Thai and Lao are exactly the same, just as before the change of regime. The only difference is their rulers."

"The people of Vientiane listen to Radio Thailand and our regional radio stations everyday. They watch our color tv channel seven. The Lao are addicted to programs like 'The Planet Venus' and 'Sad Flower.' This is proof that you can't stop the people." Brother Wirawon repeats the last sentence firmly.

"The 4 days' time I spent in Vientiane, I noticed that the goods the Lao use in everyday life almost all come from Thailand. Even goods which our government forbids selling in Laos are there in bulk--such as Crown Brand monosodium glutamate, of which there is plenty on sale." Brother Wirawon tells that he had seen with his own eyes.

"Huh? They won't let you go sell monosodium glutamate too?" Krachok Khao wonders.

"They consider monosodium glutamate to be a strategic good because it can be used as a coagulant," answers Brother Wirawon.

"I think we should make these economic matters the heart of the matter instead, because no matter how you forbid it there will be people sneaking in to sell. Anyone who wants to sell, should sell directly to the state. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the National Security Council should reconsider the policy," Brother Wirawon gives as his opinion.

"Right now, Laos orders goods from Singapore and Hong Kong, shipping them in through Thailand, and all we can do is sit and watch it." Saying this, Brother Wirawon shakes his head. "Such as bicycles. I can't go in and sell ours because they're considered strategic goods. So Hong Kong sends theirs in for sale and they get rich."

"As for the matter of bicycles, the leaders of their country tell us that they quit using them as strategic goods after World War II," says Brother Wirawon with a sickened smile.

Our policy might just classify bicycles as strategic goods until World War II ends!

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CSO: 4207/3

BRIEFS

POPULATION FIGURES--Mr Chalong Kalayanmit, director general of the Department of Local Administration, announced that from the collection of provincial population figures nationwide last 30 June, it appears that Thailand has a total population of 49,229,561 people, divided into 24,739,120 males, and 24,490,441 females, with Bangkok Province having the largest population, namely, 5,535,048 persons. The provinces below Bangkok are: Nakhom Ratchasima, 1,993,481 persons; and Ubon Ratchathani, 1,648,187 persons. As for the province with the smallest population, it is Ranong, with 90,137 persons. Mr Chalong then pointed out provinces with populations of 1 million or more, of which there are altogether 12. Besides Bangkok, Nakhom Ratchasima, and Ubon Ratchathani, others are: Udonthani, with 1,523,413 persons; Khonkaen, 1,421,312 persons; Nakhon Sithammarat, 1,296,332 persons; Buriram, 1,209,464 persons; Chiang Mai, 1,206,337 persons; Sisaket, 1,130,685 persons; Roi Et, 1,100,463 persons; Surin, 1,085,026 persons; and Nakhon Sawan, 1,003,629 persons. [Text] [Bangkok BAN MUANG in Thai 14 Sep 83 pp 1, 16] 12532

CSO: 4207/3

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

ARMY EDITORIAL ON STRONGER PARTY LEADERSHIP OF ARMED FORCES

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese Aug 83 pp 1-8

[Editorial: "The New Leadership Structure, an Effective Tool in Strengthening the Party's Leadership of the Army and National Defense"]

[Text] To accelerate the building of our army into an increasingly regular force and modern people's revolutionary army in order to meet the requirements of the strategic tasks of the revolution in the new stage, the 5th Congress of the Party pointed out that we "...must further strengthen the party's leadership of the armed forces...", "...fully implement the one person in command system and insure that the commander fulfills his responsibilities in performing the tasks assigned by the party and state..."(1)

Under the leadership of the party, the Vietnam People's Army, an army organized, educated and trained by the Vietnam Communist Party and President Ho Chi Minh, has always proven itself worthy of being a competent tool of the dictatorship of the proletariat state, a solid pillar of the system of socialist collective ownership.

For nearly 40 years, in keeping with the principle that the party provides complete leadership of the people's army, the Party Central Committee, most directly the Political Bureau, has closely led the buildup of the people's armed forces. The party has correctly and creatively resolved such basic issues as the military line and tasks, military science and art, organizational principles, the leadership and command system, the party work-political work system, cadre work and so forth within the army.

Under the clear-sighted leadership of the party, our people's armed forces, along with all the people, won victory over two powerful imperialists, France and the United States, thereby completing the national, democratic revolution throughout the country, reunifying the fatherland and advancing the entire country toward socialism. Then, our army and people won consecutive victories in two wars to defend the fatherland against the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists and their lackeys. We have also fulfilled our glorious international task for the Lao and Kampuchean revolutions.

Historic fact has proven beyond any doubt that the leadership provided by the party is the factor determining each victory and each stage of growth of our army, of our armed forces.

From the 1950's until recently, our party, in order to establish its leadership over the army, has maintained a policy of "the party committee providing comprehensive leadership and the commander being the person in charge," a policy under which party committees were organized in a vertical system extending from the Military Commission of the Party Central Committee to the basic organizations of the party and a system of political agencies served as agencies assisting the party committee and commander in the performance of party work and political work.

This policy played a large role in the buildup of the armed forces, in the conduct of the long revolutionary war and was a firm guarantee that our army would grow rapidly and win glorious victories.

In the new stage, the stage of building socialism and defending the socialist fatherland, the building of the national defense system has reached a new level of development, one which is much broader in scope and much more complex than the previous stage. In the stage of defending the socialist fatherland, the people's war is increasingly becoming a comprehensive and modern war waged by all the people. Our army has been and is being equipped with many modern weapons and much modern combat equipment and being built, trained and managed along increasingly regular force and modern lines. In combat under modern conditions, the army must act in a resolute, urgent and closely coordinated manner. The commanders on the various echelons must make decisions and deal with situations in an effective, determined, precise and timely manner in order to win victory and complete each task well. The revolutionary situation and tasks and the objective development of the requirements in the combat operations and the buildup of our army demand that we improve the party's leadership of the army and national defense work. On the other hand, in the nearly 40 years of buildup and combat and having been forged and challenged in leadership and command work, the party's corps of cadres within the people's army has grown rapidly. We have established fine traditions and gained valuable experience regarding the leadership structure and the command system. At the same time, we are continuing to selectively incorporate the advanced experiences of the party's and armies of the fraternal socialist countries, primarily the Soviet Union, concerning the leadership and command structure.

In order to meet objective requirements and on the basis of permissible subjective conditions, the Political Bureau, in keeping with the resolution of the 5th Party Congress and the Statutes of the Party, issued the resolution "on changing and improving the mechanism whereby the party leads the Vietnam People's Army and national defense work and implementing the one person in command system within the army."

The new conditions that exist require a new and suitable leadership mechanism. The purposes of changing and improving the mechanism whereby the party leads the army are none other than to firmly guarantee leadership by the party in every situation, heighten the responsibility of the commander and constantly

improve the quality of leadership of the party and the fighting strength of the army in the work of building and defending the fatherland.

The new mechanism whereby the party leads the army is a part of the mechanism "the party leads, the people exercise ownership and the state manages" and represents the application of this mechanism to the special characteristics, the situation and the tasks of the army.

The foremost requirement of the new leadership mechanism is meeting the basic requirements set forth in the resolution of the 5th Party Congress: "The party must provide direct, centralized and unified political, ideological and organizational leadership of the armed forces, constantly increase the working class nature of the army and insure that it is completely loyal to the fatherland and socialism, is closely united around the Party Central Committee, is close to the working people, absolutely obeys the leadership of the party, is combat ready, wins victory in combat, firmly defends the socialist fatherland, eagerly works to build the country and fulfills our international obligation."(2)

To insure that these foremost requirements are met, the new leadership mechanism is based on the following primary principles:

--The Party Central Committee and, on a day to day, direct basis, the Political Bureau, provide direct, centralized and unified leadership of every aspect of the Vietnam People's Army.

--On the basis of the Vietnam Communist Party providing direct, centralized and unified leadership of every aspect of the Vietnam People's Army, the one person in command system is implemented on all echelons of the army. To strengthen this system, military councils have been established on prescribed echelons as collective military leadership organizations.

--The system of party committees extending from the upper to the basic levels has been abandoned. The political agencies on the various echelons of the Vietnam People's Army are agencies that provide party leadership and perform party work and political work within the army. The basic organizations of the party within the army have been established in accordance with party statutes and the regulations of the Party Central Committee.

--The appointment of cadres as commanders or political officers on the division level and upward as well as the appointment of the members of the military councils on the various echelons must be approved by the Political Department and the Secretariat.

The new leadership mechanism is an entity consisting of the leadership organization and methods of the Party Central Committee within the army and national defense work; the implementation of the one person in command system and the establishment of the military councils; the changes in the function and tasks of the system of political agencies; and the establishment of pure, solid and strong basic party organizations and mass organizations. Each organization within this mechanism has its own position, function and task; together, these organizations form an entity, the purposes of which are to

strengthen the leadership provided by the party, heighten the personal responsibility of the commander in management work and uphold the right of collective ownership of cadres and soldiers in order to complete each task assigned by the party and state well.

The one person in command system is a very important organizational principle in the buildup and combat of the army. Under the party's direct, centralized and unified leadership of the army, the one person in command system insures that the commanders on the various echelons fulfill their responsibilities, continue to be decisive and flexible in their commanding of modern combat operations and maintain strict discipline and tight organization in the buildup, management and commanding of troops.

On the basis of the line of the party, the Constitution, laws and regulations of the state and the orders of the army, the commander is given by the party and state all the authority needed within the scope of his responsibility and is personally responsible to the party, the state and the commander on the upper echelon for his performance in the commanding of combat operations, the buildup and management of troops and the implementation of the decisions and policies of the party and state and the tasks of the unit.

While fulfilling his duties, the commander must closely coordinate with the political agency and the basic party organization.

The commander must promptly and fully inform the political director and the secretary of the basic party committee of his policies and measures and propose to them matters requiring leadership in order to insure the completion of the tasks assigned to the units by the upper echelon.

The commanders of the local military agencies, local army units and border defense units are under the centralized, unified guidance of the commander on the upper echelon and under the leadership of the local party committee.

The military council is a collective military leadership organization, the purpose of which is to strengthen the one person in command system.

The basic functions of the military council are to insure the constant combat readiness of troops, insure high quality military training and political education, firmly maintain the discipline of the army, strengthen and increase the effectiveness of the one person in command system and increase the fighting strength of the unit. As a collective military leadership organization, the military council collectively considers and decides major policies and measures pertaining to important matters encountered in the activities and daily life of troops in exact accordance with the regulations contained within the orders for each echelon; however, they may not make decisions concerning combat strategy and plans or concerning the norms contained within the operational plans of troops and plans for building the party. Matters regarding cadre work are collectively discussed by the council and decided by it on the basis of a majority vote within the scope of management authority granted to it. The military councils on the military region, service, military corps and other echelons are responsible to the Party Central Committee, the government and the Ministry of National Defense

for the implementation of the resolutions of the party government and the orders and directives of the Ministry of National Defense.

The military council operates as a collective and adopts resolutions on the basis of a majority vote. The resolutions of the military council on each echelon take the form of orders and directives from the commander on that echelon.

Party work and political work within the army are a very important part of the activities conducted by the party to lead the armed forces in the successful completion of the tasks assigned to them by the party and state. Performing party work and political work is a principle of the party in the buildup of the revolutionary armed forces.

Every activity involved in party work and political work must have the basic objectives of insuring that cadres, soldiers and national defense workers and personnel are completely loyal to the socialist fatherland, to the people and the ideals of the party, insuring that they are closely united around the Party Central Committee and insuring that they excellently complete each task assigned by the party and state, build units that are solid and strong, maintain combat readiness and fight victoriously.

Party work and political work within the army must fully adhere to the requirements of the political and military tasks and be closely linked to military work, scientific-technical activities and rear service work.

Within the new leadership mechanism, the function of the political agency within the army has been changed in order to further strengthen the party's leadership of the army. Whereas, in the past, the political agency was an agency that assisted the party committee and commander in the performance of party work and political work, within the new leadership mechanism, the political agencies on the various echelons are agencies that provide party leadership and perform party work and political work within the army.

The system of political agencies within the army consists of the Political General Department, which is the agency for the entire army; the Political Departments on the military region, service, military corps and equivalent echelons; and the political offices on the branch echelon and within the divisions and equivalent units. The person in charge of the political agency is the political director.

The Political General Department is the political agency for the entire army. The Party Central Committee, the Political Bureau on a day to day, direct basis, leads party work and political work within the army through the Political General Department. The Political General Department is the agency that assists the Secretariat in guiding party work and political work within the army. At the same time, it is a general department subordinate to the Ministry of National Defense.

The Political Departments, on the basis of the directives of the Political General Department concerning party work and political work and the orders of the commander on their echelon, adopt specific policies and measures designed

to carry out party work and political work well and carry out the political task assigned by the upper echelon.

The political office is the place that directly organizes the performance of party work and political work within the basic unit.

Within the army, basic party organizations have been established within regiments and equivalent units, in brigade battalions, in the battalions and companies of students at academies and officer schools, in the departments and offices within agencies, at hospitals and national defense enterprises and so forth.

The basic party organizations at local military agencies, local army units and border defense units are established in exact accordance with the regulations governing the organization of the party within the Vietnam People's Army and are under the leadership of the local party committee and also under the guidance of the political agency on the upper echelon.

The basic party organization is the first, the basic cell of the party. Within the army, it is a part of the party base, is the link between the party and the masses; it is the place that educates, trains, accepts and selects party members; the place that brings the lines, positions and policies of the party to the basic unit and organizes the implementation of these lines, positions and policies; and the place that brings together and taps each of the positive factors that lies among party members and the masses in the effort to organize the implementation of the lines, tasks, positions and policies of the party and state.

The basic party organization must fully comply with the resolutions and directives of the party in accordance with its leadership function. Party work and work among the masses must be closely linked to military work, specialized work and production with a view toward achieving a combined strength within the basic unit, stimulating positive factors and waging a struggle to overcome negative phenomena. Every activity of the basic party organization must be oriented toward insuring the completion of the unit's tasks: maintaining combat readiness, winning victory in combat and studying, working and producing in a highly disciplined and efficient manner that reflects high quality. Full importance must be attached to building a party that is pure, solid and strong and improving the quality of the corps of party members, most importantly the quality of the corps of key cadres at basic units.

The strength and the effectiveness of party leadership are directly manifested in the basic organization of the party. Therefore, as the resolution of the 5th Party Congress pointed out: "Increasing the fighting strength, developing the initiative and creativity and increasing the stability of the basic organizations of the party, especially the party chapters, so that they are worthy of their position and importance as basic organizations are always the foremost responsibility of the entire party."(3)

The mass organizations within the army are the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union and the Trade Union. The Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union is the

school of communism of the young, is the right arm and reserve unit of the party. The Trade Union is the school of communism, the school of economic management and state management of the working class.

These organizations, which are organized within the basic units, are under the direct leadership of the basic party committee and under the guidance of the political agency on the upper echelon.

The right of collective ownership of the masses is, to an important degree, expressed through their mass organizations. As a result, only by building a communist youth union and a trade union that are solid and strong is it possible to fully uphold the right of collective ownership of the masses and, on this basis, help to strengthen the party's leadership of the army.

These latest changes and improvements to the mechanism employed by the party to lead the army are a new step forward in the development of our party's organizational work, are consistent with the situation surrounding the revolution and the development of our armed forces in the new stage.

The organizational changes that have been made in the various fields, in general, and the changes and improvements made to the mechanism used by the party to lead the army and national defense work, in particular, are designed to implement the resolution of the 5th Party Congress and strongly manifest the revolutionary and scientific character of our party's organizational work. Facts have shown that it usually is not easy to correctly and fully incorporate everything that is involved in this change. Not only must we change the way that we think and overcome conservatism, slowness to act and empiricism in order to quickly incorporate the new, we must also guard against incorrect attitudes and thinking, against onesided, wrong methods of evaluation.

As mentioned above, the changes and improvements to the mechanism employed by the party to lead the army and the implementation of the one person in command system have but one objective, to strengthen the party's leadership and increase the fighting strength of the people's army. There is nothing here that elevates or reduces the importance of any organization or agency in any manner that lies outside its position and function.

For this reason, training cadres, especially the management cadres, commanders and political directors of the basic units throughout the army, is of special importance. Management cadres must not only have a firm grasp of the viewpoints of the party and the contents of the resolution, but must also employ correct methods of analysis and possess a pure, unbiased attitude in order to be worthy of being the key force in organizing the effort to gain a thorough understanding of and implement the resolution within units.

As the experience of many fraternal socialist countries has shown, the implementation of the new mechanism employed by the party to lead the army cannot be done in an impetuous, reckless manner, rather, it must involve a gradual process, a process within which ideological work is closely coordinated with organizational work, a process that we carry out while

gaining experience and gradually supplementing and improving upon that which has already been done.

As the Political Bureau resolution pointed out, the Secretariat will soon issue the necessary regulations to define, in greater detail, the principles and major contents of the Political Bureau resolution as they pertain to organizational work. On the basis of the Political Bureau resolution and the regulations of the Secretariat, the Ministry of National Defense will study and issue new orders, regulations and work rules designed to establish the new mechanism being employed by the party to lead the army as a unified system. Time will be needed to conduct additional research concerning the mechanism for resolving matters pertaining to national defense and the buildup of the local armed forces in the provinces and municipalities and the mechanism for insuring a centralized, unified command on an individual front or within an individual area of operation. Research into how to arrange and stabilize the corps of cadres in a manner consistent with the requirements of the new leadership mechanism also cannot be conducted quickly; it, too, will require time. These are very important jobs in the field of organizational work, jobs that must be urgently promoted but conducted in a cautious manner, jobs that must be completed in accordance with the plan and within the time allotted.

The changes and improvements to the mechanism employed by the party to lead the army and national defense work are a major job of our party, our army. This job is first and primarily the responsibility of the party organizations within the army. The party committees on the various echelons, from the military regions, services, military corps and branches to the divisions, must exercise the greatest possible leadership. The task of maintaining combat readiness, combat and training tasks and the task of building units must be completed in the best possible manner. At the same time, they must display a high spirit of responsibility, activism and initiative in making thorough preparations for the implementation of the new mechanism. We cannot relax our efforts for one moment, especially in the process of shifting from the present leadership mechanism to the new one.

FOOTNOTES

1. The Vietnam Communist Party: "Van kien Dai hoi dai bieu toan quoc lan thu V," [The Proceedings of the 5th National Congress of Delegates], Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1982, Volume III, p 89.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., p 94.

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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

REQUIREMENTS OF CAMPAIGN TRAINING DISCUSSED

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese Aug 83 pp 9-25

[Article by Colonel General Le Trong Tan: "Several Matters Concerning Campaign Training"]

[Text] Over the past several years, under the light of the resolutions of the 4th and 5th Congresses of the Party on building socialism and defending the socialist fatherland, we have focused many efforts on training in order to make our army an increasingly regular force, modern army, meet the requirements of the buildup and combat tasks of the people's armed forces in the new period and joined efforts with all the people to defeat the multifaceted war of sabotage and be ready to crush a large-scale war of aggression of the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists, who are acting in collaboration with the U.S. imperialists.

In military training activities, we have attached special importance to campaign training. Since 1980, the ministry has held many classes to provide training in campaign art to high ranking cadres throughout the army and conducted command staff exercises and maneuvers and maneuvers with infantry participation for the various military regions, services and military corps in the many different types of campaigns in a people's war to defend the fatherland. It can be said that never before has campaign training been conducted in such a positive manner, never before has campaign training involved so many new and diverse elements or been conducted on such a large scale.

We have achieved marked results. Through the various training classes, on-the-job classes and, in particular, the various campaign maneuvers, the commanders and command staffs of the military regions, services, military corps and branches gradually gained a thorough and unanimous understanding of the basic viewpoints and primary elements of the military line of the party, military strategy, the various modes of warfare and armed struggle and the art of organizing and conducting a campaign in a people's war to defend the fatherland. The preparations for and conduct of campaigns by the various headquarters and the professional qualifications of campaign staffs have been raised to a new level. The headquarters of the military regions, services, military corps and branches have gradually gained a full understanding of

their tasks and duties as well as the specific requirements and the order of jobs in the preparation of decisions, the actual making of decisions, the organizing of their implementation and the conduct of a campaign in a manner consistent with the specific situation. The various campaign agencies have begun to gain a full understanding of their tasks and duties as well as the specifics involved in preparing decisions for headquarters, organizing their implementation and drafting a large volume of campaign documents in a very short period of time by the parallel work method. Campaign training and campaign maneuvers have been closely linked to the maintenance of combat readiness; and, through this campaign training, units have gained much valuable experience with which to gradually improve the regulations on shifting to a state of combat readiness, supplement and improve combat plans and so forth. It can be said that the overriding result achieved in the recent campaign training was that this training provided a better command of theory and improved the practical skills of commanders and campaign and strategic command staffs regarding the organizing and conduct of a number of types of campaigns in a people's war to defend the fatherland under modern conditions, thereby truly helping to increase the fighting strength and raise the level of combat readiness of our army. Of course, there were still some limitations and shortcomings in campaign training that we must recognize and make every effort to correct.

As everyone knows, campaign training is a basic form of training for the generals and high ranking officers of the army and for campaign and strategic command staffs. In the process of this training, generals, commanders and campaign and strategic command staffs study the theoretical and practical bases and the main elements of the military line of the party, of military strategy and campaign art in a people's war to defend the fatherland. Also in this process, these cadres receive training in how to fulfill their tasks and duties when organizing and conducting a campaign and training in the specific jobs and the order in which these jobs are performed when organizing, commanding and directing a campaign. The results of campaign training do not only have a direct impact upon the effort to learn campaign art and apply it in war. Whether campaign phenomena are understood correctly or not and whether problems related to campaign art are resolved correctly or not also have an impact upon the implementation of the fundamentals of our military line, the fundamentals of military strategy; and, of course, this has an important effect upon how well the political objectives of a war are achieved.

For this reason, campaign training occupies an extremely important position in disseminating, teaching, gaining a thorough understanding of, developing upon, concretizing and organizing the implementation of the military task and military line of the party as well as military strategy in a people's war to defend the fatherland.

On the basis of the experiences that have been gained in the realities of campaign training over the past several years, it can be seen that campaign training must be further improved in accordance with the following several guidelines:

I. Improving the Quality of Campaign Training Materials, Developing and Constantly Improving the Campaign Art of a People's War To Defend the Fatherland

Under the correct leadership of the Vietnam Communist Party and President Ho Chi Minh, our nation of Vietnam has continuously waged victorious wars of liberation and national defense over the past several decades and continuously defeated powerful aggressors, the French colonialists, the U.S. imperialists and the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists. These facts prove that the political line and the military line of our party have been correct, prove the superior, revolutionary and scientific nature of the military art of the Vietnamese people's war, and art which includes campaign art.

In the recent wars of liberation and national defense, our army and people, in order to victoriously implement the political line, the military line and the military strategy set forth by the party, displayed a high spirit of self-reliance, a high spirit of initiative and creativity, and successfully resolved many problems regarding campaign art in a way that deeply reflects the unique aspects of the military art of our nation and reflects the general laws of armed struggle and war under the specific historic circumstances of the people and the country of Vietnam in the face of specific aggressors.

It has been on the basis of the political line and the military line of the party and the military strategy established during each war; on the basis of the specific enemy with whom we are at war and the comparison of forces between ourselves and the enemy; on the basis of the development of the people's armed forces, primarily main force troops, and the combat mission of the army during each period; on the basis of the characteristics of the terrain and the material-technical bases of the country; on the basis of the nation's tradition and experience in armed struggle; and on the basis of studying, researching and applying the advanced experiences of the Soviet army and the armies of the other fraternal countries that we have established, developed and correctly resolved the problems concerning the campaign theory and practice of the Vietnamese people's war in a manner suited to each war we have fought. This is also the correct course to follow in developing and improving upon the campaign art in our present day people's war to defend the fatherland and improving the quality of campaign training materials.

1. To begin with, campaign training materials must correctly reflect the political line, the military line and the military viewpoints and thinking of the party in a war to defend the fatherland and must represent the concretization of the fundamentals of military strategy, be consistent with military strategy and be designed to achieve the successful implementation of military strategy and help to achieve the political objectives of a war.

In essence, this is a process of researching, understanding and correctly applying, a process of resolving problems in a creative manner and fully implementing the fundamentals of the military line and military strategy in campaigns and campaign art in a manner that expresses the principle that military affairs support political objectives, that campaigns support strategic objectives.

One very basic requirement is the need for campaign training materials to reflect, in a correct and detailed manner, the opponent of our army and people in war. The study of the Chinese aggressor army and predictions made concerning it must be consistent with the conclusions that have been reached concerning them in the strategic field. Of course, campaign training materials must not simply repeat the strategic conclusions that have been reached, but must, instead, gradually shed more light on and more thoroughly explain the plans, the utilization of forces, the force deployment, the fighting methods, the strengths, the weaknesses and so forth of the enemy on a campaign and tactical scale as well as in the different types of enemy campaigns and our campaigns, in each type of terrain, in wars of different sizes and on the different strategic fronts. They must show that the immediate, dangerous strategic enemy of our country's revolution and the revolutions of all countries in Indochina is the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists, that the basic, long-range strategic enemy is the U.S. imperialists and their various lackeys and show the collaboration that exists between China and the United States in order to, on this basis, define the specific combat objectives of our army and people in war and the manifestations of these combat objectives within the scope of a campaign.

The strengths and weaknesses of the enemy and the laws governing their operations within the strategic field are, of course, expressed in a concrete manner within the scope of a campaign. The projections and conclusions that are made and reached concerning the enemy in the two fields of strategy and campaign operations cannot contradict or negate one another. Of course, campaigns have a relative independence of their own; strategy is manifested in a campaign through the special laws of a campaign. Therefore, we must adopt a scientific and objective, a comprehensive and concrete attitude in order to conduct research and reach correct conclusions concerning the enemy within the scope of a campaign. We must avoid being subjective, haphazard and vague; in particular, we must oppose the tendency to underevaluate the enemy and overevaluate ourselves or vice versa when researching and compiling campaign training materials, when teaching lessons and when making suppositions about the enemy in lessons or in campaign maneuvers.

Campaign training materials must reflect a thorough understanding of the fundamentals of the military line and military strategy by defining the objectives and missions of campaigns and insuring that the objectives of military strategy and the political objectives of the war are met: annihilating the enemy and protecting land (including the offshore waters, the islands, the continental shelf and our air space); protecting the life and property of the people; protecting material-technical bases and the achievements of socialism; protecting the socialist Vietnamese fatherland and defeating a war of aggression waged by the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists in collaboration with the U.S. imperialists and the other aggressor and reactionary powers. The objectives and missions of campaigns must reflect determination to fight and win, reflect the spirit of taking the initiative and being resolved to attack the enemy and reflect the highest possible effort by our army and people to win victory in accordance with the strategy and the strategic plan that have been adopted.

In keeping with the people's war viewpoint of the party, the forces that conduct a campaign must be the combined forces of all the people, the nucleus of which is the three arms of the military: main force troops, local troops and militia and self-defense forces (along the borders and seacoast, these also include the border defense troops). There are closely coordinated mobile forces and stationary forces. There are the main force, regular force and modern military corps of the ministry and the military regions, which participate in combat operations coordinated among the various services and branches (and are usually organized in strong campaign groups). There are the regiments, battalions and companies of the local army. There are also border defense troops, militia and self-defense units and so forth. The strong campaign groups must be the nucleus of and play the most decisive role in modern campaigns. The various arms of the military engage in combat within campaign areas of operation that are established and prepared before war breaks out, in district military fortresses and in the provincial (and municipal) strategic units. Campaign training materials must clearly define these forces and strengths of our campaigns in a war to defend the fatherland (not only those of the main force military corps).

In order to fully develop upon the strengths of these forces, the art of organizing and conducting campaigns must involve the selection and establishment of a suitable campaign formation, one that goes beyond the usual formations of modern campaigns with which we are familiar. These campaign formations (deployments of campaign forces) must be formations within which the above mentioned campaign forces are efficiently deployed and arranged, are closely coordinated and create the greatest possible strength for fighting the enemy. We must be able, at the same time, to attack the entire campaign formation of the enemy, launch a frontal assault on the enemy, attack the enemy's rear, surround the enemy and divide enemy forces. Consequently, we must maintain and develop an advantageous campaign formation, one based on firmly maintaining control so that we can strongly attack the enemy; attack the enemy along an entire line, attack the enemy when we are in between enemy positions and closely coordinate these two types of attacks; attack the enemy by means of large military corps to annihilate large numbers of enemy forces, attack the enemy by means of small units and detachments to annihilate small enemy forces and cause widespread attrition among the enemy on the scope of the entire campaign, thereby setting up key battles that will determine victory in the campaign.

The fighting methods employed in a campaign must thoroughly reflect an offensive strategy and make it possible to take the initiative and resolutely attack the forces of the enemy by means of the greatest possible strength; the combat operations of the main force military corps must be closely coordinated with those of the local armed forces; basic methods of fighting and the various types of offensive and defensive combat operations must be closely coordinated in a manner consistent with each type campaign: defensive campaigns, offensive campaigns and counter-offensive campaigns. This combines the combat coordination among the branches and services by large, powerful forces with the independent combat operations (conducted under the common plan and command) of the troops and detachments of the various branches and the flexible fighting methods of the local army and the militia and self-defense forces, among which the combat coordination of the different branches and

services must play a strong role. On the one hand, we must make effective use of such modern tactics as breaching enemy lines, encircling and enveloping enemy forces, conducting airborne and seaborne landings, attacking the enemy while moving our forces from one place to another and so forth. On the other hand, we must also employ those tactics in which we are strong and have much experience, such as raids, ambushes and attacks on the nerve centers, storehouses, signal and communications facilities, rear service bases, rear area and so forth of the enemy. Full use must be made of the firepower of modern weapons and technical equipment; at the same time, every effort must be made to achieve the full effectiveness of both modern and rudimentary weapons and technical equipment in attacks on the enemy.

Generally speaking, campaign training materials must be improved to reflect the special characteristics and the superior nature of the campaign art of a people's war to defend the socialist Vietnamese fatherland, an art that has reached a high pinnacle of development, and fully reflect the thinking of taking the offensive and maintaining control, maintaining control and taking the offensive and defeating the new object of our combat operations, the Chinese aggressor army. This is a campaign art of a popular, integrated and modern nature, one that reflects, in the field of campaigns, the general laws of armed struggle, of a people's war waged under modern conditions in our country.

The quality of campaign training materials and the results achieved in the effort to improve the campaign art of a war to defend the fatherland depend primarily upon how well the military line of the party and the military strategy established for this type of war are understood. Because, if we examine campaign art as an integral part of military art, as being under the control of military strategy, we see that it is impossible to separate campaign art from military strategy. Of course, when applied to campaigns, the fundamentals of the military line and military strategy must be consistent with the separate laws that apply in a campaign in order to mold the theory of campaign art. On the other hand, only when problems concerning the theory and practice of campaign art are resolved well do they turn military strategy into victory on the battlefield and, in this way, help to develop and improve military strategy. This is the dialectical relationship between military strategy and campaign art; in this relationship, campaign art is both dependent upon and relatively independent from military strategy.

2. Campaign training materials for a people's war to defend the fatherland must be consistent with terrain conditions and the overall situation of our country as well as with the continuous growth of our armed forces.

Our country has many types of complex terrain: the mountainous jungles, the lowlands, the seacoast and so forth, with the most common type being mountainous jungles. After winning total independence and reunifying the country, our people turned their hands to building socialism throughout the country. At present, we are in the initial stage of the period of transition. The three revolutions, the production relations revolution, the scientific-technological revolution and the ideological and cultural revolution, are being carried out gradually. The building of the material-technical base of socialism has only begun. The long war as well as the weaknesses and

deficiencies of small-scale production are posing serious difficulties to the efforts to transform and develop the economy, improve the living standard of the people and strengthen the national defense system. These are, of course, only temporary difficulties that are being encountered in the course of our progress; we will gradually overcome them. However, more time is needed to bring about major changes within the national economy. Industry, especially modern industry and the national defense industry, cannot meet the needs that are involved in protecting the fatherland. The communications-transportation systems on land, at sea and in the air together with the road network, bridges, ferry landings, railroad stations, air fields, seaports and production and repair facilities are limited in many respects. The signal, post-telegraph, wired radio and television networks and modern communications equipment are insufficient to meet the communication, signal and command needs of modern campaigns. Material-technical support bases that produce, repair or replace components of the system of modern weapons and technical equipment as well as facilities that supply, stockpile and transport large quantities of ammunition, fuel, grain, food, medicine and public health implements can only be constructed gradually. The conditions and circumstances of our country, that is, its population, natural resources, military geography, terrain, climate, the size of its territory and its land, sea and coastal borders, also have unique features.

All of the specific conditions presented above are very important bases for researching the campaign theory and campaign art of a war to defend the fatherland in our country and delving deeply into the different types of campaign in the different periods of development of our country when war breaks out. A process of comprehensive, detailed and precise research is required in order to resolve the following matters in a suitable manner: the number of campaigns conducted during each period of development of a war, the scale on which campaign forces are utilized, the timing of campaigns, the base of the different types of campaigns, etc. Our guidelines must be to make the most economical and efficient use possible of forces and means in order to win victory over enemy forces that are large and equipped with large quantities of material and technical means.

The process of improving campaign art is also the process of researching and developing upon the new strengths of the people's army, of the people's armed forces, of the entire country. Our people's armed forces, which consist of main force troops, the local army and the militia and self-defense forces, are being built, developed and becoming increasingly powerful and the people's army itself is increasingly becoming a regular force, modern army in order to meet the requirements of strengthening the national defense system and defending the socialist fatherland in the new stage of the revolution. Through the efforts of the party, the state and all our people and with the tremendous assistance of the fraternal countries, primarily the Soviet Union, the people's armed forces, primarily the people's army, have undergone a reasonable buildup and their quality has been constantly improved in every respect. The weapons and technical equipment of the army are being modernized. The organizational structure of the services, branches, military corps, large army groups, standing forces and reserve forces is becoming increasingly balanced and coordinated. The military science and the military art of a war to defend the fatherland are also being established and gradually

improved. These are the new factors in the fighting strength of our people's armed forces, of our army; the gradual formation and development of these new factors can only occur in the process of our armed forces overcoming their own difficulties and limitations. Our campaign training materials must reflect and develop upon these new factors of the armed forces in the course of resolving problems related to the organization and conduct of the various types of campaigns.

The new strength of the people's armed forces is, of course, closely linked to the new circumstances of our country that exist as a result of socialist construction, our solid alliance with the fraternal peoples of Laos and Kampuchea and our complete, close cooperation with the fraternal countries in the socialist community, mainly the Soviet Union. Increasingly positive results will be achieved in the effort to build and strengthen the national defense system, build and strengthen the nation's defenses and prepare for and wage a people's war to defend the fatherland. The system of forces, the system of projects, national defense educational and training activities, the building of strategic stockpiles, the mobilization plan and so forth are gradually being established and implemented in accordance with plans. The material-technical support system is being built and developed into an increasingly improved and modern system. The system of reserve forces has been developed throughout the country and is becoming a regular force, more powerful system with each passing day. A war time rear area complete with all the necessary components has gradually been constructed in peace time. Defense plans and plans for preparing for and waging a people's war to defend the fatherland have been established and are gradually being implemented in accordance with a precise strategy...

All of these facts reflect the superiority and strength of the socialist system that is being built in our country and combine to form a battle position from which our army and people can gain control and take the offensive, take the offensive and gain control throughout the country and within each locality, a battle position that is a very good one from the point of view of organizing and conducting the various types of campaigns. Within this battle position, plans for fighting the enemy on land, in the air and at sea have been formulated and are constantly being improved. The forces that will fight the enemy, both stationary and mobile forces, have been planned or deployed. The system of combat organizations and battle positions, from the villages, enterprises and streets to the wards, districts, provinces and municipalities, has been built in accordance with the plan. The organization needed to mobilize manpower and materiel has gradually been prepared... The art of organizing and conducting a campaign must be based on and fully develop upon the strength of this battle position in order to define the objectives and scale of campaigns in a manner consistent with our new capabilities, create an advantageous position, deploy the campaign formation in an efficient manner, make highly efficient use of forces, establish and select effective methods of fighting, organize every aspect of campaigns support operations and so forth.

3. With regard to a war to defend the fatherland, our campaign training materials must be based on the valuable experiences that we have gained from how campaigns in previous wars were organized and conducted and must improve

and develop upon these experiences in a manner consistent with the new combat objective, tasks, equipment and so forth of our armed forces.

In our country, during a period that lasted more than one-third of a century, our army and people, under the talented leadership of the party and the great President Ho Chi Minh, staged an armed uprising, fought a revolutionary war and coordinated this war with an uprising by all the people; they fought a war of liberation and wars to defend the country, winning very brilliant victories over wars of aggression waged by old style colonialists, neo-colonialists and hegemonists and expansionists. When in their fight against the U.S. imperialists, our army and people in both regions of the country won victory over the many different forms their war of aggression assumed: "The special war," "the limited war," "the Vietnamization of the war" and "the air war of destruction." In the fight against the wars of aggression of the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists, our army and people also won victory over the war of aggression waged by Beijing's lackey Pol Pot army on the southwestern border and the war of aggression waged by the "real" Chinese army on the northern border. In the course of defeating the military strategies of the enemy in these wars of different types, our army and people have gained much invaluable experience in armed struggle and in how to organize and conduct campaigns. Of course, the experiences referred to above must be experiences that have been summarized, experiences that are universal in nature and drawn from the actual experiences of many units, many localities and many battlefields, not merely the experiences of an individual locality.

As regards campaigns, it can be said that our army has a full storehouse of highly persuasive practical experiences in organizing and conducting the campaigns of the Vietnamese people's war, experiences that can be used to build the campaign art of the Vietnamese people's war. Our people's armed forces have gained both theoretical and practical experience concerning how to organize and conduct many specific types of campaigns on different levels of development: small, medium and large-scale campaigns; campaigns coordinated among many branches and services and independent campaigns launched by individual services; campaigns conducted by the main force military corps on selected battlefields in the mountainous jungles; campaigns that combine offensive operations and uprisings in the rural areas of the densely populated lowlands; campaigns waged in the cities and towns; campaigns against the bases, rear area and communications network of the enemy; campaigns fought against enemy forces conducting large-scale sweep operations; campaigns to provide strategic transportation support; air defense campaigns waged by the air defense forces of the three elements of the military to defeat enemy air attacks; activities conducted against enemy blockades at sea... We also have wide experience in how to organize and conduct each campaign on each front as well as organize and conduct a system of campaigns within strategic offensives.

Our army has gained much concrete, unique and very creative experience in how to organize and conduct campaigns for the purpose of performing important strategic missions at a time when we did not have strong campaign groups or many main force military corps. We have achieved suitable campaign superiority at a time when the enemy has enjoyed a superiority of manpower and modern weapons and technical equipment. We have coordinated the operations of

the main force military corps with those of the local army, of the militia and guerrilla forces; combined coordinated combat operations with independent combat operations; coordinated offensives with uprisings and armed struggle with political struggle and the other forms of struggle of the people. We have coordinated the use of modern, relatively modern and rudimentary weapons and equipment in order to attack enemy forces armed with many modern weapons and much modern technical equipment. We have penetrated and attacked the base systems of the enemy at times when we did not have tank troops or an air force; coordinated breaching operations with attacks on the rear to divide enemy forces; coordinated frontal attacks, attacks against the rear and attacks from within the formation of the enemy. We have coordinated local rear services and mobile rear services and coordinated "pre-deployment" with transportation to provide a full supply of weapons, ammunition and grain at times when we did not have many mechanized means of transportation.

No one can doubt the correctness or the progressive nature of the experiences presented above. Because, they have been confirmed by the real victories that we have won in the recent wars. They represent the profound and priceless knowledge and practical skills that have been gained with regard to organizing and conducting campaigns, knowledge and skills that have been tested in our long fights and made decisive contributions to the defeat of many different enemies, to our victories over many military strategies adopted by the enemy in their various wars of aggression. We must not be complacent or satisfied with what we have achieved but we must never feel inferior either. We must know how to use the experiences we have gained as a scientific basis for researching and resolving problems involved in organizing and conducting campaigns in a war to defend the fatherland and improve the quality of our campaign training materials.

Of course, we must also see the limitations inherent within our experiences. We have much experience in offensive campaigns and counter-offensive campaigns, which are strengths of ours, but little experience in defensive campaigns. We also do not have much experience in coordinating the various services in large-scale, modern campaigns. The main type of campaign that our people conducted for many years, that is, the campaigns in the war of liberation, must be researched in greater detail in order to develop and improve upon the campaign art of a war to defend the fatherland.

4. Campaign training materials must reflect an active effort to study and creatively apply the advanced experiences of the armies of the fraternal socialist countries, primarily the Soviet army, in organizing and conducting modern campaigns. As mentioned above, our army does have some experience in organizing and conducting modern campaigns and campaigns involving large-scale coordination among the various branches and services. However, compared to the development of a war to defend the fatherland, this experience is inadequate. Therefore, making a positive effort to study and creatively apply the advanced knowledge and experience in this field and make use of the latest achievements of Soviet military science and military art are the most direct way to bring our campaign art to the point where it reflects the general laws that govern the organizing and the conduct of modern campaigns.

We must seriously and deeply research and must study, in a comprehensive, basic and systematic manner, the specifics involved in organizing and conducting modern campaigns and must engage in this effort with a serious attitude. This means that the purposes of our research and study must be to firmly grasp these specifics, to gain a clear understanding of their theoretical basis, their methodological basis and their practical basis and to examine the process of development of the specific elements and matters that have been adopted by the fraternal armies. As a result, we cannot stop at basic viewpoints and concepts but must truly study the entire field of practical application, which involves such things as the specific requirements and the order of jobs in organizing and conducting a campaign; the specific requirements and the order of the jobs of the commander and the campaign command staff; advanced staff operational methods; organizing campaign material-technical support... This also reflects our respect for the achievements and experiences that the armies of the fraternal countries have recorded and gained through hard work, even through bloodshed. We must give special attention to researching and studying the advanced knowledge and experiences as well as the universal experiences that the fraternal armies are now implementing.

The practical significance of this study lies in creatively applying advanced knowledge and experiences in organizing and conducting campaigns in a manner consistent with the specific conditions of our army, our armed forces, our country. Our army, the Soviet army and the armies of the other fraternal countries subscribe to the same military thinking, proletarian military thinking. However, the military science and military art of each army have formed and developed under different historic circumstances. As a result, we cannot apply this knowledge and these experiences in organizing and conducting modern campaigns to our specific conditions merely by "reducing them to a slightly lower level" or "making wholesale changes." Involved here is a very positive and creative process of researching and applying modern military knowledge and utilizing the modern weapons and technical equipment as well as the modern combat methods of the armies of the fraternal countries on the battlefield of our country in a manner consistent with the capabilities of our army in every area, our material-technical support capabilities, our country's terrain and so forth in order to supplement our experience, making it wider and suited to the new conditions that exist. This effort does not erode the tradition, the experience or the combat strengths of our army and people, rather, it helps to develop and enhance this tradition, this experience and these strengths. In the realities of armed struggle, our army and people have resolved this problem in a very successful manner. We used non-guided missiles deployed at fixed positions and mobile non-guided missiles in close coordination with anti-aircraft artillery of all types and attack aircraft to attack enemy forces that had an absolutely superiority of modern combat aircraft and electronic command, signal and reconnaissance equipment. Our air force successfully employed small squadrons to retaliate against the large squadron formations of the U.S. Air Force and gained control of the air at necessary times and in necessary areas of our air space... These lessons help us to better apply the experiences in organizing and conducting modern campaigns of the armies of the fraternal countries in a war to defend the fatherland and not merely copy these experiences or apply them in a mechanical manner.

The concrete and thorough expression of the fundamentals presented above in campaign training materials and in matters regarding the theory and practice of campaign art in a war to defend the fatherland cannot be fully achieved in a short period of time. This requires a truly positive and continuous process of research, application and experimentation, of continuous supplementation, development and improvement through training sessions and maneuvers, through each research class, each training year and through the collective intelligence of the corps of high ranking cadres throughout the army. This also requires a process of insuring that the campaign training activities of our army are scientific and practical in nature and reflect the consciousness of the party.

II. Improving Campaign Training Methods and Making Them More Effective

Campaign training, which has become one of the basic forms of training for generals and high ranking officers, for campaign and strategic staffs, is conducted on a large scale and is a regular force training system of our army. To improve the quality of campaign training, we must improve training methods and make them more effective. Because, if the subject matter in which training is being conducted is good but the methods of researching, teaching and training are unsuitable, the results of training will be limited, sometimes very greatly limited.

1. To begin with, it is necessary to select and establish methods of training that are suited to the objective and the specific requirements of combat training. The experience gained in combat training over the past several years has shown that, in addition to the system of methods now being employed within the academies, the following training methods are considered to be suitable and clearly effective. In order of ascending importance, our campaign training methods are:

- Research and study conducted by each cadre on his own;
- The training of individual groups and components;
- Training classes;
- The training lessons of command agencies;
- Command staff maneuvers;
- Troop maneuvers under simulated combat conditions.

Each of the training methods mentioned above has its own importance within the entire system of campaign training methods. One method cannot be substituted for another but all of these methods supplement and enhance one another. However, the effectiveness of these methods is not determined by the methods themselves. The effectiveness of these training methods depends upon their application and continuous improvement in a manner consistent with the objectives and the specific requirements of campaign training. Here, only the improvement of a number of training methods will be discussed.

Research and study conducted by each cadre on his own is a universal campaign training method. It can be employed to teach and train high ranking commanders, the cadres at command agencies, the agencies that perform party work and political work and the campaign and strategic technical and rear service agencies and cadres who are engaged in researching military theory and science at the advanced academies or on the job.

This method helps each cadre to develop scientific thinking in order to grasp the essence of that which is being taught in training, gain a clear understanding of its basis in theory and practice and develop a deep understanding of methodology in order to grasp the fundamentals of each matter being taught in training while forging and cultivating skills and habits in order to be able to take conscious actions in accordance with laws, actions for which there are clear guidelines and objectives. Suitable forms that this training can take are: researching the basic contents of the military line of the party, of military art and campaign art; reviewing campaigns and how the various types of campaigns have been organized and conducted; and studying campaign orders, campaign staff work and the duties, tasks and work requirements of the campaign commander, the headquarters of the branches and services, the commanders of the various military commands and the officers within the campaign and strategic agencies, the military agencies on the district, provincial and municipal levels and so forth together with necessary reference materials. Of course, these elements of campaign training must be given concrete expression during each training year and each training period. Of importance is the need for the specifics involved in campaign training under the self-study and research program to coincide with the programs of the advanced academies and the on-the-job programs for the cadres of the entire army.

To insure the quality of training, it is necessary to further improve the self-study and research conducted by the corps of generals and high ranking officers. To begin with, studying on one's own and conducting research on one's own must be considered a basic training and educational method in improving the qualifications of the high ranking officers within the army as regards military theory and practice, in general, and campaign art, in particular. On the basis of the long-range objectives and tasks of cadre training, the ministry establishes uniform campaign training objectives, requirements and programs for cadres throughout the army during each period and for each year. On this basis, campaign training agencies stipulate how much time must be spent researching and studying each basic training subject, each matter involved in training, including the amount of time that must be spent researching reference materials. The days set aside to provide guidance and conduct inspections and examinations as well as the subjects and methods of inspection and examination are also clearly stipulated and uniform (on the scope of a general department, the agencies of the military regions, services, branches, military corps and so forth). Together with this, the minimum needs of cadres are met, such as the need for official training materials, reference materials, papers and pens, notebooks, training films, etc. One decisive factor in the implementation of campaign training requirements and programs by this method is routine and close guidance, management, inspections and supervision by the commanders of agencies and units. The highest commander of an agency or unit must be thoroughly familiar with the subject matter and

program for the research and study conducted by cadres on their own as they pertain to campaign art and must consider the completion of this training task during each period and each year to be one of his fundamental tasks and one of the fundamental tasks of subordinate cadres. The commander must personally check and supervise cadres to insure that they comply with the study program and spend the required amount of time in study; when necessary, suitable methods can be employed to inspect the notes taken by cadres as well as the results achieved in their studies. Once every 3 or 6 months, the commander must evaluate the situation surrounding the campaign self-study and research program of cadres and propose necessary measures to stimulate the implementation of this study program in a manner that yields high results.

The corps of high ranking cadres must consider research and study conducted on one's own to be their responsibility, to be a necessity in order to constantly improve their understanding of military theory and improve their ability to command troops and complete the task assigned them well. They must implement their training program well just as they perform their task for the upper echelon well. They must not study in a "form for form's sake" manner and not care about the results they achieve. Each cadre must adopt a specific study plan, establish a specific deadline for the completion of the research or study of a training subject and schedule time to prepare for inspections and examinations; each must consider the results of inspections and examinations to be a measurement of the level as well as the results of his study. When researching or studying any subject, cadres must take notes, summarize the contents, reach conclusions and propose their own opinions. In the course of conducting research and study on their own, each cadre must make an effort to cultivate the scientific method of thinking in order to grasp the essence of training subject matter, determine that which is reasonable as well as that which is not and discover things that are new or propose matters that must be researched. On this basis, each cadre must forge and cultivate for himself a scientific, advanced method of self-study, one suited to his level of development. Conducting research and study on one's own is a basic method for enriching the military knowledge and the knowledge of campaign art of high ranking cadres. Patiently reading and making an effort to understand what is being read are a good way to gain knowledge. Being too lazy to read, listen, to go view a film makes it impossible to acquire knowledge and impossible to take positive, effective and creative action. Therefore, establishing a good and effective regime of self-study and research is an objective, pressing demand of each high ranking cadre within our army.

Maneuvers are an integrated, comprehensive campaign training method involving a high degree of practical application for commanders, command agencies and troops under conditions that approximate those of actual combat. Maneuvers can be command-staff maneuvers and maneuvers in which troops participate. Command staff-maneuver can be conducted within army camps (at the permanent peace time command post) or outside army camps (at field command posts and mobile command posts); they can be conducted with or without signal and liaison equipment, with or without a contingent of infantry troops and can be maneuvers that involve one or two sides, one or many echelons. Maneuvers in which troops participate are the most universal combat training method. They can be conducted with all the forces and equipment of one echelon (military

corps, service, military region) or a representative contingent of the forces of a branch or service.

Maneuvers help the commander, the command agency and troops to develop, in a systematic and integrated manner, actual organizational and operations skills under conditions that approximate those of actual combat. In this way, maneuvers forge and cultivate activism, initiative and creativity, forge and cultivate good habits, practices and skills so that duties and tasks are properly performed in the course of organizing and conducting campaigns in diverse and complex situations. The effectiveness of maneuvers as a campaign training method depends upon both sides: the agency directing the maneuvers and the troops (or agency) participating in the maneuvers.

The agency directing the maneuvers bears the main responsibility for the specific subjects in which training is being provided, for organizing the maneuvers, for supporting the maneuvers and for evaluating and summarizing the maneuvers. As regards the subject matter being taught in training, each maneuver can differ in terms of the specifics involved in training and practical application. Generally speaking, however, maneuvers can be conducted to formulate, inspect, supplement and improve upon the combat plan on one front and provide troops with training in the application of the proposed plan; to study and test something pertaining to the theory or practice of campaign art; and, sometimes, to inspect and evaluate the qualifications of troops. Some of these objectives can be combined within a maneuver.

On the basis of the above, the agency directing the maneuvers establishes the purpose of the maneuvers, the basic theme of the training and the basic training situations. These matters must also progress from a low to a high level, from the simple to the complex in a manner consistent with the qualifications of our cadres and troops. The sooner that the above are defined, the more able we are to improve upon the subject matter being taught in training, make thorough preparations and prepare the various areas of support needed for maneuvers. Basically, the purpose of the maneuvers, the basic training theme and the basic training situations in maneuvers must make practical contributions to increasing the fighting strength and raising the level of combat readiness of the army while resolving existing problems or new problems that arise in the theory or practice of campaigns. However, due to the separate requirements of campaign training activities and research work, some maneuvers must be general in terms of their purpose and the specifics involved in training and are only slightly related to combat missions in the different areas of operation. The purpose and the basic theme of training as well as training situations must be based on the campaign art involved in a war to defend the fatherland. Possible considerations include: coordinating the operations of the main force military corps with the operations of the local army and the militia and self-defense forces in the counter-offensive phase of a defensive campaign or in the combat operations of a counter-offensive campaign; organizing coordination between the forces attacking from within the enemy formation and the forces launching a frontal attack against the enemy; organizing material-technical support by utilizing local, "pre-deployed" rear services and transporting supplies from the strategic rear, etc.

It is also necessary to gradually improve the way that maneuvers are directed and to put this work on a regular force, scientific basis that reflects high quality. To begin with, it is necessary to select and train for this work cadres who have a command of campaign theory and practice, are well versed in the military art of a people's war to defend the fatherland, have a firm grasp of modern military knowledge, are able to organize and direct maneuvers and possess a positive and creative spirit. We must establish within the component that directs the maneuvers a scientific, reliable and highly efficient work procedure, extending from the drafting of the purposes and various documents of the maneuvers to preparing and executing the various situations, conducting a preliminary review of and evaluating the maneuvers and so forth. An effort must be made to gradually standardize the organization and the size of the section that directs the maneuvers and the types and quantity of communications equipment, transportation equipment, fuel, explosives and so forth for each type maneuver. The material-technical support needed for each type maneuver must be gradually established in a manner consistent with our circumstances. Every effort must be made to overcome the phenomena of "reducing to their essence," "conveniently changing" or "readily and extensively changing" the specific requirements, the organization, the schedule and so forth of maneuvers because such practices are uneconomical and do not insure that high quality will be achieved.

The troops (agency) participating in the maneuvers must be prepared in a comprehensive, specific and detailed fashion in accordance with the purpose for the maneuvers. They must participate in the maneuvers in an active and creative spirit, make the greatest possible effort to apply what was taught to them in training and strictly comply with the requirements, the schedule and the discipline of the maneuvers as set forth by the section directing the maneuvers. After each basic training theme and training situation, the units and agencies participating in maneuvers must take the initiative and gain experience to insure that better results are achieved in subsequent training subjects and situations. Commanders and command agencies, the agencies that perform party work and political work and rear service and technical agencies must truly improve themselves and their units in maneuvers; they must insure that they and their units make clear progress as a result of maneuvers. They must manage their units and agencies well in the course of maneuvers in order to train their units in accordance with combat requirements, maintain safety during the maneuvers and properly maintain and economically utilize weapons, technical equipment, fuel, military gear, food and grain. They must resolutely oppose the practices of conducting maneuvers that are maneuvers in form only or conducting "pretend maneuvers," which reduce the results of training and waste manpower, money and time.

2. In order to increase the effectiveness of the various training methods, it is necessary to gradually but boldly apply modern military training knowledge and utilize modern technical equipment in campaign training. This is consistent with the guidelines of modernizing our army, in general, and training activities, in particular, in the face of the strong development of the scientific-technological revolution within the army and in society. In campaign training, doing this well is an objective and basic requirement. Because, campaign training involves very many diverse factors; the volume of information required in training is increasing with each passing day;

commanders, command agencies, other agencies and troops are required to conduct very many activities in various areas; the volume of documents and calculations required is quite large; the number of units, weapons, pieces of technical equipment and many other types of equipment participating in training is very large; training situations are becoming increasingly complex and tense... If all of the work involved in the factors mentioned above is performed merely on the basis of the ability of the commander to think, on the basis of mental calculations and the simple manual labor of the officers within the troop command and leadership system and on the basis of intensive manual labor by troops, training will take longer, certain training subjects might be overlooked, the reliability and accuracy of decisions, plans and calculations will be reduced and, of course, the quality of training will be adversely affected.

Basically, we can define modern command knowledge and theory as management theory, information theory and the various fields of mathematics as well as the use of computers in order to gradually incorporate them in campaign training in a manner consistent with the qualifications of our cadres and the equipment of our army during each period. We have the conditions needed to do this. Because, many high ranking cadres of the army have been trained in and are familiar with these matters; our army has a certain amount of modern technical equipment; we have the assistance and experience of the armies of the fraternal countries and so forth. In the immediate future, we can, in some exercises and maneuvers, make use of computers to gather, analyze and process information. The requirements, organization and equipment involved in the electronic struggle in modern campaigns are also matters that must be gradually incorporated in training in order to gradually familiarize cadres with them.

In view of the facts that our level of modern military knowledge and modern military technology is still limited, modern equipment is neither universal nor well coordinated and the level on which modern technical equipment is being used and maintained is not truly high, we can move forward in the areas mentioned above, but must do so gradually. Perhaps we can begin by familiarizing cadres and troops with theory and some pieces of equipment. Then, we could establish models in the application of theory and the use of equipment. Later, we could incorporate this application and use in the training lessons of some contingents on certain levels. Finally, after many campaign training plans and programs, we could, at campaign and strategic agencies, be training specialists in this area, that is, training cadres who have a firm grasp of theory, are skilled in formulating programs and are proficient, thereby taking an important step forward in modernizing the campaign training activities of our army.

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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

ARTICLE STRESSES IMPORTANCE OF TECHNICAL SUPPORT IN CAMPAIGNS

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese Aug 83 pp 56-63

[Article by Senior Colonel Tran Son Nham: "Several Matters Concerning Technical Support in Campaigns"]

[Text] In modern warfare, technical support occupies an extremely important position. Campaigns usually involve the use of many modern technical weapons and pieces of equipment over a large area of operation and under very stringent time requirements. Providing technical support in a campaign is truly a matter that must be the concern of the various campaign echelons, a matter to which they must devote much of their organizational and management skills in order to meet the large needs of the campaign under the complex conditions of the different types of campaigns.

The objective of technical support operations in a campaign is to maintain the ability of the armed forces to fight, to put into the hands of troops a full and well coordinated supply of technical equipment that is in good condition and can readily be used in a highly effective and excellent manner in campaigns and combat.

The campaigns of the Vietnamese people's war are always a combination of two modes, of the three elements of the military and are always based on the fighting strength and the combat support of all the people. Our technical equipment encompasses many different levels of technology (modern, relatively modern and rudimentary) and is designed to support the many different methods of fighting of the various arms of the military. The combat support provided by the people also involves its own technical requirements. Consequently, the factors, the organization, the deployment of forces, the modes and the process of work involved in technical support must thoroughly reflect the basic characteristics of our campaigns.

Under our present conditions and circumstances, technical support operations in campaigns have the basic tasks of providing a full and well coordinated supply of all types of weapons and technical equipment for combat and support operations; organizing additional training in technical specialties for troops so that they can manage and use technical equipment well and in a safe and economical manner; correctly utilizing the technical property and impact of

the various types of weapons and technical equipment in combat; organizing and carrying out the repair and salvage of technical equipment damaged in campaigns; organizing the receiving and utilization of technical forces (equipment and personnel) when a mobilization order shifts them from the national economy to the army; organizing technical support of the people as they participate in combat support within campaigns and so forth.

In our campaign experience, in order to complete the tasks mentioned above, technical support operations in campaigns must be conducted by technical sector or specialized technical sector, which consist of the following:

--The weapons sector, which provides the various types of rifles used by the infantry, the various types of mortars and ground artillery as well as air defense artillery, artillery on tanks and armored vehicles and the guns, artillery and missiles on ships and aircraft together with the maintenance equipment, tools and technical supplies needed to maintain these various types of weapons. Mention must also be made of the relatively modern and rudimentary weapons manufactured by the local armed forces, especially the militia and self-defense forces, themselves (mines, obstacles, booby traps and so forth). The technology of the militia and self defense forces must also be modern, possess large destructive power and be highly efficient in annihilating the enemy.

The ammunition sector, which provides the various types of ammunition for the weapons of the various services and branches; the various types of bombs, torpedoes, rockets, mines, grenades, explosives, plastic explosives for special operations troops and so forth as well as the technical supplies needed to support this sector.

--The tank-armored vehicle sector, which consists of many types of combat tanks, transport tanks and tanks and armored vehicles on which weapons and special equipment have been mounted.

--The truck and tractor sector, which provides the various types of special purpose trucks, trucks on which special purpose weapons or equipment are mounted, track mounted transport vehicles, track vehicles on which special weapons and pieces of equipment have been mounted and the various types of tractors. Attention must also be given to the civilian trucks and tractors within the economy which, when necessary, can be mobilized and put to use within the military to support campaigns.

--The boat and ship sector, which, in addition to the various types of combat ships, also provides the patrol boats of border defense troops, transport ships, support ships and so forth and the special purpose equipment used by the navy on shore and at ports. Mention must also be made of the transport ships of the state and people that can be mobilized for campaigns in time of war, including rudimentary means of transportation.

--The aircraft sector, which provides the various types of combat aircraft, reconnaissance planes, bombers, transports, training aircraft and so forth and the support equipment and various types of special purpose technical equipment of the air force at air fields.

In addition, technical support is also provided by the specialized technical sectors of the services and branches, which include the various types of technical equipment, such as radar, command equipment, guidance stations, precision measuring equipment, the special purpose equipment of special operations troops and so forth.

As mentioned above, the technical support of all types of campaigns must be based on the principle of comprehensive supporting all arms of the military, supporting both the main force military corps and the local armed forces; however, priority must be given to the main fronts, the forces performing the main missions, key battles and the decisive battles of the campaign.

The requirements of technical support are different in each type of campaign.

In an offensive (or counter-offensive) campaign, technical support operations must be organized in tightly structured formations of an independent nature, in which the majority of campaign technical forces are coordinated with the technical forces of the defense units and the upper echelon and must be carried out in combat formations. Moreover, offensive campaigns involve a high degree of initiative regarding targets, timing and sites and sometimes involve deep penetrations of enemy territory, consequently, technical support operations must provide for greater mobility, larger stockpiles and a higher and very urgent rate of attrition in order to insure that combat operations can be conducted continuously over a period of many days. In particular, in the course of an offensive campaign, the requirements mentioned above are higher than in any other type of campaign because of the need to provide troops with high mobility, strong firepower and the power to breach enemy lines.

In defensive campaigns, fewer technical supplies are usually consumed than in offensive (or counter-offensive) campaigns; however, defensive campaigns might last longer and, during a defensive campaign, attention must be given to preparing technical support for the counter-offensive and offensive mobile forces of the campaign or blocking forces coordinating with other forces to develop the counter-offensive into an offensive.

If the campaign area of operation lies in the mountainous jungles along the border, along the seacoast or in the islands, technical support operations are controlled by terrain, weather and climatic conditions. As a result, plans must be adopted for making use of the combined strength of each force as well as each piece of technical equipment of the upper levels both within and outside the army, from the central to the local and basic levels, in order to provide prompt and rapid reinforcement.

Our country has a long coastline. In our overall defense posture, campaigns against seaborne landings usually involve combat coordination on a relatively large scale among the different services and branches, consequently, such campaigns require much technical equipment from the very outset, especially for the forces that are fighting enemy forces that are still far away or fighting enemy forces at sea.

The salient characteristics of this type of campaign, a campaign which primarily involves the navy, the air forces of the navy and the marines, are that the targets and objective of the campaign lie at sea or near the shore, remain there for only a short amount of time and the enemy can quickly change the direction of their landing, consequently, our methods of fighting differ from those employed in combat on the mainland. Therefore, in many respects, technical support operations are more complex, especially with regard to transportation, which must be coordinated with the air force or the navy in order to resupply the island line and provide it with large supply reserves; salvage and repair operations must be conducted right on ships under arduous circumstances; firepower must be strongly concentrated during the initial period and the initial battle of the campaign; therefore, a full supply of ammunition must be available at these times (including technical equipment needed for combat at night or at dawn). In addition, it is necessary to make full use of the technical forces of the locality and organize mobile technical forces to reinforce the campaign.

For the purpose of defeating enemy air attacks, our air defense campaigns consist of the air defense forces of all three arms of the military, with the air defense force serving as the nucleus. An air defense campaign can occur within the area of operation of combined services and branches or be waged as an independent campaign on a particular strategic front or a specific region of the country. Therefore, before such a campaign is launched, it is necessary to provide a full and well coordinated supply of the various types of technical equipment for missiles, anti-aircraft, radar, command equipment, power sources and so forth, equipment that meets technical requirements and is highly reliable (100 percent), in order to control air space and promptly destroy the forces of the enemy from the very outset and with high efficiency. Attention must also be given to providing technical support to the air defense operations of the people and to overcoming the aftereffects of enemy air attacks.

In an air campaign, because such campaigns are conducted independently by the air force or in coordination with the forces of the other services and branches, technical support must be prepared before the start of the campaign and after each phase of operations of the air force. In particular, we must inspect, certify, calibrate, supplement and promptly replace the various types of automated electronic equipment on military and civilian aircraft and support equipment, especially fire resistant components, technical equipment on the ground and so forth, to insure that this equipment is stable and highly reliable. Here, importance must be attached to insuring the around-the-clock loading of bombs, missile and rockets on aircraft in accordance with the requirements of combat missions.

The above are several of the primary matters involved in providing technical support in a number of different types of campaigns. The modes and measures whereby technical support is provided in campaigns must be based on the increasingly broad development of the various types of campaigns conducted by us in a war to defend the fatherland.

On the basis of the experience gained by us in the many years of the revolutionary war and on the basis of the actual situation that exists now,

importance must be attached to the following several primary matters in technical support operations in a campaign:

1. Organizing the use of weapons and technical equipment well.

At present, the weapons and technical equipment of our army are gradually being improved, with modern weapons and equipment constituting an increasingly large percentage. This reflects the tremendous change that our troops have undergone; it has a direct impact upon the combat operations of the armed forces through persons who are well versed in the properties and impact of these weapons and equipment and who know how to use them in combat. As a result, organizing the good use of weapons and technical equipment in order to meet the requirements of each different type of campaign has become an important task of the campaign command echelon, a task that has the objective of increasingly the fighting strength of the armed forces. Facts have shown that if the utilization of weapons and technical equipment is not well organized, times will occur when weapons are not being used as effectively as possible in order to achieve optimum firepower in combat and there will even be times when they pose obstacles and difficulties to combat and campaign operations.

This work encompasses the jobs of using, managing, maintaining, storing, repairing and salvaging weapons and technical equipment, providing technical training and so forth, among which the basic tasks involved in technical support in preparing for and conducting combat operations are management and maintenance. Because, in conjunction with increasing the proficiency and efficiency with which weapons and equipment are used and practicing economization in combat, correctly complying with management and maintenance regulations in combat is designed to constantly maintain fighting strength and increase the life and the economic usefulness of weapons and technical equipment, especially of types that we do not yet produce. And, regardless of the situation, we must know how to use the weapons of the enemy to attack the enemy, use the supplies and equipment of the enemy to supplement ours.

Within the solid and interconnected technical support battle positions that are established in peace time and in order to make technical preparations for campaigns, the commanders and technical agencies on the various levels, in addition to constantly keeping abreast of the true strength, the quantity and the quality of the various types of weapons and technical equipment, absolutely must conduct inspections, supplement, in a well coordinated manner, and adjust the types of combat and support technical equipment for troops and insure that high technical coefficients are achieved (100 percent for some types); give priority to inspecting scarce types of weapons and equipment and the important types of firepower of the services and branches; and, in particular, conduct inspections in order to calibrate the various types of support equipment and matched equipment sets so that they are precise and highly reliable.

Technical preparations for campaigns that take place in the mountainous jungles are different in many ways from campaigns conducted in coastal and lowland terrain. If the scale of the campaign is large and if a large quantity of increasingly modern weapons and equipment is involved, the combat

operations of the services and branches are controlled even more by geographical conditions (especially within the area of operation of the campaign), the weather and the climate. In areas in which there are many high mountains, where roads are narrow, in poor condition and few in number, where there are many deep valleys and dense jungle, the utilization of technical equipment is affected. At altitudes of 2,000 to 4,000 meters, the power of engines is only 70 to 80 percent of what it is at normal altitudes; however, fuel consumption rises by 20 to 30 percent. Steeply graded, winding roads that cross streams with rocky bottoms damage the tracks and tires of vehicles; when the gradient is 25 degrees, hydraulic brakes are necessary; when the gradient is 25 to 45 degrees, both manually operated and hydraulic brakes are needed to quickly change direction, gears quickly wear out and loose joints cause engine settings and the calibration of sites and direction devices (of both vehicles and artillery) to be disturbed. The high heat and humidity cause weapons to rust quickly, optical equipment becomes cloudy, electronic components quickly degrade and explosives, fuses and detonating cord quickly absorb moisture, thereby reducing the firepower of weapons and technical equipment. As a result, in a campaign, we must establish the materiel reserve line of the various levels and create the conditions for supplementing, reconditioning and maintaining weapons and technical equipment rapidly, with priority given to the forces on the front, the units performing the main mission, scarce and valuable technical equipment and equipment that must be used first.

In the process of conducting a campaign, it is necessary to perform technical maintenance in between the phases of combat, during the final days of combat or when the unit is transferred to the second line in the formation or assigned the mission of serving as campaign reserves. Technical equipment that has been operated under difficult conditions (highly intensive use, poor terrain, poor weather) must be given special maintenance.

Following a campaign, units must quickly perform maintenance on the various types of weapons and technical equipment, recondition weapons and equipment on the spot or send them to damaged equipment centers for repair in order to restore and maintain the fighting strength of troops immediately following the campaign. Regardless of the circumstances, there must be well coordinated conditions for providing good maintenance, especially in terms of key technical forces and means. That is, maintenance must be performed at the stipulated time for each type weapon and equipment, performed in exact accordance with technical regulations and performed in a manner that insures high quality and avoids sloppiness and "cutting corners." Therefore, the technical maintenance plan must be recorded in the order issued by the campaign command echelon so that all units perform this work well in every situation.

2. Providing a full and well coordinated supply of high quality ammunition of all types.

Ammunition is a very important matter in campaigns and combat; if there is a shortage of ammunition but many weapons in need of ammunition, firepower is weak; only with a full supply of ammunition is it possible to make full use of the effect of the various types and calibers of weapons with which units are

equipped. Therefore, the ammunition base is one of the fundamental factors used as the base of calculations made by the commander to determine the size and timing of campaigns and establish fighting methods consistent with capabilities. The quantity of ammunition used in campaigns coordinated among the various services and branches is very large.

In a campaign, the supply of ammunition must be based on the mission, the area of operation and time requirements and must comply with the principle of centralizing the supply of ammunition on the main front and within units performing the primary mission while providing less of an ammunition base to the other fronts, the second line units and mobile forces.

Ammunition reserves are of three types: the permanent combat ready reserve, the campaign reserve and the strategic reserve, with the campaign reserve being equal to the permanent combat ready reserve plus the amount of ammunition provided by the upper echelon for use in each campaign. The purpose of stipulating how much ammunition is to be consumed is to enable the command echelon to compute the size of the campaign reserve and practice economy in the use of ammunition; in the realities of combat, the amount of ammunition consumed may be higher or lower than the amount stipulated.

However, every type of ammunition must be of high quality, must be supplied in a well coordinated manner and must be transported in a prompt manner both before and during the course of a campaign in accordance with the principle of the upper level transporting ammunition to the lower level; in special cases, the upper level can bypass the next lower level and transport ammunition directly to the battlefield or gun crew and, in other cases, the lower level can take delivery of ammunition direction from the storehouse of the upper level.

Therefore, the deployment of ammunition storehouses must be suited to the campaign mission, to terrain and weather conditions and must be protected from all kinds of damage that might be inflicted by the enemy, especially those on the front. Ordinarily, they are deployed behind the first campaign line. In addition, the remaining reserve storehouses can be deployed at the rear service base of the campaign.

3. Organizing prompt and effective repair and salvage operation.

In modern warfare, in the course of campaigns, many weapons and pieces of equipment inevitably break down or wear out or are completely used, including their reserves. Most attrition and breakdowns occur in combat, an insignificant percentage occurs during the movement of forces from one place to another.(1)

The prompt and effective repair of weapons and technical equipment rapidly creates an on-the-spot source of reinforcements, increases the amount of time weapons and equipment can be used in order to maintain the permanent combat strength of each force participating in the campaign, economizes on manpower as well as transportation costs and limits the damage inflicted by the enemy to the lowest possible level. This work has the task of restoring weapons and equipment to the best possible condition and combat capability in a campaign;

it is performed by replacing worn or broken parts and components with new components or coordinating the repair of some parts with the replacement of others.

In a campaign, repair work is usually conducted on the basis of a division of echelons based on the plan: minor repair work is performed on the division and lower levels; medium-scale repair work is performed on the military region, military corps, service, branch and mechanized infantry division levels; and major repair work is performed at the factories of the upper level. However, to insure that repairs are made quickly, repairs must primarily be made on the spot and at battle positions. Consequently, it is necessary to organize repair units with all the supplies and equipment they need on vehicles so that they can accompany combat formations or reinforce the lower level with a view toward insuring that minor repairs are made during the day that breakdowns occur, with the most efficient way to do this being replacing the entire component. To accomplish this, it is necessary, when making technical preparations for a campaign, to predict which types of technical equipment will break down in order to adopt a plan for the division of repair and salvage echelons; establish the areas of operation, the position and the order of movement of repair units; and predict the rate of breakdowns so that repairs can be made in keeping with the development of each situation.

In the course of a campaign, salvage operations become increasingly necessary, especially in mountainous jungle terrain, not only to clear the way for mobile forces, but primarily to make it possible to quickly restore weapons and technical equipment so that they can be returned to troops in combat and prevent the technical equipment on the battlefield from becoming more seriously damaged or falling into the hands of the enemy. Therefore, the best campaign salvage unit is equipped with all types of equipment, such as cranes, tractors, wreckers, tank wreckers and so forth to perform the jobs mentioned above. The principle underlying this work is to give priority to salvaging equipment that is in need of only minor repair work so that it can be promptly repaired and salvaging technical equipment that lies within the range of enemy firepower or in areas of radioactivity; in addition, damaged technical equipment scattered about many different sites must be salvaged and brought back to the nearest yard for repair. First, however, damaged equipment must be pulled from roads to provide for mobility.

4. Organizing centralized, unified and flexible technical command operations.

In the process of directing each technical activity in support of victory in combat, the various campaign levels and the technical agencies on the various levels must firmly adhere to the principle of centralization and unity and provide comprehensive and flexible guidance, primarily because, in every type of campaign, the situation develops in a complex, urgent and violent manner. However, it is also because, in a campaign, we have many different technical forces on many different levels; without a centralized, unified command, technical support operations among the various services, branches, arms of the military, units and levels cannot support one another and sometimes even pose obstacles to one another. This is a very important requirement of the campaign command levels and technical agencies; at the same time, it reflects the harsh nature of war because, one technical mistake or difficulty that is

corrected slowly can lead to serious consequences for the campaign (or combat operations). Therefore, the organizational work involved in technical command operations must be scientific and creative in nature; of importance here is the need to know what headquarters intends to do and keep abreast of developments in each situation and each stage of combat in order to complete the technical support task. On this basis, it is necessary to utilize the combined strength of each force and each piece of technical equipment in the campaign and closely coordinate with the technical forces of the various sectors, from the central to the local and basic levels, as well as with friendly units in order to create a technical support battle position extending from the frontline to the rearline and the national rear area, thereby meeting the requirements that arise in every situation of the campaign.

FOOTNOTES

1. In the experience of the Soviet Union, of the breakdowns that occur with weapons and technical equipment, 90 percent take place in combat and 10 percent take place during the movement of units from one place to another.

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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, TRADE AND AID

CIA SAID BEHIND PARCELS SENT TO VIETNAM

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 6, 7, 8, and 9 Sep 83

[Article by Nguyen Tran Thiet: "Behind the Parcels Sent to Vietnam"]

[6 Sep 83 p 2]

[Text] Every day crowds of hundreds or thousands of happy-faced people go in and out of the Saigon Post Office. As I watched the animated stream of people flowing by I could see nothing worthy of criticism. The receiving and sending of gifts is an ordinary activity of society, so why is there so much controversy surrounding that matter?

After going to Tan Son Nhat airfield and working with customs and public security personnel of Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi, I obtained precise evidence about the schemes and plots of the enemy to win over our people by means of psychological warfare parcels. I will relate stores that are 100 percent true -- although for many reasons I have had to change the real names and addresses -- so that the readers can also understand what the enemy are plotting behind the parcels.

Gift Parcels

Prior to 1979, most of the parcels sent to our country were gifts. When she learned that her younger brother had graduated from medical school, to express her happiness a woman sent to the new doctor a rather expensive but meaningful gift: a surgery uniform. When an uncle received a wedding announcement from his niece, he sent her gifts. The postal employees and the bride were moved by the generous gifts: a gold watch, several meters of silk brocade, etc. During those years there was a very good relationship between the customers and the postal personnel. No one had to wait too long, few people had to pay taxes, and there was practically no trouble between the customs cadres and the people receiving parcels.

At the beginning of 1978 an organization of Vietnamese living in Canada came up with the idea of accepting small parcels from Vietnamese in that country and shipping them to Vietnam in large crates. The people who organized the sending of those parcels were thinking of their country, where they had their roots. They even assumed responsibility for getting in touch with Air Canada to charter an airplane to take the parcels to Vietnam. Organizations of Vietnamese

living in Asian, European, and North and South American countries imitated the Canadian organization. The CIA immediately smelled an opportunity to do its work. The post-war activity program of the U.S. in Vietnam was bolstered with a new factor.

Washington never fails to act when it has an opportunity to stick its bloody hands into Vietnam. It was the Americans who organized the evacuation from Vietnam, and it was the Americans who bestowed psywar gifts on the people who left the country they hated. The public security comrades presented evidence:

"Look at these letters, sent to Vietnam from eight countries in all five continents -- Asia, Africa, America, Europe, and Australia -- by people who had just fled abroad. Their contents are strangely similar. And here are some parcels. Is this a coincidence or is it intentional? It's certain that the postal personnel of eight different countries could not have the same method of wrapping parcels, and how could people who didn't know one another have the same idea of spending about 5,000 Vietnamese dong to buy a certain type of cloth to send to eight different addresses in Vietnam? Clearly, the CIA drafted those letters and it can be confirmed that it paid for and paid for the contents of those parcels and for wrapping them. The customs, postal, public security, and other cadres, coordinating with one another, obtained from the 1.27 million parcels sent to Vietnam (counting only those sent to Ho Chi Minh City) in the course of a year from nearly 40 countries in the world undeniable evidence of the insidious plots initiated and orchestrated by the U.S. government and the CIA.

In mid-1979 the U.S. government pretended that it had to give in to the demands of Vietnamese who had become U.S. citizens, who were usually disdainfully called "yellow-skinned Americans." It authorized an American with a Vietnamese wife to charter an airplane from a U.S. airline. It announced the location to which the parcels were to be sent. According to reports, the Americans had a complete list of names and addresses of the relatives of former field-grade and general-rank officers in the puppet army, former high-ranking officials in the puppet regime, and former puppet ministers and vice-ministers in Vietnam. Pretending to be members of the organization which sent and received gift parcels, the CIA officials went to California, the state with the most Vietnamese, and explained their scheme to such high-ranking lackeys as Nguyen Cao Ky, Ngo Quang Truong, and Phan Quang Dan and told them, "Don't use your names when sending parcels, and don't send them directly to your relatives. Don't allow the communists to find out about your organizations in Vietnam. You should select an ordinary, innocent citizen and a vague address to serve as the contact point. Write letters to your relatives in advance to inform them of your intentions."

The CIA went to the homes of families members of which were revolutionary cadres and enquired in detail about the relationship, character, psychology, qualifications, organs, enterprises, and positions of the people receiving the goods. The first U.S. charter flight carrying parcels from the U.S. to Vietnam was only a "trial balloon." The CIA mobilized its network to closely monitor the parcels to find out how they were handled. No problems arose.

Could such gift parcels be used to penetrate Vietnam? The CIA leaders decided

to plant in each of them a few leaflets, several nude photographs, and copies of the newest music of the reactionary musician Pham Duy, and to use Vietnamese-language publications published by Vietnamese traitors abroad as gifts. Of course, gift parcels which were psywar gifts in nature could not reach recipients in an unimpeded manner. The customs cadres requested the recipients of such goods to sign a report affirming that the confiscated materials were reactionary propaganda.

The CIA immediately blew out of proportion and distorted our proper actions. The big-mouthed thieves stirred up the Vietnamese in the U.S. by falsely accusing the Vietnamese authorities of causing trouble and refusing to grant permission to receive parcels sent from the U.S. To make the drama more interesting, the American man with the Vietnamese wife declared that he had been bankrupted by Vietnam's duplicity. He was not able to recompensate the people who had sent the parcels, so he had to bear the dishonor of being someone who could not pay his debts.

That incident fabricated by the CIA achieved the desired results. The Vietnamese in the U.S. were deceived and were cut off from the truth, so they did not understand why they had been given a hard time, or know that the goods they had sent had not been confiscated. The U.S. government attained its goal of inciting the Vietnamese living in the U.S. to (without reason) curse the government of Vietnam. Afraid that its scheme would be exposed, the CIA hastily rang down the curtain on its absurd drama. A well-known American requested permission from the government in Washington to settle the matter. He flew to Hanoi and confessed to us the crime of planting psywar goods in the gift parcels. But when he returned to the U.S. he boasted that Vietnam had agreed to his demand that the parcels be returned. He then volunteered to assume responsibility for sending goods to Vietnam and expressed readiness to reimburse anyone who had suffered losses. If they didn't understand the CIA plot, who wouldn't praise that American as being noble and knightly? In actuality, he didn't spend a cent, for how could he reimburse anyone when there were no losses to reimburse? Clearly, the CIA has jumped into the fray and had transformed those gifts from relative to relative into tools of its post-war plots and schemes in Vietnam. Its plotting behind the parcels is being exposed and condemned.

The Life of a "Writer"

That day, 4 June 1983, I was at Tan Son Nhat airfield. A large number of people arrived to pick up parcels. Some people received Honda and Peugeot motorbicycles, others received Diamant and Favorite bicycles, and some received so many parcels that they had to rent a car to take them away. In that crowd of people, I noticed a woman about 40 years old. She was short, had a round face, and wore her hair in buns on the sides of her head. She wore a blouse made of white polyester cloth and pants made of black sateen cloth. From outward appearances, she was very simple and ordinary. She used no cosmetics or perfume. Was she a cadre who worked for an organ? Did she come to pick up a gift from a child or younger brother who was studying in a socialist country?

She took a declaration form and absorbed herself in filling it out. Half an

hour later I heard the announcer call out, "Mrs Huynh Thi Nha...Precinct 5...pay 17,540 dong in taxes." The "cadre" went to the cashier's table. She counted the money. Her face revealed no sadness, happiness, or anger. She picked up the parcels, carried them out herself, tied them behind a woman's Honda motorcycle, started up the motor, and sped away. I was perplexed: what kind of person was she? Did she love or hate our regime? Did she approve of or support having to pay such a large amount of taxes? I asked the customs cadre, "Who is Huynh Thi Nha? Who is sending her goods from abroad -- her parents or siblings?" "You're a journalist but don't know," he replied. "She was a writer during the puppet period who specialized in writing romantic novels. She has no relatives abroad. Two years ago she received the first parcel from a person in the U.S. named Huynh Tien Phuc. She declared that Phuc had served in the French army and had gone to the U.S. in 1944. She said that he was about 70 years old and was her uncle."

"If you go to the public security headquarters or to her housing area you can learn the full details. As far as we are concerned, she is a good customer. Forbidden items or decadent photographs and books are never mixed in with her parcels, she pays her taxes promptly and fully, and she has never complained that taxes are too high or requested a reduction of or exemption from taxes."

As the customs cadres had suggested, I went to the Ho Chi Minh City public security headquarters. It was not necessary to open up the file cabinet to search for her file: the public security comrades told me all about her.

"Mrs Nha's husband was also a writer and poet during the puppet period. They were unable to join in the evacuation prior to 30 April 1975. After 10 days of reform study they returned home. Both of them wrote ostentatiously, but their so-called literary works were too inept so no publishing house would print them. They were unemployed and refused to work with their hands, so they gradually sold their possessions to buy food and secretly made preparations to flee. The CIA found them in 1980. "Huynh Tien Phuc" was only a name made up by the CIA so that it could send money to support their lackeys. We understand very clearly that one of the post-Vietnam war plots of the U.S. administration is to rally the old literati and transform them into spies who seek out information in order to write articles which slander our regime.

[7 Sep 83 p 2]

[Text] I decided to go to the housing area where Bui Hai and his wife Nha were living. As I was going up the stairway I met Mr and Mrs Bui Hai going down. I looked at the wife with astonishment. "Are you Mrs Nha?" I asked. She no longer bore any resemblance to the "female cadre" who had gone to pick up parcels that morning. She wore jeans and a bright red T-shirt on which were printed the English words "I Love You." She had put on powder and lipstick, lined her eyebrows, and put on a wig. Arm-in-arm with her husband, she laughed and chattered continuously. Was she delighted over something?

I knocked on the door of room No 34. Comrade Van Son, a cadre of Military Region 7, was waiting for me. When I asked "Where are Mrs Nha and her husband going," he shrugged his shoulders and said, "They have no fixed schedule. Morning, noon, afternoon, and night they go off to restaurants. They spend

money as if it were garbage. Our monthly salary wouldn't be enough to buy their beer and whiskey for a single day."

"How do they get along with their neighbors," I asked. "Their relationship must be divided into four periods. Prior to May 1975 they regarded the people around them with disdain. Between 1975 and 1979 they fell on bad times and regarded the resistance fighters with respect. After they began to receive money from the U.S. they looked down on the people around them, but during the past year they have pretended to be good, courteous, proper neighbors."

Son told me about some things that had happened in the housing area. A woman and her 12-year old son lived in apartment No 38. It was a poor family which had been part of the infrastructure of the anti-U.S. movement in the city. The old woman strictly forbade her grandchild to play at the apartment of Nha and her husband or to accept gifts from them. The boy obeyed her for more than a year, but then was "bought off." Nha and her husband met him when he was returning from school. Both of them tried to charm him and persuade him to come to their apartment. The couple went further and further, and every week gave him cookies and meat rolls. Finally, they attacked him by means of a suit of clothes. Nha opened a parcel sent from the U.S. and took out a suit of children's clothing, which they gave him to try on. The clothes fit as if the boy had been measured and the measurements had been sent to a skilled tailor. The woman gave him the clothes. The boy was overjoyed and thanked her profusely. His grandmother had to go to Nha's apartment to pay for the clothes. Nha turned on the charm: "How can a thousand dong be compared to the neighborliness between you and me? You should not speak about money."

The grandmother had to give in and thought, "All in all, Hai and Nha are good people." From that day on she was no longer distant from Nha's family, and last month Nha gave her three meters of cloth to make two blouses.

The psywar schemes of that "writer" were extremely insidious and evil. I asked Son, "Why don't you report to the responsible organ? Why allow her to keep on doing those things?" He replied, "Of course, we will take steps to deal with the couple, but the most important thing is to bankrupt the plot of using goods from abroad in psychological warfare activities."

Son wrote down an address for me. When I went to Hanoi I met with the people who are responsible for monitoring such matters. They had a pile of decadent publications and more than 200 tapes containing more than 3,000 extremely reactionary songs. The U.S. government had opened its doors to welcome so-called singers and musicians of the puppet period. The CIA pays those lackeys very generously, and encourages them to compose and record songs so that they can be broadcast over the Voice of America and sent to Vietnam.

"It seems that the Americans even attempt to win over some resistance war singers," I said. "You are referring to Mong Dung and Van Khanh, aren't you?" asked one of the cadres, "They sent letters to their families which said 'We thought that because we were well-known singers the Americans would welcome and support us. Who would have thought we would have to wear down the heels of our shoes just to get singing jobs in bars. We could not endure the obscenities

and crude behavior of the customers, so we had to abandon singing and get jobs as dishwashers. We applied for jobs but none of the singers of the Thieu regime wanted to get to know us or be our friends, or to write letters of introduction for us. They hated anyone who followed the communists in the past."

Reactionary artists, totalling 150 musicians and 200 singers, under the direction of Pham Duy and his four children -- Duy Quang, Duy Khanh, Duy Cuong, and Thai Hien -- organized a family band called "The Dreamers." Every time they record a new tape they send it to Vietnam via many different routes -- by mail, by sailors on foreign ships destined for Vietnam, or by means of diplomats, tourists, journalists, or Vietnamese living abroad -- or via students or cadres returning from abroad."

I tried to remain patient but could only listen to a few of the music tapes because their lyrics were obscenely reactionary.

I remember that at one time many cafes in Saigon played such tapes. Who knows how many secrets lie behind the parcels sent from abroad? The "writer" Nha is an example. Why do the traitors of the past continue to brazenly receive salaries from those who invaded our country? The Ministry of Interior cadres had rather concrete evidence about Tran Tam Tiep, head of the so-called "Overseas Literary Center." Following the Americans' orders, Tran Tam Tiep came up with the ruse of appealing for Vietnamese exiles in the U.S. to contribute money to set up a "humanitarian assistance fund" to conceal the money provided by the CIA for artists and writers still in Vietnam, such as Nha Ca, Duyen Anh, Hoang Hai Thuy, etc. What we must do now is to find out who the people receiving the parcels are, for whom they are receiving them, and why they are receiving the parcels.

In conclusion, the comrades at the Ministry of Interior advised me, "Don't worry. We have complete files on Mrs Nha and her cohorts."

"Gifts From Heaven"

I had not made inquiries but I knew about his family in some detail. He was a person who had participated in the resistance war and in the battle of Dien Bien Phu. In 1978 he became 60 years old and retired.

He had five children. His oldest son, an engineer, had a wife who was a doctor and had two small children. His second daughter and her husband were secondary school teachers. They made arrangements so that they could live together in warm, attractive living quarters. He worried most of all about his third son. When he returned after fulfilling his military obligation, he selected bicycle repair as his trade and married a "businesswoman." They lived together in the same house with him but ate separately. At mealtime they would offer him a dish of lean meat one day, or chicken legs or pigs' feet on other days, but he never touched them.

The first contradiction in that family arose in the period just before Tet in 1980. His wife complained that he was a "parasite" who didn't earn any money and was distributed nothing during the Tet period. When she saw that he put up with that for the sake of domestic tranquility, she became even more abusive. He became angry and the first fight in nearly 40 years of married life took place. His children analyzed the affair according to their own viewpoint: some criticized him for being crazy, while others praised him for passing on human qualities to his offspring.

For his part, he was proud of his life but he was always sad because he was economically dependent and thus relied increasingly on his wife and children. He seldom had social contact or went out, but liked to lie about the house reading books and "Kim Van Kieu." One day, when going through a pile of letters kept by the family he noticed a letter from his younger brother, a traitor who had surrendered to the enemy. He had forbidden his children and relatives to mention his name and could not understand why the letter he sent was still kept. He had not yet read the letter. Perhaps his wife was the person who had received the letter and had stuck it in there because she was aware of his order forbidding contact with the traitor. Curious, he read the letter. His younger brother bragged that he owned a farm in the U.S. and owned his own home and car. His eldest son Thang Long had just entered medical school and his youngest daughter was named Thu Ha. He wrote in the letter, "I gave them those names so that they would always remember Thang Long [Hanoi] and what happened in Hanoi in the fall of 1945."

He put the letter back into the pile, then folded it up and put it in the wallet he always kept in his breast pocket. He suddenly remembered that in 1959 his brother was chosen to go to "B" for the first time. Before reaching the battlefield he was ambushed and captured. Unwilling to undergo torture, he defected. He hated his brother and thought that his hand would not shake in the least as he pointed a gun at his chest, should the two meet on the battlefield.

In the letter, his younger brother said nothing of the past, but only said that he wanted to establish contact and hoped that he would send him a little news about friends and relatives. How should he deal with the problem? Something urged him to send a letter to his younger brother. Was it brotherly sentiment? Had he become melancholy and forgiving in his old age? Both things were true but they were not the main reasons. The main reason which had just arisen in his mind but which he couldn't stop thinking about was the parcels sent from abroad. Many families had food and possessions because relatives in places so far away that "canons couldn't reach them" sent them parcels. He had a younger brother who had betrayed him and with whom he had been angry for years. Now that the country was independent and united, he remembered the homeland. "Strike those who run away, not those who run back," as our people often remind one another. For more than a week he had been a judge who continually thought of ways to rationalize his writing a letter to his younger brother. Each time he felt guilty about wanting to contact the enemy he thought, "Those things belong to the past. I've been too stern."

He decided to write a letter to his younger brother. The letter took up less than half a page of notebook paper. He mailed it at the post office without

telling his wife or children. More than a month later he received a reply. His wife and children dared not open the letter. Appearing to be nonchalant, he threw the letter he had been waiting for into a drawer. That afternoon, after his wife went to work and his children went to school, he read the letter. His younger brother wrote a letter eight pages long in which he expressed his homesickness and expressed the desire to give his family any gift it wanted. For the time being, he was sending the family some medicines and tonics.

He now had to openly express his attitude to his family. He called a family meeting and explained, "Your uncle and I are both more than 60 years old. I hope that when I die I'll still have a younger brother overseas to mourn me.

His family readily accepted that sentimental reason and the first medicine he received rapidly disappeared. His daughter-in-law, who dealt in the black market, helped him by giving him 7,000 dong for the medicine. He was not selfish in spending the money. The "gift from heaven" was divided evenly among his sons, daughters, and grandchildren. A short time later he received another gift from the U.S. By selling the "cassettes" sent in the second parcel he got an even larger sum of money.

When she learned that he had money, his third daughter-in-law, who dealt in the black market, said to him, "If you hold on to 20,000 dong you can't make a profit. My friends are willing to borrow it at an interest rate of 10 percent. Do you agree?"

He asked, "Does that mean that I would earn a profit of 2,000 dong?" His daughter laughed loudly and said to her husband, "Our father is very backward!" She turned in his direction and said, "I'll hand over to you a profit of 2,000 dong every month. And that is after I've deducted my 'commission'."

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Liking what he heard, he handed all the money to his daughter-in-law. His wife complained, "Why didn't you consult me about the money?" He replied, "You criticized me for being a parasite who didn't earn any money. I must prove to you that you're wrong."

Over a period of 2 years, every time he received a parcel his character underwent a change. He wrote long, increasingly warmer letters to his younger brother. He was no longer a person who bestowed favors, but became a person who accepted favors from a person in far-away America. He wrote, "When you encounter people who have arrived from our country, take the time to talk with them and you will understand how difficult our country's economic situation is. My family is very grateful to you for having sent parcels. In a spirit of brotherliness, I would like to recommend that from now on you only send western medicines."

That was a plan his third daughter-in-law had outlined for him. He turned the medicine over to her. She paid him a fair price. She suggested that he allow his fourth son and youngest daughter to help her market the goods and he did not object. Although they were living together, he didn't notice any change on

the part of his children because he himself had changed. He no longer went to the state restaurant to eat noodle soup costing seven dong. He was tired of the state restaurant's insipid noodle soup. Every day he smoked a package of filter-tip cigarettes and could not eat a bowl of rice without meat.

One day toward the end of 1982, after receiving the 12th parcel sent from the U.S., he received a letter from his younger brother, who revealed that "When I received your son's letter I was very sad. I dare not let my wife read it. I've enclosed a photocopy of the letter. I don't stand to profit in any way from reestablishing fraternal ties."

He read the letter from his eldest son. His face became flushed with anger. He condemned his son for being absurdly jealous because he hadn't received any money from his father, for having no heart, and for completely lacking sentiment toward his uncle. His son had written:

"Dear Sir!

You brought disaster to our family from 1959 to 1979. Wasn't that enough? What is your intention in resuming relations at this time? Do you intend to push my parents and siblings onto the path of treason that you took? If you still have some conscience left, I hope that you'll let our family live a normal life."

Speaking frankly, he was not unaffected by his son's straightforward words. What should he do? He pretended to have no knowledge of his son's letter, while he racked his brain thinking of a way to respond to his younger brother's letter: "Try to understand! My son was recently denied acceptance by the Party because he had to explain his relationship to you." (In fact, the son and his wife became party members prior to 1975).

After he sent the letter he had a poor appetite and didn't sleep well for nearly half a month, but he had to continue on the course he had set. Now his fourth son made the following proposal: "I've found a place to sell dollars on Hang No Street. I'll pay you a profit of 10 dong per dollar." "Be careful!" replied his father. "Ha! You're always needlessly worried! Where did you hide that wad of money as thick as a big toe? I think that you should put your capital to work. If we deal in gold we'll make even bigger profits."

When I heard that story about him, a person who participated in the resistance war, I was very sad. I wanted to meet him and talk with him, to urge him not to fall into the abyss and commit political suicide, but the public security cadres stopped me: "This affair is about to end. We investigated and located the place where his third son produces ersatz medicine. We also know about three places where his two youngest children often go to deal in gold and dollars. The problem now is to end the affair at the right time."

I thought about the "gifts from heaven" which caused a person who had made contributions to become so decadent.

A Person Visits His Homeland

The telephone of the Ho Chi Minh Cultural Service rang. Thanh Hai, head of the cultural protection bureau, picked up the receiver. "Hello!" A voice from the other end of the line said, "I'm lucky it's you, Thanh Hai!" Come over to my place. There's an especially happy story. It'll probably take all morning. Will you come?" Thanh Hai replied, "I'll be there in half an hour."

At the appointed time, Thanh Hai knocked on the door of an apartment well-known to the city's public security police. The door opened. He was startled. Professor T, who had caused him such trouble more than 3 years ago, stood before him smiling.

Comrade Ho Cong Thanh said, "The professor came to the city and worked with us all day yesterday. In the past, there was a misunderstanding between us."

The incident happened more than 3 years ago. That day, Thanh Hai met with a representative of Vietnamese living in the U.S. who had returned to Vietnam on a visit. Thanh Hai received an "ultimatum."

"I'm leaving the country at 1000 hours the day after tomorrow. Inspect my tape recordings. Please give me a receipt. He spread on the table all sorts of authorization papers from many authoritative echelons in Hanoi. How should one deal with a person who had so much legal, very reliable documentation? Signing a paper so that professor T -- a representative of Vietnamese living in the U.S. who had returned to visit his homeland -- could take 77 recorded tapes out of the country was the simplest solution, and no one could criticize such an action, but Thanh Hai's sense of responsibility would not allow that."

Thanh Hai telephoned the municipal public security police. Ho Cong Thanh explained, "It would take at least 154 hours to listen to all 77 tapes. We have only 40 hours if we don't waste a minute eating or sleeping. Perhaps this is a case of someone wanting to trick us, so we must be determined not to be defeated. I recommend that in addition to you and me we select two other qualified, responsible comrades. You can prepare four good cassette players. Each of us will listen to the tapes all night tonight. We'll meet with him at 0730 on the day after tomorrow."

At the appointed hour, professor T came to the Cultural Service and received the following reply: "Dear professor! We are forced to retain nine tapes with unwholesome contents. Please be understanding."

"Don't you think that that violates my rights?" asked the professor. "Either I leave with all 77 tapes or you can also retain and imprison me."

"Take it easy. We had sufficient time to listen to the tapes with bad contents. I hope that you will understand the situation and support us."

The airplane would soon take off. The professor set conditions: "If I miss my flight you'll have to reimburse me. I request you to arrange for me to speak with Hanoi."

"We won't keep you from making your flight, although we have sufficient reason to detain you. In your luggage we found 30 paintings and many poems that have

not been censored."

"You don't believe me! You think that I'm a spy, don't you? If so, then I'll say goodbye forever."

More than 3 years had past. Nine tapes with unwholesome contents were still in the files.

Today, professor T had returned to meet the people to whom he had bid a permanent farewell. He revealed, "That day, aboard the plane, I was very angry at you, but later, when I sat recalling the contents of the tapes you retained, I gradually realized that you were correct, very correct. Then I decided that I had to seek the truth. Had I taken advantage of my status as a Vietnamese living abroad to serve a foreign country?"

"Let us begin with a poem. It was an innocent poem written by a poet named Hoang prior to the August Revolution. You asked me how I obtained the address of that poet. I had it because of Mrs Kieu Oanh, an old friend of my mother had been living in France. When she learned that I was going to visit the homeland, Mrs Kieu Oanh sent me a letter to deliver to him in person. The letter, which I read and practically memorized, was as follows:

"My dearest Hoang,

"You became 60 on 7 January. For some reason, the older I get the more I remember the beautiful souvenirs of youth. I remember the boy who lived on the same street, and still remember your birthday and age. You are 4 years older than I. I could call you 'old man' but I always want to be the pretty girl for whom you wrote a poem in 1939. Write that poem down for me, won't you? I would like the poem and your signature, and hope that you'll oblige me. Send it to me via professor T. I'll be counting the hours until I hear from you.

"Your Kieu Oanh"

"Perhaps Mrs Kieu Oanh was the girlfriend or mistress of the poet Hoang. I had to help her fulfill her desire. I met with the poet. The grey-haired old man was moved when he read his girlfriend's letter. He wrote down the romantic poem he had composed when he was a youth expressing his love for the girl in the pre-1940 period and handed it to me. I was happy because I had fulfilled my mission."

"Six months later, during a trip to France, I intended to meet Mrs Kieu Oanh. I was stunned to learn that she had been dead 14 years. That was strange. Who was using her name and why? I questioned reliable Vietnamese living in France and learned the truth. Hoang, it turned out, was a poet with melancholy thoughts. The 'old woman' Kieu Oanh had sent Hoang a second letter expressing warm sentiments, accompanied by a request for five other poems. 'Kieu Oanh' did not forget to send Hoang a parcel valued at 5,000 dong. The poet Hoang wrote a letter in reply and received additional, more generous, gifts, accompanied by a request for permission to print a collection of his poems in France. The poet Hoang was moved by the sentiment shown by his old girl friend. He sent to France his entire collection of poems. Very fortunately,

those poems, which described the melancholy thoughts of a person who overrated himself, was bored with life, and was tired of our regime, were retained. I suddenly became enlightened. I had been used to pave the way for their insidious plot.

"The story about the paintings was also very painful. I admit that I have no talent in art. Some people gave me dollars and recommended that I buy still-life paintings by artists A, B, C, D, etc. I also didn't concern myself with which artists belonged to the old Saigon regime and which ones returned after participating in the resistance war. I didn't suspect that I was being used as a fuse for the policy to 'neutralize' Vietnamese artists. I was only one of the people who carried out their scheme to buy landscape paintings and still-life paintings at very high prices. They never bought paintings of soldiers, children and teenagers wearing red armbands, workers at construction sites, the digging of ditches to fight drought, etc. Thus in order to sell paintings a number of artists changed their themes."

Thanh took me to meet the artist Nguyen Thi, who worked at the Municipal Art Studio. Thi told a story about a young woman artist, Miss Hoang Anh, who had been a second-year student at the (former) Advanced Art School and had graduated after the nation had been completely liberated. She painted many good paintings. A foreign customer went to buy a painting from her. A week after buying the painting the customer returned and said to Hoang Anh, "The child in your painting is wearing a red armband. I'd like you to remove it. Please understand that because of the red armband the painting can't be sold abroad." Hoang Anh didn't know what to do. She didn't want to sully her art, but she had already spent the money she received for the painting. Unable to "satisfy" her customer, Hoang Anh requested that he return the painting and she borrowed money from a friend so that she could return his money.

Professor T talked very openly and frankly. He admitted that "One of the reasons I visited the homeland this time was to meet with you to clear up old misunderstandings. If I hadn't 'clashed' with you perhaps 'they' would still be taking advantage of me. I spent a lot of time answering a question: does our government truly respect and trust the overseas Vietnamese? I have sufficient proof that our government not only trusts the children of Vietnam who are living in foreign countries but trusts them too much. I want to emphasize the words 'too much.' Did not the Vietnamese living in France contribute to the construction of a rather large project in Vietnam? Don't hide anything from me. I met the construction engineer Th. D. in France. I hate him and despise him. It must be said that he committed all sorts of crimes against the nation. According to his calculations, the project would cost several million francs. The Vietnamese living in France contributed small amounts or large amounts, depending on their means, so more than the required amount was raised. Construction engineer Th. D. returned to Vietnam, carrying with him the promises of Vietnamese living in France to the homeland.

"We guaranteed that the project would be completed within 3 years. We requested from the government only a large piece of land and a few hundred workers who could be trained as craftsmen when the project was completed.

"Is it not true that 6 years passed before the foundation of that building was

laid?"

"Mr Th. D. explained that the contributed money had been used up."

"So you believed him? That is the meaning of the word 'too' which I used. Why didn't you accuse Th. D. of being a CIA agent? Why did they seek all ways to prolong the open-ended contract? By doing so, they forced you to lose a large plot of ground and to pay hundreds of people to play and wait, while the old man Th. D. used the overseas Vietnamese's money to buy two hotels so that he could operate them."

Professor T asked questions: "Did you think that you didn't have the right to intervene in the contract because you hadn't invested any capital or drawn up any plans? Were you afraid to try to speed things up because you were afraid of hurting the pride of the overseas Vietnamese?"

"I knew what was going on, as did the Vietnamese living in France, so everyone was mad at Th. D. The people forced him to sell the two hotels immediately and to recoup the honor of the Vietnamese living in France by completing the project in X months. The engineer was severely condemned. I'm sure that he won't try anything else. I hope you don't misunderstand us. You should have promptly informed the overseas Vietnamese about what happened in order to expose the traitor Th. D."

Professor T fell silent for a moment, then continued, "I think that the Vietnamese in France also made a mistake by selecting the wrong person to represent them. You should review the situation to find out how much damage Th. D., acting on CIA orders, did, especially in regard to the cadres he took to France and bribed with material goods. That enemy of our homeland is very dangerous!"

Thanh and Hai agreed with professor T. The old and new enemies of our country try to take advantage of even our smallest oversights to sabotage us militarily, politically, economically, and culturally, and try to create artificial discord in hopes of creating division between Vietnamese living far from the homeland and our government. They are being defeated and will continue to be defeated because nearly all of the overseas Vietnamese are straightforward, loyal, generous, and patriotic.

After telling me the story about professor T, Thanh took me to see a warehouse of "forbidden materials," including all kinds of decadent pictures, photographs, books, and newspapers: 116,000 books, 2 million pictures and photographs, 2,092 martial arts and pornographic films, and 3,549 recorded tapes. Among the titles of the books were "Let's Make Love," "Love Me," "I Love My Homeland: the USA," etc.

Did the true Vietnamese who returned from abroad on visits, tourists, or sailors on ocean-going ships understand the contents of the things they brought into our country? How about the things sent along with gift parcels? Thanh Hai spoke of their schemes:

"Our enemies seek all ways to sneak past our inspection network. They unwind

tapes on which there were recorded decadent songs and use them as packing materials. They keep blank tapes in their pockets to exchange for tapes with bad contents. They record messages from relatives on the first part of a tape and messages with reactionary contents in the middle of the tape. Sometimes we receive large numbers of new tapes that are still wrapped in cellophane to ensure that no one has used them. Even so, we inspect them to find out the true situation. On one occasion, when the designated recipient arrived to pick up the tapes they and the people accompanying them became angry and crudely insulted us. We put a cassette into a player, invited the 'customers' to sit down, and turned on the switch. All three 'customers' who were listening to the tape looked at one another and suddenly ran away. They were afraid that they would be arrested because they were associated with people who slandered, distorted, and sullied the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Recently videocassette tapes have appeared in parcels. With such tapes one can 'send,' 'receive,' and 'view' television at any time. We released to the customers tapes that consisted entirely of recordings of the Espana 82 international soccer matches. But we could not release to them recordings of martial arts films, violent films, or pornographic films.

I sat in the Cultural Service for a rather long time talking about the enemy's plots against our country. If all of those things were circulated in Saigon, they would do untold damage. Regrettably, professor T was not able to view those psychological warfare items. However, he had his own experiences. He gave us a copy of a speech delivered by Nguyen Cao Ky at an anti-Vietnam conference in Tokyo on 7 December 1982, under the title "Resisting Communist Expansion by Means of a Psychological Warfare-Economic Strategy." The professor also told us about some international "charity" organizations which, purportedly to "help orphans and undernourished children in Vietnam," sent aid to reactionaries in religious garb.

Professor T has returned to the U.S. Goods from the U.S. continue to slip into our country. Thanh Hai opened a cabinet and placed before me a number of knitted shirts. He said, "Do you know how many of these shirts flooded markets in our country in 1982? Some 2,350,000 of them. One ship sold 11,000 of them to the Clolimex company. Very fortunately, we stepped in in time."

I picked up one of the shirts. On the front a boy and girl were kissing. Underneath there were the English words "I Love America," and on the back there was an American flag. One could easily have removed the flag and placed it on another shirt.

No! We cannot wait until the water has reached our feet before acting. There are many ugly things which we must promptly bring to an end, so that the plots behind the parcels cannot become crimes.

5616

CSO: 4209/18

ON AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVIZATION IN NAM HO

Hanoi VIETNAM COURIER in English Aug 83 pp 18-20

[Text]

Several years ago in the movement for agricultural cooperativization in Nam Bo many production collectives and agricultural cooperatives established a good record, but no few units showed bad performance and eventually disbanded in some places.

This was due mainly to non-observance of Lenin's principle of gradual advance to higher levels of organization.

Of late the resolution and directives of the Communist Party of Vietnam's Political Bureau and Secretariat on the transformation of agriculture have criticized undue haste and stressed the need for a gradual and steady advance through transitional stages toward the collectivization of production.¹

The Objective Need for Transitional Stages

Following the readjustment of land holdings many places in Nam Bo set up production collectives or cooperatives composed of former poor and landless peasants without going through a transitional stage. Difficulties soon cropped up as material and technical bases were almost non-existent, and the per capita land holding very small. There was no field re-arrangement, no irrigation, no facilities, etc., thus leaving production at the mercy of nature. Worse still, the shortage of

draught power and working implements, both rudimentary and mechanized, hampered tilling, irrigation and drainage and, to top it all, available capital was insignificant or, inexistent.

Besides, the peasants were not acquainted with collective work. That is why the above-mentioned units showed only changes in ownership relations but none in production relations and management. As a matter of fact, they only grew rice and made no attempt to advance toward specialized or diversified farming and to promote stockbreeding, small industry or handicrafts. They neither applied new cultivation techniques nor used new strains. Managerial cadres were not conversant with the managerial principles of socialist collective production. Most of the collective units had not worked out the necessary economic-technical norms nor did they apply correctly the principle of distribution according to labour. Hence the low labour productivity and incomes.

Take for instance the cooperative of Giong Rieng district, Kien Giang province: established in November 1978 after a land readjustment, with a total area of 505 hectares (4,515 square metres per capita), and with poor peasants and lower-middle peasants accounting for 91% and upper-middle peasants for 9% of

membership, it had neither tractors nor cultivators but only 4 threshing machines, 62 buffaloes and oxen, which were not yet cooperativized for lack of fund, and a very small fixed capital: 82.9 dong per farmer in 1980 (while a good cooperative in Ninh Binh, Cho Gao district, had 253 dong).

This poor material base did not help the cooperative develop its production. The soil was not cultivated on schedule and with appropriate techniques. Owing to defective management, two years after its founding (1980) it still had not established the necessary economic-technical norms, nor a system of rewards and sanctions for the management of labour. Every year a part of its land was left untilled. Its rice yield was only 1,362 kg per hectare as against 2,500 kg per hectare harvested by individual peasants. The share of the collective economy in the income of a co-op member's family keeps on decreasing:

1979: 72.3%; 1980: 56.3%; 1981: 46.6%.

As accumulation did not increase, stockbreeding, small industry and handicrafts did not develop.

On the other hand, some production collectives which had gone through a transitional form managed to build adequate material, technical and psychological bases and develop their production.

Thus transitional stages are necessary in agricultural cooperativization; one of these transitional forms is the solidarity-for-production team which has itself to be suited to the conditions prevailing in the Mekong delta at present.

The solidarity-for-production team dealt with in this article is a name common to many transitional forms in step 1: irrigation team, plant-protection team, new-strain team... Although their level of socialization differs, they all aim at preparing material, economic, technical and psychological conditions for the building of production collectives corresponding to low-level cooperatives in the North.

It is necessary to go through transitional stages when progressing from small individual production to collective economic organization at a high level of socialization (high-level cooperative in the North). Each transitional stage calls for an appropriate form of production organization in which production relations and productive forces constantly evolve. Take for instance the change in ownership relations:

Step 1: Before collectivizing the means of production (land² and implements), there is no change in ownership relations and distribution relations as yet. There are only initial changes in labour relations and in the building of some common material and technical bases.

Step 2: Progressing from the partial to the complete collectivization of the means of production of individual peasants, socialist principles begin to be applied: production according to plan, initial specialization of labour, application of scientific and technical achievements, irrigation, mechanization, initial distribution according to labour.

Corresponding to these steps the following forms of organization have appeared in Vietnam:

In the South	In the North
Stage 1: Solidarity-for-production team	Labour, exchange team
Stage 2: Production collective Cooperative	Low-level cooperative High-level cooperative

The Transitional Character of Solidarity-for-production Team

In many places it is viewed as a preparatory step for collectivization, a psychological preparation to acquaint the peasants with collective life through simple collective activities. Production is still individual in character. The solidarity-for-production team has only three main tasks: to exchange labour; to receive materials from the State for distribution to its members; and to mobilize the peasants to fulfil their obligations to the State. Hence the view held by some that the solidarity-for-production team "stands on the margin of socialism" — which explains why it is slighted and even ignored in some places.

In fact, in solidarity-for-production teams with a good record their activities go beyond mere "drilling" collective life and socialist elements begin to appear. Some instances: solidarity-for-production team No. 9 at Ke An — Ke Sach has accumulated enough fund to buy such means of production as tractors, insecticide sprayers, etc. The solidarity-for-production teams in Tien Giang have re-arranged their fields, done irrigation work, etc., showing that they are in a transitional stage to socialism.

"Transition" implies a stage in which new elements appear and old ones disappear. Transition does not mean only "drilling" in collective life but also comprises transformation and elevation to a higher level. In its evolution the solidarity-for-production team develops material factors, the embryos of collective production. These elements cause the peasants to get together, thus creating strength for the collective economy and premises for advancing toward a higher form: the production collective.

Here many old economic relations still remain: the means of production are still owned privately (implements) or used privately (land). Therefore distribution relations have

not yet changed. Most of the peasants' economic relations are still closely bound to the free market. Production is still scattered and unorganized.

However, if old economic relations unavoidably still remain, it is necessary to create new economic factors in an active way and cause them to prevail in production activities if one is to go ahead.

Depending on the characteristics of each locality the solidarity-for-production team may have its own orientation and form of development. But in order to progress to a higher form, the production collective, it must fulfil 4 conditions:

First, to build some initial common material and technical bases; create conditions for applying new scientific and technical achievements; take steps toward scientific and technological revolution;

Second, the poor peasants, the main force of future production collective, have accumulated enough capital and sufficient economic potential for effective investment in production;

Third, the managerial cadres can handle management of production; and

Fourth, the peasants have been sufficiently acquainted with collective production through experience of voluntary collective work.

Having undergone the test of practice, the solidarity-for-production team, a transitional form of agricultural cooperativization in the Mekong delta, is considered a universally valid and necessary³ step. This transitional form is being studied and applied by all localities in the South according to their concrete conditions. It will help the Southern countryside advance firmly on the path of socialist transformation.

PHAM BICH HANH

1. In many other instances the cause of the failure is that cooperativization was not preceded by readjustment of land holdings. This was treated in Vietnam Courier No. 1 — 1983.

2. Land is owned by the entire people but used by individuals or collectives.

3. We do not rule out the possibility of going direct from individual production to the organization of production collectives, bypassing the stage of the solidarity-for-production team, wherever favourable material, technical and social conditions exist or big investments are made by the State.

CSO: 4200/110

ON LAND READJUSTMENT IN LONG AN

Hanoi VIETNAM COURIER in English Aug 83 pp 20-21

[Text]

Long An (5,100 square kilometres; population 865,000) has set itself the central task of eradicating exploitation in the countryside and carrying out land-holding readjustment, land allotment to poor and landless peasants linked to manpower redeployment and building of production collectives. In 1976-1978 the province concentrated on liquidating the vestiges of feudal exploitation by landlords and rich peasants, putting an end to land tenancy and land rent collection while confiscating illegally appropriated land and doing away with land usurpation. More than 12,300 hectares of land were thus recovered and 3,200 hectares allotted to peasants, in the first place to families of revolutionary martyrs, disabled soldiers and those who had given support to the revolution, who had no or little land. From 1979 to 1982 the province urged rich peasants and rural bourgeois to cede land to the State. This land was allotted to individual peasant households and production collectives. In places where production collectives or solidarity-for-production teams had not yet been set up, the land was provisionally allotted to peasant groups who

would organize production collectives later on.

Land-holding readjustment was carried out in accordance with the actual conditions prevailing in each region of the province. In Dong Thap Muoi (Plain of Reeds) where most of the land had been reclaimed by peasants and put under extensive farming with extensive land appropriation, the province divided the land into three categories according to soil quality and entrusted to each family 0.3—0.4 hectare (not including house, garden, fish pond). In other regions where most of the land had long been in the hands of landlords and feudalists, the province, basing itself on State policy and taking into account the attitude of each exploiter, enforced such measures as confiscation, or forcible cession to poor and landless peasants. By the end of 1982, in implementation of those measures more than 2,500 families of upper-middle peasants had ceded 3,622 hectares, and 133 families of rural bourgeois 672 hectares. Moreover, the province had recovered 322 hectares and, in implementation of State policy on land allotment, distributed 1,085 hectares to 1,648 peasant families

and 2,439 hectares to production collectives.

Together with the readjustment of land holdings Long An successfully redeployed manpower and step by step organized the peasants for collective production. Between 1976 and 1979 2,600 solidarity-for-production teams had disbanded for lack of experience. But by the end of 1981 the province had consolidated and set up 430 teams. Since early 1982 Long An has resolutely linked land-holding readjustment to manpower redeployment and the building of production collectives, taking Tan Thanh district as a pilot scheme. Lying in Dong Thap Muoi this district has about 73,200 hectares of land with a population of 16,000 and fairly extensive land holdings (more than 4 hectares on an average), with scores of families occupying over 20 hectares). On the other hand, nearly 200 families had little or no land. The province classified the land into categories then set 0.4 hectare as the limit for land holdings; of the remaining 2,400 hectares it allotted 882 hectares to poor peasants and 1,247 hectares to 44 production collectives for them to build new economic zones. Within the first 3 months of 1982 all the landless peasants in 5 communes of Tan Thanh district received land.

Also since 1982, after a drive for land-holding readjustment, 1,135 peasants in Vam Co district and 292 others in Can Duoc and Can Giuoc districts volunteered to go and build new economic zones. On this basis the province set up 44 production collectives comprising 1,013 peasants right in Tan Thanh district. In other districts land-holding readjustment also went along with building production col-

lectives. In this way, by the beginning of 1983, 81 communes out of the 141 in Long An were engaged in organizing production collectives. Production collectives were set up in all the communes in Vinh Hung, Can Giuoc, Duc Hue districts and the rural suburbs of Tan An town. The southern districts (key rice-growing areas where population density is high) built production collectives tilling 40 — 50 hectares of land each while the northern districts (mainly in the Plain of Reeds) exploited 70 — 100 hectares each; many production collectives had 150 — 300 hectares each. Nearly all production collectives in the province drew up production plans for each crop and after one year of collective work their members already saw their income rise including those who were formerly middle peasants. By the end of 1982, 124 out of 446 production collectives were applying the contract system down to individual farmers. Thus the contract system is becoming a new booster for production collectives in Long An province. However, land-holding readjustment and the building of production collectives still proceed rather slowly and the Party and State line and policy are not yet correctly applied in some places. Nevertheless, Long An has acquired initial experience in land-holding readjustment, manpower redeployment and building of production collectives. On this basis, production collectives are to be set up in all remaining communes — a target set for the end of this year.

Since the beginning of this year Long An has mobilized its population to reclaim land in the Plain of Reeds and the northern part of

Ben Luc and Thu Thua districts, while continuing to encourage people to build new economic zones. The province has helped Tan Thanh district draw up a master plan and mobilize over ten thousand people to build an irrigation system, a communication network and a number of welfare projects... thus creating favourable conditions for people coming from other places in the province and from provinces in the North to build new economic zones. The province also has made investments in agriculture with a view to producing half a million tonnes of food grain this year. It is planning to train more than 20,000 cadres for management, veterinary service, animal husbandry, plant protection, etc. This personnel is to serve as a core for the consolidation and building of production collectives in all three regions — coastal, plain and mountain — of the province.

P. V.

CSO: 4200/110

AGRICULTURE

GOAL OF 19 MILLION TONS OF FOOD SET FOR 1985

Hanoi VIETNAM COURIER in English Aug 83 p 22

[Text]

Vietnam plans to produce 19 million tonnes of food, including subsidiary food crops equivalent to more than 3 million tonnes of paddy in 1985.

To reach this target the following measures are to be carried out:

— To reclaim virgin land and grow rice, obtaining an average rice yield of 2 tonnes per hectare on 80,000 hectares and 2.6 tonnes per hectare on 150,000 hectares.

— To multiply crops on 250,000 hectares planted with subsidiary food crops (2 tonnes/ha), 160,000 hectares planted with Winter-Spring rice (3.16 tonnes/ha), 102,000 hectares with Summer-Autumn rice (3 tonnes/ha) and 482,000 hectares with 10th-lunar-month rice (2.36 tonnes/ha).

— To supply enough good rice strains to the whole rice area, and increase input of fertilizers: 9 million more tonnes of manure and 300,000 more tonnes of nitrogenous fertilizer. To carry out strictly the transplanting of rice on schedule on 1.2 million hectares (the transplanting being done hitherto behind schedule), increase the density of rice seedlings on 3 million hectares and fulfil the task of pest control on the whole rice area.

These factors are all important and follow this order of priority: intensive cultivation; crop multiplication and reclamation of virgin land.

Special attention must be paid to intensive cultivation. A proper intensive cultivation will give us 3,870,000 more tonnes of food in 1985. If good rice strains are used in an organized way an increase of 10—15 per cent in rice yield can be obtained. A rational crop structure in each area can give an increase of 15—20 per cent and the use of selected strains will make it possible to have a 40—50 per cent increase in yield.

With regard to fertilizers, during the present five-year plan, if every hectare of rice is given one more tonne of stable manure, we may obtain an additional 270,000 tonnes of paddy (it is estimated here that every additional tonne of stable manure will give 30 more kg of paddy but in fact an increase of 200—300 kg of paddy has been obtained in many places). Besides, the State also plans to supply food crops with an additional 300,000 tonnes of nitrogenous fertilizer annually. If properly used, a tonne of chemical fertilizer can increase rice yields by 2—3 tonnes per hectare.

With regard to planting technique, at present, too early or too late rice transplanting still affects nearly 30 per cent of the whole rice area (about 1.2 million hectares). If the transplanting is done strictly on schedule, rice yield may

increase by 0.3 tonnes per hectare. If the proper density of rice seedlings is planted on over 3 million hectares, which until now are too thinly planted (in some places, only 25—30 tufts of seedlings per square metre), an increase of 0.6 million tonnes of paddy can be obtained annually.

Every year, pests and diseases cause considerable loss to food crops, reducing output by over 20 per cent. Efforts should be made in plant protection to reduce losses. If we can retrieve only 7 per cent of the loss, 0.812 million more tonnes of paddy will be added to total output annually.

Crop multiplication and land reclamation are two important measures to expand food crop area. However, more attention should be given to crop multiplication because whereas the reclamation of 230,000 hectares of virgin land will give 0.472 million more tonnes of food, crop multiplication on the same area will give 2.708 million tonnes. In our country, it is not too difficult to raise the rate of land utilization from 1.3 to 1.5.

To facilitate intensive cultivation, crop multiplication and reclamation of virgin land, the agricultural branch must carry out the four following tasks:

1. To speed up the building of the material and technical bases for agriculture which include water conservancy works to irrigate 3.6 million hectares of paddy fields (0.96 million hectares more than in 1980); the drainage of 0.2 million hectares, and the prevention of invasion by sea water for 0.25—0.30 million hectares; the production of more organic fertilizer including 400,000 hectares of azolla pinnata, and 10,000 hectares of sesbania; the rational utilization of chemical fertilizers; the perfection of the system of production; the supply of seeds and the prevention of pests and diseases; and the supply of adequate farming tools; to try to raise the proportion of mechanized tillage to 45 per cent by 1985.

2. To define the system of crop cultivation for each area.

3. To consolidate and expand the socialist relations of production, and strengthen managerial work.

4. To build high-yield rice areas and high-yield subsidiary food crop areas: 2.4 million hectares of rice in the Red River and the Mekong river deltas producing 9.7 million tonnes of paddy and 420,000 hectares of subsidiary food crops yielding the equivalent of 1.7 million tonnes of paddy.

DUONG HONG DAT

CSO: 4200/110

HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE

ACHIEVEMENTS, INTENSIFICATION OF TRIBAL EDUCATION DISCUSSED

Hanoi NGHIEN CUU GIAO DUC in Vietnamese Jul 83 pp 5-8, 16

[Article by Luong Ngoc Toan: "Education in the Ethnic Minority Region"]

[Text] Ten years have elapsed since the Fourth Conference on Education in the Mountainous Region was held in December 1973. Since then, the educational task in the ethnic minority areas in North Vietnam's provinces has registered noteworthy achievements from many points of view.

1. General education has developed rapidly and the number of tribal students has increased markedly; compared with the total number of students at all levels, the number of tribal ones represents the following percentage:

<u>Academic Year</u>	<u>Level 1</u>	<u>Level 2</u>	<u>Level 3</u>
1973-74	11.1%	5.7%	3.6%
1981-82	19 %	15.8%	10.7%

The number of tribal students has thus increased vigorously especially at levels 2 and 3. Compared with the population of each tribe, the number of general school students coming from that tribe represents the following percentage:

<u>Academic Year</u>	<u>Tay</u>	<u>Nung</u>	<u>H'mong</u>	<u>Muong</u>	<u>Thai</u>
1972-73	21 %	12 %	1.4%	13 %	8.9%
1978-79	21.1%	18.5%	5.7%	26.2%	19.6%

General education in the Tay, Muong, Nung and Thai tribal areas and in the lowlands of the mountainous provinces has thus developed at nearly the same rate as in the delta (25 percent). In the 1978-69 academic year, the lowland districts of Binh Gia, Van Lang, Trung Khanh and Tan Lac achieved [a number of general school students equal to] 24 percent, 26 percent, 27 percent, and 24 percent of their respective populations.

Owing to such achievements, the number of tribal students in colleges and vocational middle schools has become fairly large. In the 1980-81 academic year, out of 267,700 college and advanced school students, 17,800 came from the ethnic

minorities; out of 4,276 postgraduates, 42 came from the ethnic minorities and were awarded scientific academic degrees and entrusted with important functions in the research and teaching organs in colleges.

2. A sufficient number of study branches and levels has been formed. The pedagogic branch possesses schools reserved for individual regions such as the Viet Bac Teachers College, the Viet Bac and Tay Bac Higher Normal Schools and a middle and a level-2 normal school in each province. Therefore, many provinces have become self-sufficient in training teachers for the primary general education level; they are Cao Bang, Ha Tuyen, Lang Son, Bac Thai and Quang Ninh. The provinces of Son La, Lai Chau and Hoang Lien Son have been able to train themselves teachers for level-1 schools. Many provinces have schools designed to provide advanced training for managerial cadres and teachers. The highland children schools and tribal youth schools are those which have provided a source of formation for the next categories of cadres with the level-2 or -3 cultural level and which have exerted a positive effect on the development of education in the mountainous region and the highlands. Many districts have already had general middle schools in districts and primary general schools in villages; in particular, level-1 schools exist in all villages. The network of labor general schools has had many good effects on the task of raising the standard of knowledge of on-the-job cadres in villages, districts and provinces. Along with concentrated supplementary education schools, the task of abolishing illiteracy and providing supplementary education has obtained the following result: 20 districts and cities (including 4 highland districts) and more than 100 mountainous villages have completely wiped out illiteracy. The kindergarten sector has attracted a noticeable number of children of the kindergarten age in various organs, enterprises and so forth.

Many front-rank units such as Ngo Luong (Ha Son Binh), Pu Nhi (Thanh Hoa), the normal middle school of Nghia Lo (Hoang Lien Son) and others have overcome numerous difficulties and hardships in order to keep up and develop their positive effect. A great many male and female cadres and teachers on mission in the mountainous region--especially the contingent of teachers working in the highlands and border areas--have sacrificed part of their youth and are doing their best to contribute more and more to the development of education in these areas where tribesmen are living.

Generally speaking, the education carried out in the ethnic minority areas in North Vietnam's provinces has made an important contribution to the task of training and improving the contingent of leading and managerial cadres and to the formation of an intelligentsia and a body of political, scientific, technical and other cadres for the benefit of many ethnic minorities. Though not yet large, the number of these cadres has demonstrated the ability of all fraternal ethnic minorities under the socialist regime to move forward and reach a high standard of scientific, technical and managerial knowledge. By developing education, we have been able to form a large contingent of tribal youths with a sufficient cultural knowledge and political consciousness who are participating in productive labor and combat activities and in consolidating national defense and maintaining security and other tasks and are thus contributing to the conduct of three revolutions in the northern mountainous region of our country.

Apart from the above-mentioned great achievements, education in the ethnic minority region is still replete with weaknesses which require solution: There still exists a noteworthy discrepancy between the lowlands, the highlands and the remote and isolated areas; illiteracy is still a very serious problem; and the quality and effectiveness of training are still low. This situation has many causes but, for our [education] sector in particular, the following problems deserve attention: The network of schools and classrooms is not yet compatible with the population distribution, the organization of teaching and learning does not yet correspond to the characteristics of each region; the substance of curricula is not yet linked to realities in the mountainous region; the organization and arrangement of academic years are still patterned after those in the delta; the method of teaching the popular [Vietnamese] language has not yet been investigated sufficiently and applied properly; there has been a failure to provide enough material facilities, to actively train, improve and employ tribal and local teachers; the policy toward teachers and students has not been supplemented and implemented satisfactorily; the task of doing research and guiding education in this region is still being carried out belatedly and inopportunately.

In short, the mountainous region--especially the highlands and the border, remote and isolated areas--has different characteristics from the delta. For this reason, it is necessary to overcome the above-mentioned shortcomings energetically if the educational task in the ethnic minority region--especially the highlands and the border, remote and isolated areas--is to advance gradually to catch up with the delta in strict accordance with the party policy on equality among all nationalities.

The guideline to be followed to develop education in the mountainous region, in general, and in the highlands and northern montagnard areas, in particular, is to intensify general education from both the quantitative and qualitative points of view according to the educational reform pattern; to attach importance to the political, ethical, labor performance and vocational aspects of education and consider them to be on a par with cultural teaching; to link teaching subject matters to social realities; to orientate and link schools to life; and along with stepping up the development of education in all regions, to consider education in the highlands and border areas important, to make priority investments in concentrated schools and to strive to wipe out illiteracy--first among cadres, party and [youth] union members and active youths--with the objective of meeting the urgent requirements of socialist construction and socialist fatherland's defense and effectively promoting the revolutionary mission in the present stage.

To carry out the above-mentioned guideline, the basic tasks of the education sector in the ethnic minority region are:

1. To develop strongly from the quantitative point of view while positively raising quality along the lines of educational reform in order to meet exactly the necessity of training cadres and of improving leading, managerial, scientific and technical cadres for the mountainous region during the new stage.

2. Gradually to raise the standard of cultural and scientific knowledge of the laboring people and children of ethnic minorities.

3. To develop the effect of education and schools on the three revolutions and on the ethnic minorities' life and to contribute actively to checking, repelling and defeating the manifold psychological and destructive war of the Beijing expansionists and hegemonists.

Though closely interrelated, the above-mentioned three tasks have different positions according to the actual and socioeconomic circumstances in each area and at each moment. In the highlands, in the remote, isolated and border areas and wherever tribesmen have too low a standard of knowledge, efforts must be concentrated on carrying out the first task. In whatever area, only by satisfactorily carrying out the first task can we create conditions to do the second. Each school of any kind whatever must develop its role as "cultural prop" for the three revolutions in its respective locality and must become a stable battlefield for socialism.

From now to the end of the 1980's, efforts must be exerted in the lowlands to attain education development norms nearly equal to those in the delta but care must be taken to associate these norms with the socioeconomic targets of this region; as for the highlands and the remote and isolated areas, efforts must be made to steadily spread level-1 general education among students aged between 6 and 15 with two degrees--level-1 elementary education and improved level-1 education--and to create conditions to develop level-2 and general middle education; to abolish illiteracy and to consistently improve the level-1 elementary education standard first of these principal recipients: cadres, party and [youth] union members and active youths; gradually and firmly to eliminate illiteracy among people under 40 and to meet the need to train and improve managerial, scientific and technical cadres as well as the technical labor force for the mountainous region.

To accomplish the above-mentioned tasks and goals in the present situation is an extremely difficult but very urgent work which has a strategic significance to the struggle to build socialism and defend the fatherland. Without developing general education urgently and vigorously, it will be impossible to meet the need to train tribal leading, managerial, scientific and technical cadres for the mountainous region. Failure rapidly to wipe out illiteracy and provide supplementary education for cadres so as to eliminate the present low standard of knowledge will hamper the acceptance and materialization of the party policy and cause damage to the revolutionary cause. It follows that, along with the intensive development of general education, it is necessary to consider the elimination of illiteracy and the supplementary education of cadres and youths to be a central task because they are carrying out two strategic missions of the revolution in a situation where the enemy is standing close to us and where we have to cope constantly with warmongering and overall-sabotage plots.

To develop education in the mountainous region in a positive and stable manner, it is necessary to solve satisfactorily the relationships between the general education of children and that of adults, between the attention paid

to the overall project and the concentration of efforts on priority works and between the need to guide the popularization of the level-1 general education of children and adults and the simultaneous need to guide the elimination of illiteracy. In view of the population distribution and topographic characteristics, the educational task in montagnard villages requires that the various educational branches closely coordinate their joint activities. There must be a close association and mutual support between the branch responsible for the general education of children and that which provides general education for adults. Only by eliminating instances of children dropping out of schools or attending classes inappropriate to their particular ages can we effectively check the protracted state of illiteracy. Only by wiping out illiteracy and popularizing the level-1 education of adults can we create favorable conditions to educate ethnic minority children. Such a coordination must be considered to be a principle to be followed in shaping up an organizational model for the education, training and improvement of teachers and in indicating the way in which the various educational branches are to carry out their activities at educational installations, especially in the highlands and border areas. It is necessary to consider it important to guide education development in the highlands and border areas while giving priority to areas where education development is still slow; to concentrate investments on normal schools, labor general schools, workers-peasants' supplementary education schools and concentrated highland general schools; and to concentrate priority efforts on eliminating illiteracy and providing supplementary education for cadres and outstanding youths. Only by concentrating efforts to bring about a change in these priority areas can we effect a real and stable change in the educational task in the ethnic minority region.

The following principal measures may be set forth to ensure the development of education in the ethnic minority region:

1. The combined strength of the entire country must be brought into play through the joint action of the central and local levels, and of the state (at the provincial, district and village echelons) and the people in both the delta and mountainous region. To ensure the development of this combined strength, the units acting as nuclei to muster all forces must be the mountainous provincial and district people's committees assisted by the local education sector which will play the role of headquarters and will take the initiative. Only whenever party committees at various echelons and the local administration really pay attention to leading and directing this task will a basic change take place for the benefit of education development among the ethnic minority people.
2. The network of schools and classes must be strengthened and a curriculum suitable for each area and type of students must be formulated. In the lowlands, the curriculum must be improved in accordance with the socioeconomic characteristics of each locality. In the highlands, it is necessary to develop these three types of schools on a priority basis: Primary general schools and concentrated general middle schools in the highlands with boarding facilities; workers-peasants' supplementary education schools in the highland districts to create conditions to train grassroots cadres; and labor general schools in districts to improve the standard of knowledge of various types of

cadres currently holding jobs at district and village installations. In the principal areas of the highlands, it is necessary to open level-1 mixed courses in scattered montagnard villages where arrangements must be made for teachers concurrently to teach children, eliminate illiteracy and give supplementary education to cadres and people; it is necessary to open principal schools in central villages and, if circumstances permit, to organize full or semiboarding facilities to enable students to study without interruption and it is also possible to open school sections in clusters of montagnard villages far from these centers to make it convenient for children to go to school. At these schools, it is possible to teach children in daytime and adults at night.

3. Research must be done to change the curriculum and the teaching and educational method according to the actual situation in the mountainous region and among the ethnic minorities. The gist of the curriculum must aim at promoting socioeconomic goals. The teaching method must be compatible with students coming from among the ethnic minorities. The organization of teaching and learning must correspond to the natural, production and social conditions in the region. The curriculum must realistically help to transform the living environment, to build a civilized life, to heighten labor productivity, to apply science and technology in the realities of life, to develop the good cultural assets of the ethnic minorities, to overcome backward and superstitious customs and habits, to struggle against the psywar allegations of the enemy, to build solidarity among all fraternal nationalities and to achieve a clear understanding of the party policy toward various nationalities.

4. The teaching of the popular language must be properly guided. One of the fundamental reasons for the low quality of teaching and learning in the ethnic minority region is the tribal students' failure to use the popular language well. In this region, the popular language teaching theme and method must be improved in such a way as to conform to the law on second-language study and to enable children to learn the popular language with success in order to assimilate study subjects effectively. It is simultaneously important to train and improve level-1 teachers on ways to teach the popular language to tribal students. Conditions must be created for male and female teachers coming from a different ethnic minority to master their students' dialect. Only if these things are done can teaching and learning achieve a realistic effect.

5. Resolute efforts must be exerted to train tribal and local teachers in conjunction with mobilizing the necessary contingent of teachers from the lowlands and delta to the highlands and border areas. Forming and stabilizing the contingent of tribal and local teachers is a key condition to ensure a steady development of education in this region. There must be a long-term project to advance toward the self-supply of teachers; the various provinces must strenuously ensure that each district has its own teachers and must reach a point where each village and each ethnic minority have their own teachers; it is especially necessary to take energetic measures to provide professional orientation for good tribal students to prepare them for the pedagogic sector as in Lang Son where special literature and mathematics classes have been opened to prepare for the enrollment of students in the Teachers College. It is necessary to consolidate normal schools into a network stretching from the

central to local level and to assign them the task of providing advanced training for the indicated recipients including students preparing for the pedagogic career. The various provinces must concentrate investments on the overall development of normal schools. For the present, a fixed number of teachers in the delta must be mobilized to meet the pressing demands of the educational task in the mountainous region, highlands and border areas. Provinces in the mountainous region and the delta must coordinate closely to select capable and experienced cadres and teachers to reinforce the mountainous region and, at the same time, must correctly and fully apply and implement all the current policies including the signing of contracts with male and female cadres and teachers to make their transfer to another region convenient.

6. The promulgated policies must be carried out satisfactorily and a study must be conducted to enact new ones. Right now, it is necessary to strictly carry out the promulgated policies and especially to see that they conform to the current prices. Adequate boarding, lodging, clothing, studying and traveling conditions must be provided for students of boarding schools and the minimum essential conditions created for the subsistence and task performance of teachers of their families. In particular, the local administration (in provinces, districts and villages) must actively motivate the local people to take sufficient care of the material and moral life of educational cadres and teachers. Meanwhile, research must be done prior to petitioning the Council of Ministers to promulgate new policies to create conditions for the implementation of the 5-year and 1980's plans on education development in the mountainous region.

7. Investments in the building of material bases and teaching and learning equipment must be intensified. Both the state (at the central, provincial, district and village levels) and the people must work together to provide schools, boarding and lodging facilities and teaching and learning equipment, etc for teachers and students. In particular, villages in the border areas must coordinate with the army to build these facilities. Investments in the pedagogic system must be given special priority. Efforts must be exerted to ensure that by 1985 each province will have built a highland normal middle school and a highland general middle school and that each district will have built a concentrated highland primary general school with boarding facilities and a labor general school in strict accordance with the requirements. The School Equipment Corporation must carry out research and produce--or direct schools to produce--teaching and learning equipment in conformity with the substance of education in the ethnic minority region, etc.

8. The organizational and managerial aspects of the ethnic minorities' education as well as the guidance exercised and research done on it must all be revamped. In the field of management and guidance, the organization from the ministry of schools must be resolutely strengthened and improved. A cadre force must be made ready to serve organizations responsible for management and guidance. In each mountainous province, the education service director must personally guide the education development (even from the qualitative point of view) in the ethnic minority region, highlands and border areas. At the same time, a deputy director must be assigned to directly keep track of

affairs and to urge them on. Provinces with many highland districts may set up highland education bureaus to exercise close guidance on education in the highlands. At the ministry itself, the Primary Education, General Middle Education, Supplementary Education, and Training and Improvement Departments must set up organs with the special mission of guiding education in the mountainous region while the Cadre Organization and Financial Planning Departments, the School Equipment Corporation, the Educational Textbook Publishing House and the Publication Department must appoint a personnel in charge of education in the ethnic minority region. An ethnic minority education research organ must be built strongly enough to study and bring out the peculiarities of ethnic minority education so that they may serve as a basis for setting forth policies and operational measures.

9. It is necessary to strengthen the leadership exercised over education by party cadres and the local administration. The present stage requires that party organizations and the local administration take greater care of the task of educating the ethnic minorities. First and foremost, education development must become a subject of local planning and receive a guidance effort proportional to and homogeneous with that given to other socioeconomic plans. To implement such a plan, party organizations are various levels and the administration must create conditions for educational cadres and the teachers' contingent to fulfill satisfactorily the mission assigned to them according to their respective functions. In particular, the party organizations and the administration at the district level must give material and moral motivation and encouragement to district cadres and teachers in order to set their minds at ease so that they may enthusiastically and satisfactorily fulfill the mission entrusted at their respective installations. At the same time, it is necessary to consider it important to diligently build the party in schools and at various educational management levels to make party organizations in these places strong enough to lead schools and transform them into solid "strongholds" of socialism. Party organizations and the administration must consider schools to be places to carry out the strategic formation of a new type of laborers among the ethnic minorities.

10. Support must be obtained from various sectors and mass organizations. Education in the ethnic minority region is a revolutionary undertaking of our entire people, party, army and people. Therefore, all sectors and strata have, each according to its respective function, the duty to join our [education] sector and contribute to this important undertaking. In this spirit, all echelons from the ministry of schools--especially the local education management echelons (in provinces, districts and villages)--must actively seek overall help and support from all functional organs such as the State Organization Commission, the State Planning Commission, the Ministry of Food, the Ministry of Home Trade, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Labor, the Ministry of Higher and Vocational Education, the Vocational Training General Department, the Ministry of Communications and Transportation, the Ministry of National Defense, the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Public Health, the Ministry of Culture and Information, the Nomad Settlement Commission, the Ministry of Forestry, the State Nationalities Commission, the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union, the Women's Union, the Confederation of Trade Unions and so on. Only by winning a uniform solicitude with a full sense of

responsibility on the part of various sectors and mass organizations and together with a great determination to be displayed by cadres and teachers of the education sector--especially by those in all localities (provinces, districts and ordinary and montagnard villages)--can the educational undertaking in the ethnic minority region, especially in the highlands, the border areas and the remote and isolated ones, effect a rapid change with a realistic effect and can it satisfactorily meet the requirements of the three revolutions and of the task of defending the fatherland in these localities.

To carry out the above-mentioned tasks to set up the educational undertaking in the mountainous region in this new stage is precisely to proceed to implement the educational reform gradually and steadily. With a high sense of responsibility, it is necessary to take care of the educational undertaking in the mountainous region, to diligently raise the tribesmen's standard of knowledge, to create conditions for the transformation of their presently poor and backward life and to develop the quintessence of each tribe's culture. To do so is precisely to create conditions to implement the party policy on various nationalities in order to assist the mountainous region in moving forward step by step and catching up with the delta, to make our entire country advance toward socialism at the same time and also to turn the northern mountainous region of our country into a really stable frontier to defend our socialist fatherland.

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CSO: 4209/12

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CHRONOLOGY

HANOI'S CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS FROM 16 JUN-15 JUL 1983

Hanoi VIETNAM COURIER in English Aug 83 p 32

[Text]

JUNE

(June 16 — July 15)

16. Chairman of the Council of Ministers Pham Van Dong sent a message to UN Secretary-General Javier Perez De Cuellar and Alhaji Yusuff Maintama Sulle, Chairman of the Special Anti-Apartheid Commission, on the occasion of the International Day for Solidarity with the South African People, reiterating the Vietnamese people's firm stance of support to the just and legitimate struggle by every means of the South African people.

— A Vietnamese delegation, headed by lawyer Phan Anh, Vice-Chairman of the SRV National Assembly and of the World Peace Council, and Chairman of the Vietnam Peace Committee, attends the World Assembly for Peace and Life, against Nuclear War, held in Prague.

22. Rafeeudin Ahmed, Deputy Secretary-General and special envoy of the UN Secretary-General ends his visit to Vietnam, begun on June 18.

23. Founding of the Vietnam — Sweden Friendship Association.

24. Closing in Hanoi of the Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam, begun on June 18, which decides on urgent ideological and organizational problems for ensuring the implementation of the immediate socio-economic tasks.

-- A delegation of Hanoi, capital city of the SRV, ends its friendship visit to Nicaragua, begun on June 19.

23. Holding in Hanoi of the fifth session of the Seventh National Assembly (from June 23 to 30) which adopts the law on the organisation of the People's Councils and People's Committees and approves the general part of criminal law.

-- An ESCAP delegation ends its visit to Vietnam, begun on June 22.

28. A delegation of the Lebanese Communist Party, led by General Secretary Georges Haoui, ends its visit to Vietnam, begun on June 23. A joint communiqué is published.

-- Signing in Bucharest of a protocol on goods exchange and payments for 1983 between Vietnam and Romania.

-- Vietnam attends the 106th session of the Executive Committee of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, held in Moscow.

29. Australian Foreign Minister Bill Hayden pays an official visit to Vietnam.

30. Signing in Ulan Bator of a protocol on goods exchange and payments between Vietnam and Mongolia.

JULY

2. The Vietnamese Foreign Ministry returns to China 14 Chinese nationals captured while illegally intruding into Vietnamese territory.

-- Holding in Phnom Penh of the first session of the Conference of chairmen of the economic and cultural cooperation commissions of Kampuchea, Laos and Vietnam.

3. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam, the Council of State and the Council of Ministers of the SRV issue a statement totally supporting the Joint Statement of the Summit Meeting of the Warsaw Treaty member States on 29 June 1983.

5. The Vietnamese Council of State confers the Gold-star Order on Wojciech Jaruzelski, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party, Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of National Defence of the Polish People's Republic.

7. Vietnam attends the Thirteenth International Film Festival held in Moscow.

-- All six Vietnamese participants in the 24th Mathematics Olympiad held in Paris have won prizes (three second prizes and three third prizes).

8. Signing in Berlin of an agreement on the GDR's solidarity aid to Vietnam in 1983.

9. Promulgation of the law on the organisation of People's Councils and People's Committees adopted by the SRV National Assembly on 30 June 1983.

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